In re Clement
Opinion of the Court
The order should be affirmed, with-costs.
.The certificate was issued April 28, 1905, to expire April 30, 1906, authorizing the defendant to traffic in liquor .at premises situate on the southwest corner of Wasson avenue.and Iron street, Lachawanna, Erie county, H. Y; The petitioner claimed that on October ' 13,1905, the defendant permitted gambling in said premises by means of a nickel slot machine. The defendant denied this. .The evidence
All concurred, except Ebuse and Robson, JJ., who dissented in' an opinion by Ebuse, J.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
As I view this case it presents' a plain, but unsuccessful attempt upon the part of the licensee, whose liquor tax certificate the State Commissioner of Excise seeks to have revoked,, to evade the provisions of the Liquor Tax Law relating to gambling. That law provides:
“Eo corporation, association, copartnership, or person, who, as owner or agent, shall suffer or permit any gambling to be done in.
The petition in this proceeding states that the applicant presented a verified statement, under subdivision 1 of section 11 of the Liquor Tax Law
It appears by the evidence that the building in which the liquor business was carried on was owned by the brother of the licensee. There was a pool room back of the barroom, and for at least a part of the time while the gambling machine was in the pool room, the door in the side street leading into the pool room was permanently closed, so that customers of Jhe pool room were required t.o go
Whether this pool room is to be regarded as a part of the barroom or not, I have no doubt that the licensee had the legal right Under his liquor tax certificate to serve his customers in the pool room, and it was so used and a part of the licensed premises.
It is true that the licensee testified that he complained of the use of the machine and demanded that it-be taken out, but this was not . sufficient to absolve him from’ the consequences of its being used, and, besides, I am not persuaded that he desired or expected that the machine would be removed and the gambling operations cease. It would have been an easy matter for him to have closed the doors
It is, however, éarnestly contended on his part that since the licensee had a lease of only twenty-six feet square where ,the bar was located, lie had no control over the pool room, and that, therefore, he was not responsible for the gambling .which was done in the pool room, and so it is claimed that he did not permit or suffer the gambling. This seems to have been the view of the learned justice at Special Term. It does not seem to me that a licensee can thus absolve himself from responsibility for the premises becoming disorderly. If this were permissible the licensee might have taken a lease of one end of liis barroom sufficient for the bar and disclaim any responsibility for what occurred in any part of the room away ■from the. bar. He might even refrain from acquiring any right to the room or premises save that of selling liquor over the bar, leaving the room to be used and occupied by others for other purposes, and thus escape the consequences Which he would otherwise" incur. If persons who traffic in intoxicating liquors may thus relieve themselves from responsibility, it affords an easy way of evading the provisions- of the Liquor Tax Law against gambling and other disorderly practices being.carried on in connection with that business, and practically nullifies and makes ineffective that salutary provision! "
I think that the order should be reversed and the liquor " tax; certificate revoked and canceled.
Hobson, J., concurred.
Order affirmed, "with costs.
See Liquor Tax Law, § 11, suM. 1, as amd. by Laws of 1903, chap. 115.— [Rep.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.