Binzen v. Epstein
Opinion of the Court
From a judgment dismissing the complaint in an action for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land and in favor of the defendant upon a counterclaim for a deposit made at the time the contract was entered into, and for the expenses of searching the title of the premises, the subject of the contract, the plaintiff appeals.
The complaint contains the ordinary allegations appropriate to such an action, and the substantial defense interposed is that the plaintiff eould not convey a good title in fee as required by the contract, or could not convey a marketable title to the whole of the premises. The alleged specific objection to the plaintiff’s title pointed out by the defendant is that a deed from the plaintiff would not pass in fee a one-sixth interest in the land by reason of the defective execution of a power of sale contained in the will of one John L. Milledoler, who died in the year 1853. Tire case was tried at Special Term upon a stipulation as to the material facts, supplemented by record
It will be observed that under the terms of the will of. John L.
On December 19, 1853, Graves, trustee, Thompson, executor, Susan A. Brett, Cornelia Graham, and their respective husbands, conveyed twenty-seven of the lots embraced in the declaration of trust to JVIargaret Ann Brett. On June 29,1854, Margaret A. Brett conveyed the lots to Cornelia Graham-. The premises embraced in the contract of sale in this action are included in the, last-mentioned conveyance. At that time Helen S. Milledoler and Walter G. Milledoler were infants over the age of fourteen years, and, as the stipulation shows, of sound mind. The conveyances to Margaret Ann Brett and from her to Mrs. Graham are for a nominal consideration. It appears that Walter G. Milledoler made a conveyance to Augusta C. Graham, and if he had any interest in the premises it passed by that conveyance. Helen S. Milledoler lived until the year 1891, when she died leaving five children her surviving.
It is now claimed by the defendant that there was an imperfect execution of the power of sale contained in the will of John L. Milledoler; that the conveyance, to Margaret Ann Brett and from her to Mrs. Graham for a nominal consideration in both instances was evidently only a method of putting the title to the premises in Mrs.-Graham, and, therefore, there was never a valid execution of the power of sale, and that Mrs. Graham, the executrix, taking the title of the infants in that manner and without the payment of an actual valuable consideration, a presumption of bad faith is raised, and that it is still open to the nephew and niece of John L. Miiledoler or their successors in interest or representatives to avoid the conveyance to Mrs. Graham.
Although there may have been a technical defective execution of
How many lots remained unsold in May, 1854, does not appear, but on or prior to May 17, 1854, sixty-five lots had been sold for which a net sum of $18,506 has been received by Thompson, executor of John L. Milledoler. On May 10, 1854, twenty-seven unsold lots were conveyed to Mrs. Graham and twenty-nine to Mrs. Brett. The infants were entitled to an undivided one-twelfth interest in the proceeds of the lots thus conveyed.;
. It is claimed by the plaintiff, and we think shown by the evidence, that the value of the interest of the infants in proceeds that might have arisen from a sale of the lots conveyed to Mrs. Graham, was secured to- them by crediting to them an amount deducted from the share of Mrs. Graham in the proceeds of the land sold for cash,; the value of the land conveyed to Mrs. Graham being fixed at the price received by the executor on the cash sales made almost contemporaneously with the conveyance to Mrs. Graham. If the proof sustains this claim, then it. is apparent that the infants’ interest was paid for. There was admitted in evidence a decree of the surrogate of the county of Kings made upon an accounting of Thompson, exécutor. The account settled by that decree is of the proceeds in cash of the lots sold and conveyed to others than Mrs. Brett and Mrs. Graham, and it shows that one-twelftli interest in the proceeds of the sale of the sixty-five lots was. taken out of the share of Mrs. Graham and was accounted for as part of moneys due to the infants. This seems to result indisputably from the account as settled by the surrogate’s decree. Mrs. Graham’s full share according to the interest she had in the moneys accounted for. by the executor, was -five-twelfths. By the decree as settled she received one-third or four-twelfths, and Mrs. Brett, who was entitled to five-twelfths, was credited with only one-third or four-twelfths, ■ and ^the amounts deducted from their shares were transferred in enhancement of those of the infants, and are a little in excess of the shares which would have been received' by the infants had the lots conveyed to
It is intimated in the opinion of the court below, and it is suggested on this appeal, that there is nothing to show that the moneys credited to the infants in the executor’s account in excess of what they were actually entitled to, resulted from the transfer of lands to the executrix.. But we think it follows from the very nature and statement of the account itself, in connection with the stipulated facts, that the allowance to the infants could not have been for any other reason or object than to pay them for their interest in the lots conveyed to Mrs. Graham and her sister.
From the record evidence thus made, it appears that the interest of the infants in the lands conveyed to Mrs. Graham was bought and paid for. ' The executor’s account was settled by the decree, and, therefore, the infants’ money was held by the executor. The decree of the surrogate was binding upon all persons who were duly cited. Only a portion of the decree is printed in the record, and while the Surrogate’s Court is one of limited jurisdiction, doubtless that.court acquired jurisdiction over the infants in the proceeding for the executor’s accounting. We must assume as much in this case, because the portion of the decree relating to the accounting came into the case without objection, and its admission in evidence trader such circumstances presupposes the existence of jurisdictional facts which would make it competent evidence.
But if our conclusions above referred to concerning a consideration being paid for the infants’ interest are incorrect, we are of the opinion that the conveyance to Mrs. Graham of the infants’ interest became indefeasible by lapse of time. That conveyance was made in 1854; the two infants then being over fourteen years of age, attained their majority about 1861. ' For forty years no attack has been made upon Mrs. Graham’s title by them or either of them, Qian y one claiming under them or either of them.
In this phase we think the case falls within the principle upon which were decided the cases of Harrington v. Erie County Savings Bank (101 N. Y. 258) ; Kahn v. Chapin (152 id. 305), and Strauss v. Bendheim (162 id. 469).
We do not regard this as a case in which there is a defect which can be cured only by a resort to parol evidence, or in which there is
The judgment should be reversed and, as it is evident that the facts cannot be changed upon another trial, judgment in favor of the plaintiff requiring specific performance of the contract by the defendant should be entered, with costs;
Van Brunt, P. J., Rumsey, Ingraham and Hatch, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed and judgment ordered for plaintiff, with'costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.