People v. New York Building-Loan Banking Co.
Dissenting Opinion
Were it not for the two cases of Preston v. Reinhart (109 App. Div. 781) and Preston v. Lamano (46 Misc. Rep. 304), the" latter of which was approved in -the former^ and which- are- .relied upon by the appellant, and which lie _ contends are directly in point, we should not feel called upon to add anything to the reasons assigned by the learned referee for his conclusion in holding in .the case at bar that Montague was entitled to be paid as a creditor the amount "of interest paid by him in excess of the interest paid by the company on the $25,000 mortgage-. The fact,, however, that both cases referred to are decisions of the Appellate Division in the- second department, and which were they directly in point we should follow, makes it necessary briefly to refer to what we’’regard as features distinguishing them from.the case at bar.
In noting the distinction, therefore, we must not lose sight of the important fact that in the cases relied upon the company made a loan, whereas in the case at bar they did nothing but take Montague’s money upon an agreement to protect him against' the foreclosure of a mortgage, which agreement on their part is- ended because of the insolvency of the company. . This necessarily results in the .failure of the consideration upon which alone the company could claim the right to receive from Montague any more money, or, in our judgment, to retain what they had already received.
It will not do in construing the contract entered into by Montague to make that the principal feature which is really incidental and subsidiary, namely, his becoming a member of the loan company, and then as a result of so regarding him, to hold that he should not only lose the amount which he paid on his stock, but that in addv tion the company should be allowed to retain money which it received without paying or parting with any consideration therefor.
In applying to the loan company, what Montague sought to obtain was protection against the foreclosure of a mortgage then on his property; and in order to procure the agreement from the loan company, it imposed as a condition, not alone that he should take
Hor do 'I think that the position of the .appellant is sustained by the line of argument Upon which he proceeds in contending that the contract, is to be construed as though the principal feature was • membership in the company, which membership imposed upon the member not only the forfeiture of what he had paid upon the stock-but deprived him of any rights, to money which he had voluntarily paid, and which the company received and insisted on retaining without having parted with - any ■ consideration therefor. This, process of reasoning also assumed that it is impossible legally to separate the two relations which one could occupy .under the contract, viz., as a stockholder and as a borrowing member ,; and yet as I read 'all the'text books and decisions the two relations are perfectly sevérable and distinct. . .
It would serve no useful purpose to collate and discuss what has been said by text writers and in the numerous decisions on the question, all sustaining this statement, thinking it sufficient to refer .. to but one, the case of Roberts v. Cronk (94 App. Div. 171; affd., 182 N. Y. 546), which was similar to the Lamano and Reinhart cases, in that it was an action by the receiver of an insolvent loan association to foreclose a mortgage executed by a shareholder. In that case it was held that “ the shareholder is not entitled to be credited upon the, mortgage in the foreclosure action with the . amount .of dues paid by him to the association, or with the amount *• of the monthly premium which lie paid as a bonus for the loan.”. In the opinion in that -case, however, it was said: “We cannot express our view of the law defining the rights of the parties in the circumstances in which they are now. placed better than to reiterate the words of Mr. Justice Williams in the case of Hall v. Stowell
If, therefore, we can, as the cases seem to hold, legally separate the relations which Montague occupied as shareholder and under his contract tó obtain security against the foreclosure of the mortgage, then it seems to follow that upon the failure of the company and its consequent inability to carry out its contract to protect him against the enforcement of the lien of the mortgage, the consideration for his payments failed, and he is entitled to such settlement as will return to him all moneys paid by him because of such contract, less the moneys paid out for him. The conclusion of the learned referee that the company did no beneficial thing to or for this claimant is not only supported but, as we understand it, is not in dispute; and the agreement of the company to do something - which its insolvency will now prevent its ever doing presents an instance where the consideration for the contract has entirely failed. . The rule is settled that when money has been paid on contract and the consideration fails, an action for money had and received will lie.
In the Lamano and Reinhart cases there was a piartial performance. The member got the advance and was furnished with
Thinking as we do, therefore, that, upon the facts and upon the law applicable to them there, is a clear distinction ‘to be noticed, between the cases relied upon by the appellant and the one at bar, we are of opinión that the order appealed from should be. affirmed, with costs.
Laughlin, J., concurred.
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and dishursbments, and motion denied, with ten dollars costs. Order, filed.
