People v. Doody

The statutory definition of “perjury,” so far as it relates to this case, is:

“A person who swears * * * that he will truly testify * * * on any occasion in which an oath is required by law or is necessary for the prosecution or defense of a private right or for the ends of public justice or may lawfully be administered, and who in such action * * * willfully and knowingly testifies * * * falsely in any material matter or states in his testimony * * * any material matter to be true which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.”

On the Fielding trial, when it is claimed that Doody committed perjury, it was not only material, but necessary, for the people to show that Doody had furnished Fielding, who was then deputy commissioner of city works, the names of men who would bid on public work as his representatives, but also that out of the moneys collected by Doody on the contract for repaving over the water main on New Utrecht avenue he paid to Fielding io per cent, of the amount of such contract. So far as appears, Doody was the only person other than Fielding, the defendant then on trial, who had direct personal knowledge as to whether such names had or had not been given by Doody to Fielding, and as to whether the corrupt payment had or had not been made as charged in the indictment. If Doody then had a personal recollection in regard to the matters about which he was interrogated, a truthful statement of such recollection was material in determining whether Fielding was guilty or not guilty of the charge against him. If Doody then well knew and remembered that he did not furnish to Fielding the names of persons who would bid upon work as his representatives, and that he did not pay io per cent, of the amount of said contract to Fielding, it was necessary for the ends of public justice that he should so testify, to the end that the defendant so unjustly charged with crime might be relieved therefrom, and from the danger of conviction on a false charge. If Doody then well knew and remembered that he did furnish Fielding the names of persons who would bid upon work as his representatives, and that he did pay io per cent, of the amount of said contract to Fielding, it was neces*613sary for the ends of public justice that he should so testify, to the end that the defendant so on trial should be convicted and punished. The statutes defining perjury, and providing the punishment therefor, are designed to prevent the failure of justice. When a person well knows and remembers what occurred in connection with an alleged criminal transaction, and the facts so well known and remembered by him are material in determining the guilt or innocence of a person accused, it is perjury, within section 96 of the Penal Code, to falsely testify that he does not remember what occurred in connection with such transaction. In Reg. v. Schlesinger, 10 Q. B. 670, the defendant was indicted for perjury growing out of an action before the sheriff’s jury in London. The defendant was examined upon the trial of the issues as a witness, and testified in regard to a certain writing that he thought that the words written in red ink on the writing were not his. On appeal it was contended that perjury could not be assigned upon the averment of the defendant that he “thought” the words were not in his handwriting. One of the members of the court said:

“I£ a witness swears that he thinks a certain fact took place, it may be difficult indeed to show that he committed willful perjury, but it is certainly possible, and the averment is as properly a subject of perjury as any other.”

Another member of the court said:

“The objection to the assignment of perjury in the first and second counts seems to me to amount to no more than this,—that, because it is difficult of proof, therefore it is bad. But there would be an easy mode by which witnesses might in many cases escape the consequences of perjury, if using the words T think’ made them not indictable.”

In People v. Robertson, 3 Wheeler, Cr. Cas. 183, it is said:

“In the present case the defendant swears also that he has cause to suspect and does suspect that the wool was stolen by Bishop. The indictment alleges that he had not cause to suspect and did not suspect that the wool was stolen by Bishop. The jury have pronounced the charge in the indictment to be true. Whatever doubts may have once existed, it is now clearly settled that a man may be convicted of perjury in swearing that he believes, a fact to be true which he knows to be false.”

