Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent from the affirmance of this judgment. The court in its charge instructed the jury that if Corcoran, the defendant’s superintendent, knew or had reason to know that the scaffold was defective and dangerous and the risk was not obvious to Robinson (plaintiff’s intestate), then the defendant would be liable, and this instruction was excepted to. This, I think, was erroneous, as it took away from the jury the question of the defendant’s negligence. As I understand it, a violation- of the Labor Law (Laws of 1897, chap. 415) does not of itself as a matter of law impose a liability upon the employer. It is evidence from which the jury may find negligence, (but it is error for the court to instruct the jury that the defendant is liable as a matter of law. This error runs through all the charge, and while there are inconsistent statements as to the defendant’s liability, I think upon this charge as a whole the jury would have ieen justified in understanding that the court had6instructed them as a matter of law that if this scaffold was defective and •dangeroys und the risk was not obvious to the deceased, then the defendant was
Opinion of the Court
Present—Patterson, P. J., Ingraham, Laughlin, Clarke and Houghton, JJ. (Dissenting opinion by Ingraham, J.)
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.