Stenger v. Buffalo Union Furnace Co.
Opinion of the Court
The defendant is a domestic corporation and at the time of the accident which is the subject of this action was engaged in operating a blast furnace in the city of Buffalo, N. Y. The furnace, so far as it is important to note, consisted of an iron cylinder lined on the inside with fire brick, about eighty feet in height, twelve to fourteen feet in diameter at the top or throat and at the bottom, and about twenty-two feet in diameter between those points. The material used in the production of pig iron, consisting of ore, limestone, coke, coal, etc., was conveyed in buckets up an inclined railway to the top of the furnace and there dumped into a funnel-shaped hopper, the lower edge of which extended into the throat of the furnace where it rested upon brackets projecting from the sides, leaving a considerable space between it and the inner walls of the furnace. From an iron beam at the top of the furnace there was
The evidence conclusively shows that in the operation of such a furnace, even when in perfect repair and when all the means referred to are employed, a considerable quantity of gas escapes into and impregnates the atmosphere at the top. This is necessarily true of the gas emitted by the frequent explosions and which forces the “ explosion doors ” open, and also as to that which escapes, if not consumed by the coal fire, when the bell is lowered, which practically uncovers the furnace. To protect the workmen engaged in filling the hopper against such escaping gas a shanty for them to
On the night of the accident plaintiff’s intestate was engaged with a fellow-workman in emptying buckets into the hopper. He had worked there for four nights previously and was familiar in a general way with the method of doing the work. While thus employed he was overcome by gas, fell into the hopper and sustained injuries from which he died a week later. Previous to the night in question no one of defendant’s employees had been injured by escaping gas, but upon that night two other of defendant’s employees were thus injured, although no change had taken place in the furnace for a considerable time prior to the accident.
The evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff tended to show that the brick work between the lower edge of the hopper and the walls of the furnace was cracked and broken and that the plates covering the space at the upper edge were warped and out of place; that thus gas was permitted to escape from around the hopper; also that the “hopper extension” or ring which was intended to fit closely around the flare edge of the bell was broken and in such condition that gas could escape into the hopper while it was being filled; also that the “ explosion doors,” so called, were out of repair and in such condition that gas could escape around them when closed; that they would open too easily and when thrown open by the force of the explosion would not close automatically as they were intended to do. While the evidence which tended to establish such facts was contradicted by the defendant, it was of such a character as to raise a question of fact as to those issues and to justify the jury in finding that the defendant was negligent in respect to the matters adverted to.
The serious question presented by this appeal is whether or not there is any evidence which tends to show that any gas escaped because of either of the defects referred to and from which injury to plaintiff’s intestate resulted. It is well settled that in order to entitle a plaintiff to recover in an action of this character it is
A careful examination of the entire record compels the conclusion that it fails to prove that the alleged 'negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injuries which caused the death of the plaintiffs intestate. It may be said that under such an interpretation of the evidence a recovery could never be had in a case like the one at bar. The difficulty in making the proof, the seriousness of the accident and the hardship resulting therefrom can in no manner change or modify the well-established rule of law that in actions for negligence to recover for personal injuries in order to enable the injured party or his representatives to recover it must be shown that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained.
No other questions are presented by the appeal which in our opinion would require a reversal of the judgment. It follows that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
All concurred, except Spring, J., who dissented.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide event.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.