An expert may be guilty of perjury in swearing to a false opinion. 2 Bish. Cr. Law, § 878; State v. Henderson, 90 Ind. 408. A person who testifies that he believes a certain statement to be true, when he has no probable cause for such belief, is guilty of perjury. State v. Knox, 61 N. C. 312. When a person swears positively to the value of goods of which he knows nothing, although his value is correct, he is guilty of perjury. 3 Greenl. Ev. § 200; People v. McKinney, 3 Parker, Cr. R. 510. “Where a man swears that a thing is so, or that he believes it to be so, when in truth he does not believe it to be sor the oath is false, although the fact really be as stated.” State v. Cruikshank, 6 Blackf. 62. An unqualified statement of that which one does not know to be true is equivalent to a statement of that which he knows to be false. Pen. Code, § 101. The facts stated in the indictment of the defendant are sufficient to constitute a crime. Where oral1 evidence is relied upon to convict a person of perjury, it is necessary to produce at least two witnesses, or one witness supported by corroborating and independent circumstances. This rule arises by reason of the fact that, where oath is placed against oath, it remains doubtful *614where the truth lies. It is manifest, however, that this rule does not apply in cases where the proof of the perjury is necessarily based upon circumstantial evidence. It is only necessary in any case to produce evidence sufficient to counterbalance the oath of the defendant, and the legal presumption of his innocence. People v. Stone, 32 Hun, 41. That a person can be convicted of perjury without the production of a witness to testify to' the falsity of the evidence of defendant on which the indictment rests is held in U. S. v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430, 10 L. Ed. 527. In that case:

“The defendant was indicted for perjury in falsely taking and swearing '‘the owners’ oath in eases where goods have been actually purchased,’ as prescribed by the fourth section of the supplementary collection law of the 1st of March, 1823. The perjury was charged to have been committed in April, 1837, at the custom house in New York, on the importation of certain woolen goods in the ship Sheridan. The indictment charged the defendant with having intentionally suppressed the true cost of the goods, with intent to defraud the United States. (2) Charging the perjury in swearing to the truth of the invoice produced by him at the time of entry of the goods; the invoice being false, etc. It appeared by the evidence that the goods mentioned in the entry had been bought by the defendant from John Wood, his father, of Saddleworth, England. No witness was produced by the United-States to prove that the value or cost of the goods was greater than that for which they were entered at the custom house in New York. The evidence of this offered by the prosecution was the invoice book of John Wood, and thirty-five original letters from the defendant to John Wood, between 1834 and 1837, showing a combination between John Wood and the defendant to defraud the United States by invoicing and entering goods at less than their actual cost; that this combination comprehended the goods imported in the Sheridan; and that the goods received by that ship had been entered by the defendant, he knowing that they had cost more than the prices at which he had entered them. This evidence was objected to on the part of the defendant as not competent proof to convict the defendant of the crime of perjury, and that, if an inference of guilt could be derived from such proof, it was an inference from circumstances not sufficient as the best legal testimony to warrant a conviction. Held that, in order to a conviction, it was not necessary, on the part of the prosecution, to produce a living wit-mess, if the jury should believe from the written testimony that the defendant made a false and corrupt oath when he entered the goods.”

1 It follows, therefore, that whether defendant was guilty or innocent of the crime charged in the indictment was a question of fact for the jury to determine. That the evidence presented a question. of fact for determination by the jury seems to have been assumed by the defendant at the trial. The only answer of the defendant to the testimony presented against him was that his mind and memory had become so impaired by disease that he was not legally accountable for his lack of memory in regard to- the transactions with Fielding about which he was interrogated. Neither at the close of the evidence offered by the people, nor at the close of the evidence on the trial, did the defendant move for his discharge. The charge to the jury was fair, and, although the questions involved in the issue were fully stated by the court, no exception thereto was taken by the defendant, and no criticism of the charge has been made on the argument in this court. Our examination of the testimony leads us to the conclusion that the verdict should not be set aside, nor a new trial granted, on the facts.

