IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE No. 82075 COMPANY, A TEXAS CORPORATION; AND 'UNITED SERVICES AUTOM013H,E ASSOCIATION, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION, Petitioners, vs. THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT FILED COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, NOV 1 8 2021 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELIZABETH A. BROWN WASHOE; AND THE .HONORABIX CLERK QF SUPREME COURT DAVID A. HARDY, DISTRICT JUDGE, BY DEPUTY CLE Respondents, and RYAN E. UHLMEYER, Real Party in interest. ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court's denial of summary judgment in a breach of contract action. Real party in interest .Ryan Uhhneyer was seriously injured in a car accident while driving in Washoe County. Ryan filed an underinsured motorist (UCIVI) claim for $50,000 with his automobile insurer, petitioner . USAA Casualty Insurance Co. (USAA—CIC), because his accident-related expenses exceeded the tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage limits. Ryan also claimed $11.00,000 in U.EM coverage as an insured under his brother D21-333 0\ A i••• 7•T • ' r Kevin Uhlmeyer's USAA—CIC policy. Both policies included an "other insurance" provision, also known as an "anti-stackine provision, that purported to limit the insured's available UIM coverage "to the highest applicable limit for any one vehicle under any insurance providing coverage on either a primary or excess basis." Based on this provision, 'USAA—GIC denied Ryan's request to "stacle coverage under his and :Kevin's policies, totaling $1.50,000 in available coverage, and paid Ryan $100,000—the highest applicable policy lirnit as between the two policies---apportioning payment between those policies. Ryan sued .LISAA—CIC for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of Nevada's Unfair Trade Practices. The district court later granted USAA— CIC summary judgment as to Ryan's statutory bad faith claim and denied summary judgment otherwise, concluding that the other-insurance provision "may not meet the clarity requirement of NRS 687B.145(1)." USAA—CIC petitioned for a writ of mandamus asking this court to compel the district court to grant summary judgment in its favor, arguing that its other-insurance provision is valid as a matter of law. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is within this court's sole discretion to consider. State ex rel. Dep'í of Transp. v. Thompson, 99 Nev. 358, 360, 662 P.2d 1.338, 1339 (1983). Writ relief is available to compel performance of a clear legal duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. NRS 34-.160; Ina Game Thch., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 1.24. Nev. 1.93, 1.97, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). But writ relief is not available when an adequate and speedy legal remedy exists, including an SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 10) 1947A .1141510. KEW appeal from a later final judgment. id.; Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 1.20 Nev. 222, 224., 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004). This court therefore will not grant writ relief from a district court's interlocutory denial of summary judgment "unless summary jud.gment is clearly required by a statute or rule, or an important issue of law requires clarification." D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth judicial Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 449, 453, 215 P.3d 697, 700 (2009) (quoting Anse, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 862, 867, 192 P.3d 738, 74:2 (2008)). USAA—C1.0 has a speedy and adequate remedy at law in the form of an appeal of the final judgment in this case, including the district court's decision as to the other-insurance provision's clarity under NRS 687B.145(1) (permitting an insurer to limit inter-policy stacki.ng of Ul.M. benefits with an anti-stacking provision subject to several prerequisites); Pan, 1.20 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 841. Even crediting USAA-GIC's clarity argument—a matter we do not decide—it does not appear that writ relief would resolve the case because the district court did not reach NRS 687B.1.45(1)s other requirernents—i.e., that the other-insura nee provision must be prominently displayed i.n the policy and the named insureds must not have purchased separate premiums calculated for full reimbursement on the same risk, Neumann v. Standard Kre Ins. Co., 101. Nev. 206, 209, 699 P.2d 101., 103 (1985)—the latter of which poses undeveloped issues of fact. Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 476 P.3d 1.1.94, 1.1.98 (2020) (holding that writ relief is improper when issues of fact remain); see also Serrett v. Kimber, 110 Nev. 486, 4.88-89, 874 P.2d 74.7, 74.9 (1994) (holding that an insurer must produce actual evidence to satisfy NRS 3 687B.145(1)s separate-premiums requirement). Accordingly, extraordinary writ relief is not warranted, and we ORDER the petition DENIED. , C.J. Hardesty „1. Parraguirre Stiglich Silver Pickering Herndon cc: Hon. David A. Hardy, District Judge Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas Leverty & Associates Law, Chtd. Washoe District Court Clerk SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (Oi 1947A 411041.