75 App. Div. 22.— [Rep.
Opinion of the Court
The New York Building-Loan Banking Company was organized as a building' and loan association. The corporation continued to transact business down to September 12, 1903, on which day a tern
It appeared that in November, 1897, the claimant owned a piece of real property in the county of Kings, upon which there was a mortgage of $25,000. In .November, 1897, he applied to the defendant corporation for aid to remove this incumbrance from his property at of before the time that it became due, arid offered to pay a premium for priority for such sums as the corporation might deem necessary to advance for that purpose. This was in, form of a written instrument submitted to the corporation by which he subscribed for 300 shares of its class A stock. This application after subscribing for the stock provided as follows: “ As a member of said corporation I desire from it cash advance of $- on the above shares, and further advance for the purpose of aiding me in removing the encumbrances, amounting in the aggregate to $25,000, consisting of a first m’t’g 'at 5 per cent held by Mrs. Harriman, 141 Jeroloman St., Brooklyn, N. Y., now resting on my property which I purchased on or about Mch. 1893, for $40,000, and- which is now well worth the sum of $52,000, and which is .situated and described as follows: 4 story and basement marble front store, 60 Court St., Brooklyn, N. Y., and to that éud I hereby bid to pay a premium of twenty-five cents per month on each share, as provided by the Articles of Association for 144 months and will pay the same in advance for priority, for such sums as the corporation may deem necessary to advance to complete the above transaction. * * * If after an examination of the property and the title thereto, the corporation considers the conditions surrounding the property such as to make it a desirable and safe transaction for it to undertake, I agree to make monthly' payments of $225.00 which sum includes the dues on the shares subscribed for by me for the purpose of covering the sum that the corporation shall be deemed to have advanced in the transaction, and the interest charges thereon until the said shares shall mature, when the said New York Building-Loan Banking Company shall execute or cause to be executed a full satisfaction of the above men
The articles of the association or corporation provide that the object of the corporation has been and is, among other things, to accumulate a fund for paying off incumbrances on lands and for aiding members making improvements thereon and removing incumbrances therefrom. By article 25 it is provided: “ Every applicant for membership shall subscribe to, an application form, in which he shall agree to the Articles of Association of this corporation and its By-Laws and Regulations adopted thereunder; and pay such premium or entrance fee per share as the Board of Directors or Executive Committee may from time to time determine equitable to the stockholders and to the best interest of the corporation.. Such entrance fee or premium shall not be credited to the stock or shares on which it is paid as a payment thereon, or enter into any accounts of the corporation or in any sense be deemed an asset or liability of the corporation.”
Article 26 provides that the shares of the corporation shall be issued in several classes.
Article 27 provides: “ The monthly installments or dues on shares in Class A shall be twenty-five cents, and must be paid on or before the third day of each month, in advance, until the money accumulating from monthly dues or installments, together with the profits from interest, premiums, fines, withdrawals, an equitable portion of any reserve or surplus fund or undivided profits and all other profits accruing to each share, shall equal One hundred dollars.” J
Article 49 provides: “ The sum bid as premium by any member for priority of advances or loans on shares shall be deemed to be a sum paid for the right to secure an advance prior to and against all
Article 50 provides: “ All sums paid for priority as provided in Articles 36 and 49, shall be for priority and not for the use of money.”
Under this application for membership . in the corporation the ' claimant paid to the corporation $225 per- month down jo and including August, 1903, By the application for shares of stock in -the corporation the claimant, subscribed for .300 shares of class A stock and also, applied for advances to enable him to remove an incumbrance of $25,000 on his property, and to that end he bid to 'pay premiums of twenty-five*cents monthly on each share, as provided in the articles of the association, for 144 months, and agreed to pay the same in advance for priority for such sums as the corporation may deem necessary to advance to complete the above, transaction.. After the corporation accepted the proposition he agreed to make monthly payments Of $225, which sum includes all dues oh the shares subscribed for by him for the purpose of covering the sum which the corporation shall be deemed to,have advanced in the transaction and the interest, and charges thereon until the said shares shall mature, when the corporation undertook to have executed a full satisfaction of the mortgage or incumbrance aggregating $25,000, and the company’s, mortgage, to be given to the claimant. By this agreement the corporation obligated itself to discharge the mortgage and all interest on the claimant’s property. I can see no basis for the division of the ■ rights accruing on the obligation to either of the parties to this agreement.' ■ The claimant, • being of full age, entered into the contract, which, it must be assumed, he supposed would be an advantage to him. In form he subscribed to the stock of the corporation, and thereby became a member of the corporation. He agreed to pay a premium of $5,000 in monthly payments for securing from this corporation an obligation that it was to pay off this mortgage of $25,000 upon his property before the maturity of the stock to. which he subscribed, thus relieving the property from the lien of the mortgage.' In full of these various payments that he agreed to make as a consideration for the corporation’s promise he undertook to pay to this corporation a sum of money each month for a certain period, and if the
But this distinction, -it seems to me, was unauthorized and.it cannot be sustained.
I think, therefore, that, the .order appealed from should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the applicaT tion of the petitioner to claim as creditor should be denied, with ten dollars- costs, without passing on his rights as between himself and the other members of the corporation.
Patterson and Clarke, JJ., concurred ; O’Brien, P. J., and. Laughlin, J., dissented.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.