The defendant asserts that the district attorney, in his opening to the trial jury, was erroneously allowed to call their attention to numerous *615statements made by the defendant involving independent crimes in which the defendant was a participant. A casual reading of the opening might seem to justify such criticism, but a more careful examination of the whole record convinces us that the evidence referred to by the district attorney was properly received, and that the defendant has had a fair trial. The opening of the district attorney is expressly based upon the defendant’s statements and confessions. Everything stated by the district attorney in his opening was shown on the trial as stated by him, by the receipt in evidence of conceded copies of the defendant’s testimony before the grand jury, and on former trials of Indictments found upon the evidence so given by the defendant. The evidence presented on the trial consisted wholly of defendant’s statements, and the circumstances surrounding the same. It is only necessary, therefore, to consider whether any of such statements and confessions are incompetent and harmful. The question at issue on this trial was not whether the defendant had committed the crime of bribery, but was wholly a question of the defendant’s memory in regard thereto. It is somewhat analogous to a question of testamentary capacity. Prior to 1896 defendant had never been engaged, at least to any extent, in doing public work; but, according to his sworn statements, in the years 1896 and 1897 he received in the name of others a large number of such contracts, and in connection with each and every of the contracts so received by others in his interest there was an agreement by which he was to pay and did pay Fielding 10 per cent, of the amount of such contracts, and also an agreement by which he was to pay and did pay a large amount to others who were personally connected with the giving of the several contracts, or with the audit and allowance of bills therefor, and payment of the same. The defendant had repeatedly testified in substance that he made these unlawful payments to Fielding in every instance, and also to others on each contract, so that the unlawful payments amounted to 35 or 40 per cent, ■of the entire amount received by him. If his statements were true, the several contracts were so intimately connected, and so interwoven as to be difficult of separation in fact, and almost impossible of separation in the memory of the person who arranged and carried out the unlawful agreements. His statements are to the effect that he was unable to get any public work, except by making and carrying out such unlawful agreements. His memory in regard to a single contract was necessarily linked to and associated with the entire scheme by which Fielding was in each instance to- receive his percentage. The defendant’s statements theretofore repeatedly made in court and to public officers in regard to the details of such transactions had a legitimate and immediate bearing upon the strength of the defendant’s memory in these intimately, associated transactions. All of the defendant’s statements referred to by the district attorney in his opening, and offered and received in evidence on the trial, related toi these several contracts, and were in the nature of a consecutive history of his transactions with the city works department, and tended to show his mental powers. The time and purpose of these statements, and the severe consequences arising therefrom, emphasize their materiality.

A casual statement may be innocently or thoughtlessly made, but *616the defendant’s sworn statements made before the grand jury were so made pursuant to an arrangement between himself and others, including his counsel and the district attorney. The statements made by him before the grand jury were therefore so made deliberately, intentionally, and positively, when he knew that the purpose of his examination was to indict those whom he testified were associated with him in crime. These statements were reiterated by him on the various trials, and one of the results of the testimony so given by him was that Fielding, on whose last trial the perjury is claimed to have been committed, was on the first trial convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. Confessedly, the defendant had taken upon himself the unenviable position of an informer, with full knowledge of the probable consequences to his associates, and his statements in connection with such information were properly considered by the jury in determining whether on the last trial of Fielding the testimony given by him was knowingly false and untrue. Prior to Fielding’s being granted a new trial there had been a failure to convict some of the others who were indicted on the disclosures made to the grand jury by the defendant. That the defendant sympathized with Fielding was openly stated by him. Notwithstanding defendant had repeated all of the details of the several transactions from time to time under oath, and before the district attorney, and that within three days before the last Fielding trial there was read to him his former testimony, containing every statement which the defendant now claims the court should have excluded, and that he then discussed the same without showing any impairment of memory, he suddenly loses all recollection as to whether the transactions with Fielding ever took place, and testifies that he has no memory as to whether they did or did not take place. The important question on the trial of the indictment for perjury herein was the strength of the defendant’s memory. His motive for committing the crime of perjury was also a proper subject of consideration. Apart from the question of defendant’s having lost his memory by disease, we do not see how a jury could well have come to any other conclusion than that the defendant was guilty of the crime of perjury, as charged. The case was evidently tried upon the theory that the defendant was irresponsible for his statements, by reason of his being affected by paresis. This was a question of fact, and has been decided against the defendant.

