Litchfield v. Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Railway Co.
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff’s intestate was killed on the 6th day of November, 1896, while in the employ of the defendant, assisting as mason’s helper in constructing a stone culvert at the bottom of an excavation which he had helped to make, and which extended across the embankment of defendant’s railroad near the village of Warsaw, N. Y., by the caving in and falling upon him of a quantity of earth from one side of the excavation.
When the so-called bridge was completed and trains were being run upon it, the excavating gang, of which plaintiff’s intestate was one, commenced removing the earth from the space between the two rows of piles, and continued from day to day until the entire excavation was completed, the sides of which were left flush with the piles, and substantially perpendicular from top to bottom. The excavating was done by plaintiff’s intestate and his associates under the direction of a competent foreman, and no accident occurred during the progress of that work. Suitable sheathing or material for shoring up the banks of the excavation was furnished by the defendant, and was where it could have been obtained by the foreman of the defendant if he desired it or deemed it necessary for the use of the excavating gang, and they might have spiked plank onto the piles or taken such other precaution as would have effectually prevented the earth from either bank from caving into the excavation. Nothing of the kind, however, was done by the excavating gang, the plaintiff’s intestate or his co-employees, and the excavation was completed as indicated.
At the time of the accident the excavating had all been completed, and the masons had been engaged in laying the new culvert
It is clear that if plaintiff’s intestate had sustained the injuries which caused his death while engaged in excavating the trench in question, the defendant would not have been liable, for the reason that the deceased together with his co-employees created the dangerous situation, if it existed, which caused the accident, by not shoring up or sheathing the sides of the excavation as the work progressed.
When the deceased and his fellow-servants were set at work to make the excavation there was no danger; the place in which they were to work was perfectly safe, and everything was done by the master which was necessary or needful to ke'ep it in that condition. A competent and experienced foreman was provided; suitable material could have been obtained by him with which to make the trench an absolutely safe place in which to work as the excavating progressed. The conditions were all apparent; the character of the soil, the width and depth of the trench, and the manner in which the tracks above were to be used. If, under those circumstances, the trench became dangerous and accident resulted, it was' caused by the negligence of the deceased or of his co-employees, and, therefore, the defendant would not have been liable therefor.
The trench, so far as the excavating gang was concerned, was not a place in which to work furnished by the master, but was made by the deceased and his co-employees for themselves, and was a detail of the general work undertaken by the defendant; therefore, the law as to safe place does not apply. (Perry v. Rogers, 157 N. Y. 251; Butler v. Townsend, 126 id. 105 ; Di Vito v. Crage, 165 id. 378 ; Golden v. Sieghardt, 33 App. Div. 161; Simone v. Kirk, 57 id. 461.)
The fact that at the time of the accident plaintiff’s intestate had finished his work as a member of the excavating gang, and was assisting the masons in laying the culvert in the trench which he
If one class of servants negligently constructs an unsafe place for another class of servants to work in, one of the first class cannot recover from the master for injuries sustained by him, caused by such negligence, while working in such place, although at the time he may have joined the other class of servants, and with them was engaged in doing work in no manner connected with preparing the place to work in.
' It follows that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide event.
Williams, Hiscock and Davy, JJ., concurred; Spring, J., not sitting.
Judgment and order reversed upon questions of law only, the facts having been examined and no error found therein, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide event.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.