In re Smith
Opinion of the Court
The learned referee correctly states the facts substantially as follows : John Smith, father of the objectors herein, at the time of
Tlie special guardian seems to have acted under the direction of Earl, who appeared to be in the position of next friend of the infants; while the guardian’s name was used he did nothing but necessary and formal acts and Earl alone was active. On the completion of the sale and after the payments of the mortgage, interest, taxes, etc., on the property and the ‘expenses of the proceeding, but exclusive of the $500 directed by the order to be paid over for the children, the sum of $744.10 remained. This money was received by Earl, and the guardian herein deposited no part of it with the treasurer of Kings county as he was directed to do. The special guardian, in whose name the two mortgages were made, collected some interest and finally the principal of both mortgages, no part of which was deposited with the treasurer of the county as directed, but all of the moneys so collected were turned over to Earl who apparently as executor deemed himself entitled to possession. In an accounting as executor and in proceedings on objection to such account Earl charges himself with having received the $744.16 above mentioned, the Bennett mortgage'of $1,150 and interest thereon as far as the same was collected, and with interest on the Wade mortgage for two years, but not with the sum of $180 interest on the $1,500, afterwards loaned to another, or with the principal sum of $1,500. One Allaben, since deceased, was the attorney for Earl at the time, and on the payment of the Wade mortgage, as Earl testifies, without the knowledge or consent of Earl, Allaben loaned the $1,500 on a second mortgage to one Darling ; two years’ interest or $180 mentioned was collected, and then, upon foreclosure proceedings, the whole $1,500 was lost. The guardian in his accounts filed herein credits himself with the payment to Earl of the amounts above set forth as having been received by Earl, and charges himself with the $1,500, together with interest thereon at the rate of two per cent
Upon the filing of the account ¡of the special guardian, the appellants, both of whom are now of full age, objected thereto, first, on the ground that the guardian should charge himself with the principal sum of $1,500, which was lost on the Darling mortgage, with interest thereon at the legal rate, and with two installments of interest paid on that mortgage before it was lost, with like interest thereon ; and, second, that the guardian should charge himself with all the amounts of moneys received by him as guardian or which should have been received by him from every source, together with a like rate of interest. The referee appointed to pass the account has charged him with the loss on the Dai’ling mortgage; has recommended that he pay two per cent interest compounded annually on all moneys he' has, and that he be credited with all sums he paid Earl; that the ■interest rate be five per cent simple since the infants respectively reached full age. The Special Term confirmed the report, and the objectors appealed.
Although a large part of the record in the accounting of Earl as administrator, including his petition and account, and the opinion of the referee, were introduced in evidence before the referee in this proceeding, and although it has appeared as confusing to all parties correctly to trace some of these funds back and forth through the hands of the respondent and through the hands of Earl, the executor, it does not appear to me that the facts give rise to any serious complications. The special guardian has consented that he be charged with the $1,500 lost in the Darling mortgage, and with the $180 of interest received thereon, the only controversy as to that item now being the rate of interest. It is admitted that he turned over to Earl, the executor of the estate of the mother of the infants, all of the moneys which came into his hands as special guardian, and Earl has accounted iii the Surrogate’s Court for these and other sums; his account, with certain alterations as directed by the referee, appears to have been settled, and payments made to the beneficiaries of substantially the whole amount save what may become due upon the adjustment of the interest.
It is not sufficient, however, in this proceeding that the special guardian show that he has paid over these moneys to Earl, and that by Earl they have been expended for the interests of the infants, or in the settlement of their mother’s estate to relieve the guardian from liability for any further sums, except as to the moneys paid them upon their attaining their majority. The appellants concede the validity of these disbursements on April 15, 1899, of $1,047.50 payment of Kerz mortgage, $145.02 Allaben allowance, $10.25 contract .and disbursements, $67.82 taxes, and $5 disbursements. What we have had to say about the $500 item leads to the conclusion that the respondent should be credited writh that sum out of the amount of $744.16 paid to Earl on April 15, 1899. That leaves in his hands $244.16, the amount he had in cash at the time of the sales to Bennett and Wade, after deducting the $500 item. There is also in his hands the several items of $57.50 interest on the Bennett mortgage, together with the sum of $1,150, principal of the Bennett mortgage paid on or about May 1, 1894. With these sums, together with $150 interest on the Wade mortgage, $1,500 lost on the Darling mortgage and the $180 interest thereon, the guardian should be charged, together with two per cent interest thereon, compounded annually from the several dates these moneys came into his hands as guardian.
He should be credited with the sums- paid to the infants. ■ It seems that Earl made these payments, and it was entirely competent for the special guardian to pay them through Earl, if he chose to do
This is all the guardian may be credited with, for they are the only disbursements which are permitted by the order appointing him. It is quite possible that had he deposited these moneys with the treasurer of the county of Kings, some of it might, perhaps, under the direction of the court on further applications in this proceeding, have been directed to have been expended in behalf of the infants, but what such sums might have been, or what the papers might have shown upon such applications, is now a mere matter of speculation. It is certain that the avails of the sale of the lands of these infants were not applicable toward the payment of the debts of the estate of their mother ( Warren v. Union Bank of Rochester, 157 N. Y. 259), and this no one now disputes. Their title was derived from their deceased father, and the action brought by the mother against them resulted in a void judgment on account of the invalidity of the service upon the infants, It seems equally certain that the amount of moneys Earl expended in improving the real estate should not on this appeal be held to be a proper credit for the special guardian. No proof exists ftiat there was any necessity for such improvements, and that the interest of the infants demanded them. (New York Building Loan Co. v. Fisher, 28 App. Div. 363 ; Warren v. Union Bank of Rochester, supra.) The only suggestion which we have, as to any such expenditure is -the petition and account of Earl in the surrogate’s proceeding. These items seem to have been in the neighborhood of $200. It is significant that the other side of Earl’s account, as executor, shows that he received, before the appointment of the special guardian, an amount nearly as great as one-half of that sum from the rents and profits of the real estate, to which, the title being in the children, there can be no dispute that he was not entitled. ;
On the question of the rate of interest to be allowed to the chil
The final order should be reversed and the proceedings remanded to the Special Term for further action, in accordance with the conclusion reached in this opinion.
All concurred.
Order so far as appealed from reversed, and proceedings remitted to the Special Term for disposition in accordance with the opinion of Hooker, J.
See Code Civ. Proc. § 426, subd. 1.—,[Bep.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.