The defendant urges various other grounds of error, none of which, however, we think could possibly have prejudiced his interests on the trial.

The judgment should be affirmed.

PARKER, P. J., and KELLOGG and SMITH, JJ., concur.

(dissenting). One Fielding, who was deputy commissioner of a city department of Brooklyn, was indicted and tried for having knowingly approved a false claim against the city. On the trial the defendant was a witness for the people, and is charged with having then falsely testified that he did not remember having had any conversations with Fielding in reference to matters material to the *617issue then being tried. The indictment sets out the alleged false testimony in detail, and negatives the truth of such testimony in every particular. I do not deem it necessary to here point out the charges of the indictment more specifically, because, in my judgment, there were errors committed at the trial which compel a reversal of the conviction, and therefore the question whether the evidence establishes the guilt of the defendant need not be gone into. Every person charged with crime is entitled to a fair trial, and,, however guilty he may be, his guilt must be established by proper and competent evidence. Every improper statement of a prosecuting officer, made during the trial, which is calculated to influence or prejudice the minds of the jury against the accused, and each item of incompetent evidence having a tendency to lead them to conclude that he is guilty of the crime charged, because he has committed other offenses, constitute imperative reasons for reversing a conviction, whether upon the whole case the accused appears to be guilty or not. People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 553, 53 N. E. 500, 46 L. R. A. 641, 70 Am. St. Rep. 495; People v. Mull, 167 N. Y. 248, 60 N. E. 629. In his opening address to the jury the district attorney was permitted, notwithstanding objections and exceptions, to say many things to the prejudice of the defendant which were not and could not by any possibility be properly proved. It must be borne in mind that on this trial the sole inquiry was whether, in truth and in fact, the defendant did remember certain conversations with Fielding, which he declared on that trial that he did not remember, and to which he had testified before the grand jury which indicted Fielding. The following are examples:

“He [defendant] had to give bribes. He had to give ten per cent, to a man named Milne. He had to pay ten per cent, to Knapp, who was the water purveyor. He had to pay five per cent, to Jensen. AH these men could hold up bills unless they got their tribute. He carried out his end of the contract, and they did their end of the work. * * * He had gone before the grand jury, and it had indicted his old friends and confederates, and after that he had gone on the witness stand and been denounced by counsel, and hammered and pounded on so it was burned into his memory so he would not forget it the next day or in a lifetime. What happened? The trials went on, and one man was sent out to the penitentiary. He pleaded guilty.” Again: “When tire time came to get certain work through in the sewer department he had to see a man named Goff, and Goff demanded fifty dollars a week; and he had to pay Goff and he did pay Goff fifty dollars a week, to overlook the work and let things go through.” Again: “In the investigation, when the various warrants turned up, this condition appeared: Thomas Fraser & Co. seemed to be the reposrtary of nearly all the warrants that came directly to Doody. Whether it will become necessary to show you this, I don’t know. But it will be revealed by Doody’s testimony that the warrants were signed Thomas Fraser & Go. * * * The question is, how far is the jury to be deceived, if he has attempted to deceive? Now, gentlemen of the jury, it will show to some extent the character of this man’s mind if you will follow it out. Why did he create Thomas Fraser & Co.? Why not take the warrants himself? AH the warrants given to Finkle, Heyward, and Crzzens all went to him. He will tell you that he got every cent of the $200,000, except the thirty-five per cent, he had to pay out under his agreement. Every dollar of it came to himself. Why run it down into this rat hole,—Thomas Fraser & Co.? Who was Thomas Fraser? In his testimony he attempts to say that Thomas Fraser is a brother of some banker in New York. He is asked: 'Did Thomas Fraser get any part of this? No, sir. Was the senior member of this firm anything to you? Yes, *618sir; a partner. Did he get any part of this? He, perhaps, did get two hundred dollars.’ It means that is a cover. Every warrant, when they came down to Eraser & Go., they will be up against a stone wall. Who is Tom Eraser & Co? He can’t be found.” Again: “Contracts made and money expended without any authority in law. What is the cause of it? They sent over to the district attorney’s office for an investigation, and the investigation proceeds to a certain stage, and immediately we are up against a stone wall. Who is Eraser & Co.? Who is Cozzens? Who is Einkle? And who is Heyward? But a little probing soon revealed in all this filth and rubbish' this man Doody. What was to be done? It was soon discovered he was the real criminal. He was the hub, and without him the spokes of the wagon could not remain on. We sent for his son, as his name appeared on some of the vouchers. It will appear by his father’s testimony that the son came before the grand jury, and he refused to answer. I show motive for the responsibility he was assuming, to show that, under that pressure of his son before the grand jury, he came before the grand jury himself. His son came before the grand jury, as Doody will tell you. The son refused to answer any questions, and was brought into court with the grand jury, and told to answer the questions, and sent back. An adjournment was had, and an arrangement was made whereby Doody was to tell his story of his criminality, and all his connection with the frauds, and the connection of everybody else. * * * He had purchased his safety at the expense of his old friends and confederates. He turned informer upon them, and thus saved himself from punishment for these crimes. Again: “That was his position in March, 1898, and on his testimony these indictments were all secured against these people. A short while after that, Milne, who had been his friend, came into court and pleaded guilty. He was the young inspector out on the works, to whom he had paid one hundred dollars. Milne pleaded guilty, and was sent to the penitentiary.”

