People ex rel. Quinn v. Voorhis
Dissenting Opinion
The defendants appeal from an order of the Special Term granting a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the board of elections “ to publish a list of places for the, registration and polling of votes according to the Election Laws of the State of Hew York, and especially Section 10 thereof, in four (4) daily newspapers published in the Borough of Manhattan which advocate the election of William Randolph Hearst as the candidate of the Democratic party for Gov
For the reasons stated, however, by Mr. Justice Clarke, I concur with him in the conclusions at-which he has arrived.
Opinion of the Court
The appeal is from an order of the Special Term directing that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue herein, commanding the defendants, as commissioners composing the board of elections of the city of New York and their successors in office, to “ publish a list of places for the registration and polling of -votes according to the Election Laws of the State of New York, and especially section 10 thereof, in four (4) daily newspapers published in the Borough of Manhattan, which advocate the election of William Randolph Hearst as the candidate of the Democratic Party for Governor, the said Democratic Party being the political party polling the next highest number of votes for Governor at the last, election in the State of New York, and its platform” adopted at the last State convention at which said Hearst was nominated for Governor “ and the Democratic ticket as nominated at said Convention.” On the motion to1 dismiss the appeal it appears that-a peremptory writ of mandamus has been duly issued pursuant to the order appealed from, commanding the appellants to convene and designate for the purpose of publishing said election notices four daily newspapers which advocate the election of said Hearst and the platform of the Democratic party as adopted at its last State convention and the Democratic ticket nominated at said convention; that pursuant to the command of said writ the appellants convened as a board of elections and reconsidered and rescinded a resolution adopted on
We are of opinion that this case; is not one in which that course should be followed. The appellants, instead of presenting aiiy evi- . dence to sustain their action or giving notice to the proprietors of the newspapers first designated as Democratic papers by them, and ■ affording them an opportunity to apply for intervention dr to present, affidavits showing that they .were supporting. the principles,, although not the present candidates, of the Democratic party, which might render them eligible for designation under the statute (Election Law [Laws of 1896, chap. 909], § 10, as amd. by Laws of Í906, chap. 259), have allowed- the, allegations of the petition, charging not only that the newspapers first designated by them were not supporting the candidates of the Democratic party, but also
It was stated upon the argument, but does not. appear in the record, although it is to be inferred from the papers upon which the motion to dismiss is made, that the president of the board, after the original designation of newspapers, by a letter duly authorized the proprietors of the newspapers to commence the publication, and that the board, without any notice or hearing to the proprietors of. those papers, has assumed to rescind the resolution and to annul the authority for publishing the notices theretofore given pursuant thereto, and has authorized the proprietors of the newspapers designated on the eighth of October to publish the notices. It would be improper, in view of the state of this record, as already indicated, for this court to express any decided opinion which might embarrass the proprietors of the newspapers in asserting their claim for the publication of the notices either under the original designation or under the last designation. We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed, and an order ot that effect may be entered.
Patterson and Houghton, JJ., concurred; Ingraham and Clarke, JJ., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
I am of the opinion that the order appealed from .should be reversed and the application for a peremptory writ of mandamus denied. The petitioner was the publisher of the Hew York Daily News, and made'his application, to the court, not in the capacity of a citizen,' or representative of a political party for the purpose of settling a public question, but to compel the board of elections to designate the paper of which he was the publisher'as one of the papers, in which the election notices should be published for the purpose of obtaining payment therefor from the city.
The petition presented to the court prayed that a writ of mandamus issue commanding the board of elections to designate the Daily News as one of the four Democratic papers in which said election notices shall be inserted, and nothing else. And the order to show cause upon which the order appealed from herein was granted, was to the same effect,'although it did conclude with the phrase “and for such other and further relief as may be just and proper in the premises.” The order to show cause, however, must be governed and interpreted by the petition, and the relief granted must be. that clearly asked for and indicated by .the moving papers. The relief demanded by the petition was denied; and the order granted relief not contemplated nr prayed for, and which may have interfered with vested rights without notice to or hearing of interested parties. It undertook by mandamus proceedings to review and set aside'the action of the'board of elections, a board which exercises quasi judicial functions, in determining in the exercise of its discretion a question of fact. The order also injected into the statute a
The office of a writ of mandamus is to compel specific action in the exercise of purely ministerial functions. If the performance of an official act involves discretion, courts, although they have power to demand action, have no right to say that it must be in a particular way. As the petition in the matter at bar asked and only asked for a particular exercise of the discretion of the board, it should have been denied; and it seems to me any action of the court based upon such papers as are here presented was unauthorized and improper.
In People ex rel. Francis v. Common Council (78 N. Y. 41) where there was a question of the designation of four papers having the largest circulation in the city of Troy and the common council had selected four, and another paper petitioned the court, the court said: “ The four papers designated have acted under their appointment. They are not parties to this proceeding, and their appointment would not be vacated by any judgment which could be rendered herein. There would in that case be five official papers when the law authorizes only four. It would be difficult to say that the claims of the papers appointed by the common council, for services rendered could be successfully resisted by the city on the. ground of any invalidity in their appointment. The effect of the mandamus would be to compel the appointment of a fifth paper without disturbing that of the other four. A very clear case should be made out to induce the court to subject the city to this additional expense, and we do not find the right of the relators to a mandamus so plain as to justify that course.”
It is true that the court by its order did not direct the designa- ■ tion of relator’s paper, but it did direct the board to select four papers which .advocated the election of a particular candidate as the candidate of the Democratic party for the office of Governor, in spite of the fact that it appeared from the papers submitted that the board had already designated four papers, and it is evident upon the face of these papers that in order to comply with the peremptory mandamus the board must first rescind its prior action, the con
As I think the order appealed from was unauthorized,, it should be reversed and the motion forjnandaimis denied.
Ingraham, J., concurred.
Appeal dismissed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.