People ex rel. Moynihan v. Greene
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I dissent upon the ground that the charges and specifications of the charges were insufficient to embrace the assignment of Beck to perform private work on the relator’s premises, and that the reception of the evidence on that point was prejudicial error; for, in my opinion, it is utterly improbable that the relator would have been convicted and discharged but for this evidence, which was not within the issues.
Writ dismissed and proceedings affirmed, with fifty dollars costs and disbursements.
Opinion of the Court
The relator, a police captain assigned to duty in the Twenty-ninth Precinct in the city of New York, was on the 10th of September, 1902, charged by an inspector of police with neglect of duty and violation of the rules of the police department. The specifications of the charges were three in number and were, in substance: (1) That the relator, notwithstanding he had knowledge that the police
Copies of the charges and specifications were served upon the relator, and thereafter, at a trial had before the police commissioner, he was found guilty and dismissed from the force. He thereupon obtained a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having the proceedings which resulted in his dismissal reviewed by this court.
I think the relator was properly dismissed. In fact, I do not understand that it is seriously questioned but what he was guilty of the charges specified and it could not well be in view of the facts appearing in the record. It is claimed, however, that the acts of the relator constituted but technical violations of the rules, for which reason the punishment inflicted was too severe, and that the relator was prejudiced upon the trial by the admission of evidence not covered by the specifications.
First. The facts proved the relator guilty of something more than a technical violation of the rules, as even a casual examination of this record will show. He knew that Beck had been detailed by the police commissioner to perform duty at the recreation pier and that he had no right to detail him to do other service, except with the permission of the commissioner. He not only disregarded the order of the commissioner in detailing Beck, but in effect countermanded that order. When an inferior officer knowingly disregards and sets at naught the order of his superior, his conduct constitutes something more than a technical violation and well deserves — if discipline is to be maintained in the department — severe punishment. He not only disregarded the order of the com
It is the duty of the desk sergeant to enter in the station-house blotter entries of all the duties of the various officers attached to the precinct to which he is assigned. No entries were made in the station-house blotter as to Officer Beck after he had been withdrawn from the pier and while he was detailed to do work in the station house. The relator testified it was the duty of the sergeant to make the entries ; “ it was their duty to do it on the blotter; it is their duty to make those entries without my direction ; the rules specifically call for it.” ' (See rule 6, ¶ B.) But rule 5, A, provides that: “ Captains shall carefully examine daily all books of record required to be kept in their respective station houses in conformity to the rules of the Department and see that the- entries are properly made.” This rule the relator also violated. He discovered, according to his own testimony, on August fifteenth — several days after Beck had" been withdrawn from the pier and been at work in the station house ■— that no entries had been made in the blotter as to what he was doing, nor were any entries made in it from that time until the second of September following. It was his duty to see that these entries were made, and he cannot shield himself behind an assertion that he told .a sergeant tó make them. The rules made it the duty of the sergeant to make the entries, and they also made it the reía-. tor’s duty to see that the entries were made. A failure in this respect was not a technical violation of a rule of the department, but a willful and flagrant neglect of duty, and nothing else. It is entirely immaterial whether this was the result of carelessness or of some sinister motive.
We have, therefore, a case in which a police officer has not only
Second. But it is said that the relator was prejudiced upon the trial by the erroneous admission of certain testimony. During the course of the trial testimony was offered to the effect that the relator detailed Beck to do certain work for him upon some houses which he owned. The fact that Beck did certain work on such, houses is not denied, though the relator did deny that' he told him to do it. I think the specifications were broad enough to admit proof of this character. The charge fairly apprised the relator of what was claimed and the specifications informed him in a general way of the nature of his alleged wrongful acts. If the specification that he had assigned Beck to do “ other than police duty ” was so indefinite that he did not fully understand what was meant and for that reason could not properly defend himself without further information, he .should have applied, either prior to or at the trial, for a more specific statement. He made no such application and, therefore, must be deemed to have waived his right thereto. (People ex rel. Powley v. Roosevelt, 23 App. Div. 578; People ex rel. Carney v. Scannell, 80 id. 320.)
Exceptions were also taken to the admission of other testimony, but an examination of them fails to disclose any error in respect to them.
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson and Ingraham, JJ., concurred; Laughlin, J., dissented.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.