These remarks, and others which I have not quoted, were highly improper, and well calculated to excite prejudice and harmful bias against the defendant in the minds of the jury. They were unrebulced by the court, and objections to them were overruled. The jury must have supposed that they were approved by the presiding justice especially as wholly incompetent evidence was afterwards admitted, against objection and exception, in proof of these statements. Statements of this character by the public prosecutor in criminal cases have been repeatedly condemned by appellate courts, and new trials granted because of them. People v. Smith, 162 N. Y. 520, 56 N. E. 1001; People v. Mull, 167 N. Y. 247, 60 N. E. 629; People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542, 53 N. E. 497, 46 L. R. A. 641, 70 Am. St. Rep. 495. See page 547, 158 N. Y., and page 498, 53 N. E., 46 L. R. A. 641, 70 Am. St. Rep. 495, and cases cited; People v. Milks, 55 App. Div. 372, 66 N. Y. Supp. 889.

The only crime charged in the indictment being perjury alleged to have been committed in falsely testifying that he did not remember certain conversations with Fielding, the prosecution was allowed to prove, by reading from the testimony of the defendant before the grand jury, a number of other distinct and separate crimes, having no connection whatever with that under investigation. Among these are the following: That he paid one Phillips money to induce the commissioner of city works to aid him in defrauding the city; that he entered into corrupt agreement with one Willis, commissioner of city works, to defraud the city; that such agreement had been carried out, and the city actually defrauded of large sums; that he entered into a corrupt agreement with -one Knapp, who was water purveyor *619of the city, by which the city of Brooklyn was defrauded; that he had bribed the commissioner of city works to allow him to defraud the city; that he paid one Milne, who was an inspector of the department of city works, the sum of $100 on each warrant he received in payment for the work done by him for the city of Brooklyn, for certifying that the work was done properly, although such work was not examined by Milne; that he entered into a corrupt agreement to pay and did pay one Jensen, who was a clerk in the comptroller’s office, $200 on each of these warrants, to induce said Jensen to mark the same “Correct”; that he entered into another corrupt agreement with Jensen by which he was to pay and did pay to Jensen 5 per cent, on all bills rendered against the city of Brooklyn; that he paid to one Goff, who was superintendent of sewers in the department of city works, a bribe of $50 each week; that he paid various inspectors of the city works department from $5 to $10 at regular intervals, as bribes; that he paid one Clark, who was president of the board of aldermen, the sum of $500, as a bribe; that he made a corrupt agreement with one Leaycraft to bribe the aldermen of the city of Brooklyn to. pass his bills for cleaning snow from the streets.

