In re Account of Grant
Opinion of the Court
Kate Grant, the general guardian of Harry C. Yan Zandt, an infant, died on the 13th of April, 1897, and Donald Grant, her husband, having been appointed her administrator, was cited to render an account of the moneys received and paid- out by her as the guardian of Harry O. Yan Zandt, and this appeal is from the decree of the surrogate settling the account.
There can be no doubt upon the authorities that this portion of the decree of the surrogate was correct. In the case of Clowes v. Van Antwerp (4 Barb. 416) it was held that upon the settlement of the accounts of a general guardian the surrogate is not authorized to make any allowance to such guardian for services rendered or ■expenses incurred by him previous to his appointment as guardian. That case was affirmed by the Court of Appeals upon the opinion •of the General Term as reported above. (Clowes v. Van Antwerp, 6 N. Y. 466.) It is a controlling authority upon this appeal. In Ex parte Dawson (3 Bradf. 130) the infant, a citizen of this State, had been clandestinely taken to England, and it was held that the guardian was justified in attempting to recover the custody of his ward by invoking the aid of the English courts, and that the expenses of. such a proceeding were a proper charge on the infant’s estate. But in that case it appeared that the proceeding had been taken by the guardian after his appointment as such, and the allowance was made because it seemed to the surrogate that it was the duty of the guar
It appeared from the report of the referee to whom'the issues, were submitted in that proceeding that the infant had been left in charge of. Ins grandmother by lhs. father, who had lived separate from Kate Van Zandt, and that she was a proper person to have such charge and custody. But the infant was decreed to be delivered to his mother simply because of the relationship between them,, and because, too., that although the grandmother was a proper person, Mrs. Van Zandt was also a proper person, and the prior right-was in her. This affords, no reason why the estate of the infant should be charged with the cost of the recovery of the possession of the boy, because it was purely - for the' satisfaction of the mother,, and not for the benefit or welfare of the infant.
In the account Donald Grant seeks to charge the estate of the-infant with board which he individually furnished him for 247 weeks at the rate of six dollars a week. The. evidence shows that after the marriage of Kate Van Zandt to Grant this boy lived in the house of his stepfather. Mrs. Grant paid nothing for the board of her son, nor did she agree to make any payment therefor. Donald Grant makes here no personal claim for board, nor does ■ he claim that the estate, of the infant should be made chargeable to him individually for board. His claim is that because the boy lived- in the family of his' stepfather the éstate of his mother should be made good for any amount which she might probably have paid if she-had been compelled to do so, but which it is conceded she did not pay, and which it does not appear she ever became liable for. It. seems to me that this statement is- a sufficient answer to the claim which the administrator-makes here. As there is no .claim that there was any agreement on the part of Mrs. Grant-to pay board for lierson, and as it appears that the mother and son lived together with the stepfather as part of his family, there is. a* serious question whether the appellant here, even individually could enforce any claim
There was a dispute as to the allowance of two small sums of four dollars and sixteen dollars and seventy-five cents for clothes furnished during the last eleven months and four days of Mrs. Grant’s life. As the surrogate upon the testimony would have been justified in finding that that clothing was not delivered, there is no reason for interfering with his decree in that regard.
For these reasons the decree of the surrogate must be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson, O’Brien and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred.
Decree affirmed, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.