Tait v. Buffalo Railway Co.
Opinion of the Court
. Between the hours of seven and eight o’clock in the morning of the 16th day of May, 1899, plaintiff’s intestate, while riding'in a vehicle on Exchange street in the city of Buffalo, was thrown therefrom by a collision with one of defendant’s cars, thereby sustaining-injuries from which it is claimed he died on the sixteenth day of the following October. The action is brought to' recover the damages sustained by the widow and children. Decedent was familiar with the locality, and had taken his horse into a blacksmith shop to be shod and left his wagon under a viaduct which is constructed in the middle' of said street, leaving a passage for vehicles and a street car track upon either side. The street was practically level and paved from curb to curb, including the open space under the viaduct. After having the horse shod, decedent hitched up, took his place on the seat of the vehicle-and looked toward the east, that being the direction the wagon was facing, and started to turn to the north and west across the northerly street car track, evidently intending to drive westerly along the space between the street Car tracks and northerly curb of the street. The car that collided with the wagon came from the east upon this track. When decedent looked he could have seen the car if it had then been within one hundred and eighty feet, but the' car was not at that time in sight, on account of the fact that from the easterly end of the viaduct, which was more than two hundred feet distant, the street car track ran along the middle of the street. As decedent’s horse reached the track the car was from two hundred to two hundred and fifty feet to the east, and decedent had, as described by an eye-witness,' pretty well turned around toward the west before the car came in sight. Apparently, he did not discover its approach until it was' very near and he was upon the track. He then whipped up his horse, passing diagonally across the track toward-the northwest, and the motorman shouted “ Go ahead; go ahead.” The car struck the hind wheel, throwing-the wagon against one of the posts of the viaduct to the south. An eye-witness says that the car hit decedent twice or-three times, “bumped against him’’ and j’umped the track, throwing decedent off the seat and upon the pavement twenty or twenty-five feet over under the viaduct. The speed of the car was from fifteen to twenty miles an hour. At this
Upon these facts plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence and defendant’s negligence were questions for the jury. (Lawson v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 40 App. Div. 307 ; Meyer v. Brooklyn, Q. C. c& S. R. R. Co., 47 id. 286; Kennedy v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 31 id. 30; Schron v. Staten Island Elec. R. R. Co., 16 id. 111; Smith v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 7 id. 253 ; Blate v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 44 id. 163.)
The serious question in the case is as to whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict that the injuries received by this collision were the proximate cause of decedent’s death. The evidence bearing upon this point is too voluminous to be fully stated in an opinion. Suffice it to say that there was evidence, which, if believed by the jury, would have justified them in finding as follows: That decedent, who was thirty-two years of age, strong and well, and had previously always enjoyed good health, was by this accident thrown from the seat of his wagon a distance of twenty or twenty-five feet, landing on the pavement; that he lay there unconscious for a few minutes, then sat up with assistance, and within about ten minutes “ hopped ” unaided into the blacksmith shop, where he sat in a chair with his hands on his side until a buggy came in which he was taken home; that within an hour he complained to the attending physician of severe pain in the left side, and of pain in the left ankle, foot and toe, which were bruised and swollen; that he had a bruise on the left shoulder and in the region of the left temple, and a fracture
A medical expert of ability and standing, who performed the autopsy and was called as a witness in behalf of plaintiff, gave it as his opinion, in clear and positive language, that decedent’s death Avas caused by pericarditis^ that being the medical name of the inflammation of the pericardium, and that. such inflammation was caused by the injury to the ribs sustained at the time of the accident ; that the softening of the heart was caused by this inflammation, which extended into-the heart; that there was no valvular lesion of the heart and no heart disease, and, in his opinion, no other Avay to account for the condition of the heart and the pericardium; that the blue lips were symptoms of heart failure and not.of acute pneumonia in the first stages; that pneumonia is not congestion, but an inflammation of the lungs,.and that if this had been pneumonia, the parts of the lungs inserted in AVater Avould have sunk instead of floated, and that the existence of pneumonia was also disproved by the fact that- it does not affect the entire lungs, whereas, excepting as the blood had settled in the posterior part of the.lungs, the conditions found were the same all over, and that the dropsical condition and contents of the lungs were incident to and resulted from the injury to and inflammation in the péricardium and heart* which showed that toward the end of life the heart was too weak to pump the blood through the lungs and around the body. He further testified that, inasmuch as the inflammation to the pericardium might
Three eminent experts were called by defendant, and in answer to hypothetical questions, and of course basing their opinions solely upon the facts recited in such questions, they stated that, in their opinion, double pneumonia, with acute pericarditis or pericardial complication, was the cause of death. They -also gave it as their opinion that the pneumonia was caused by a germ, and that the same germ or the pneumonia poison caused the pericarditis. They conceded that the injury might have caused the pericarditis, but were of opinion that, while chronic pericarditis would hasten death, it would not cause the acute congestion of-' the lungs, and they disagreed with the opinions advanced by the expert called by the plaintiff in other respects. The value of the expert testimony depended entirely upon whether the hypothetical questions embodied all the material facts relating to the history of the case and revealed by the autopsy, which the jury would have been warranted in finding. (Brehm, v. Great Western R. Co., 34 Barb. 256; Feeney v. L. I. R. R. Co., 116 N. Y. 375 ; Klein v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 164; Gay v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 Blatchf. 142, 154; Cornish v. Farm Buildings Fire Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 295; Getchell v. Hill, 21 Minn. 464, 471; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483; Watson v. Anderson, 13 Ala. 202.) It is contended with much force and reason that the hypothetical questions upon which the experts called by defendant gave their opinion as to the cause of death, did not contain a fair presentation of the case, and conveyed the impression that decedent recovered from the injury, and omitted to recite that he constantly complained of pain in his side, in the vicinity of his heart, and that he coughed and spit blood daily from the time of the accident until his death, and they erroneously recite that he complained to his physician in August of having a cold, and omit the fainting spell which he had a few days prior to his death, and the weak and dizzy condition he was in on occasions when coughing and spitting blood as described by the lay witnesses, and also some of the evidence of the old internal injury and of the effect thereof as shown by the autopsy. ■
The nature and character of the evidence relating to the history of the case and the autopsy was such that when supplemented and supported by the unequivocal opinion of a qualified, reputable medi,ca! expert, to the effect that decedent’s death resulted from pericarditis, which was caused by the injuries sustained in consequence of the accident, and that what is designated as acute pneumonia by defendant’s experts was merely congestion incident to the pericarditis, it became a question of fact for the jury to decide whether the injuries received were the proximate cause of decedent’s death (Turner v. Nassau Elec. R. R. Co., 41 App. Div. 213; Hurley v. New York & Brooklyn Brewing Co., 13 id. 167, 171; Purcell v. Lauer, 14 id. 33; Lyons v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 89 Hun, 374; affd., 152 N. Y. 654; Weber v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 12 App. Div. 512; Beauchamp v. Saginaw Mining Co., 50 Mich. 163, 172-174.)
In the Hurley Casé (supra) the rule as to the proximate cause of death is well stated by Justice Bradley as follows: “ It is not sufficient that the plaintiff’s intestate may not have died when she did die if the injury had not been received by her. Bor is it necessary to the proximate cause of the act which produced the injury that different physical conditions followed, resulting in death, if there was-an unbroken connection between it and them-. In other words,
If the jury had rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff, we are of opinion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain it, and it was, therefore, error for the court to direct a verdict in favor of defendant.
It follows that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
All concurred.
Judgment and order reversed and-new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide event.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.