Assuming that this evidence was pertinent to some inquiry then pending before the grand jury, it was clearly incompetent on this trial, and necessarily harmful to the defendant, by holding him up to the jury as one habitually guilty of defrauding the city of Brooklyn, and bribing its officials. Assuming, again, that the testimony of defendant before the grand jury as to his conversations with Fielding was competent upon this trial upon the question whether he did or did not remember them upon Fielding’s trial, the evidence should have been limited to that. His statements before that body concerning his connection with other crimes were inadmissible for any proper purpose. This evidence did not tend to prove a motive for committing the alleged perjury, nor the intent of defendant in committing it, nor identity; nor did it tend to¡ prove that the perjury was not accidental, nor that the several distinct offenses thereby proved were part of a scheme of which the perjury was also a part. In order to render proof of other crimes competent, it must fall within one of these requisites. People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286. It was not rendered competent by showing it to have been testified to by defendant himself before the grand jury. It was simply proof of other and independent crimes, and does not differ, in respect to admissibility, from evidence of such crimes derived from other sources. To emphasize this evidence, indictments against these various parties were put in evidence, and proof was allowed, against defendant’s objection and exception, that one of the persons indicted (Milne) had pleaded guilty, and had thereupon been sent to the penitentiary. This, also, was error. The inquiry was whether the testimony of the defendant on the Fielding trial that he did not remember certain conversations with Fielding was false. The indictment against Milne was for conniving at the audit and allowance of a fraudulent claim against the city. What that claim was, does not appear. Neither Milne’s admission of guilt, nor the character of his punishment, were pertinent to the question of defendant’s perjury. Taken in connection *620with the evidence of this defendant before the grand jury as to his-transactions with Milne, above alluded to, it was thus made to appear that the defendant was guilty of the crime of bribing Milne, and that Milne had confessed it. The necessary effect of all of this evidence-was to incite in the minds of the jury a belief that the defendant was habitually criminal in all his dealings with the officials of Brooklyn,, and theréby the more easily to persuade them that he was guilty of the perjury with which he was charged. There is no conceivable connection between these facts, and the evidence was clearly inadmissible. People v. McQuade, 110 N. Y. 285, 18 N. E. 156, 1 L. R. A., 273 (see page 306, 110 N. Y., and page 165, 18 N. E., 1 L. R. A. 273); People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 466, 14 N. E. 343, 1 Am. St. Rep. 851.

The admission in evidence of the several indictments against Willis and Phillips for conspiracy, against Willis for bribery, against Knapp for conniving at the audit of a fraudulent claim, against Milne for the same offense, against Clark and Eeaycraft severally for accepting money to influence their acts as aldermen, and against Goff and' Jensen for accepting bribes, was improper. An indictment is a mere-accusation. It neither proves nor tends to prove anything, even, against the defendant named in it. Even a witness cannot properly-be asked whether he has been indicted, because an indictment furnishes no proof of guilt, and to permit an affirmative answer might improperly influence the jury against his credibility. Kober v. Miller, 38 Hun, 184, and cases cited. These indictments bore no relation to-any question involved in this trial. It was made to appear that they were found upon the evidence of the defendant above referred to, and’ which connected him with each of the offenses named in them. It is-obvious that this evidence could have had no other effect than to* improperly influence the minds of the jury against the defendant.

It was error, also, to permit to be read in evidence the remark oh the presiding justice on the first trial of Eielding concerning this defendant, to the effect that he was an unwilling witness. The opiniom of the judge, thus proved, that the defendant was reluctant to tell the truth on that trial, may well have influenced the jury to believe that he testified falsely on the second trial. People v. Hill, 37 App. Div. 327, 56 N. Y. Supp. 282; People v. Brow, 90 Hun, 509, 35 N. Y. Supp. 1009; People v. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 51 N. E. 1024..

Other errors are alleged, which it is unnecessary now to consider, inasmuch as those already mentioned require a reversal of the conviction.