Cochran v. Cochran
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff in this action, a virtuous, industrious and CImstian young woman, was married to a son of the defendants when she was eighteen years of age, her husband at the time being of practi
After the marriage the plaintiff continued to live at home, and her husband appears to have escorted her to her work in the morning and to have visited her every evening until finally the parents took strong measures to prevent him from visiting ■ her when he announced the fact of the marriage. Immediately after the fact became known to the defendants they took steps to bring about a separation ; they went to the home of the plaintiff, where their son was at the time, and inquired, for him at midnight, and, on being told, at liis request, that lié was not'present, they went away, only to send for him again in the morning. • The evidence shows that the father took the boy on his lap ' and told him that “ those people' don’t love you like your own father and mother do,” ■ and appealed to the boy to stay with his mother through her trophies' in reference to the death of her sister, and did many things-, calculated to work upon the feelings of a youth of eighteen, and that subsequently the boy was furnished money and was
We have no quarrel with the language of the court in Pollock v. Pollock (9 Misc. Rep. 82) that it “yet remains to be judicially sanctioned that parental solicitude for a child’s felicity is a reprehensible quality,” etc.,, but here the facts complained of occurred
It is not necessary to determine, in an action for damages for the alienation of affections, whether the marriage of an infant operates to take away the control of the father and emancipates the son, though it would seem to follow that with the obligations which the marriage relation involves, the son, once having entered the relation, is bound to perform its duties. If this is true, then the lesser relation must cease. But that is not the question here; the matter now before us is the alienation of the husband’s affections, and the evidence in this case clearly justified the jury in holding that the rights of the wife had been invaded by the practical abduction- of the husband, and keeping him away from her until he was willing to take the stand as a witness in behalf of the defendants, showing that the affection had ceased. There was no question here, as in Servis v. Servis (supra), of the affections having been previously alienated, or never having existed.
It is urged, however, that there was error in admitting conversations of the plaintiff with her husband, not in the presence of these defendants, both before and after the marriage, in which the husband detailed conversations with his father in reference to the
___ affair. W e have examined these matters, and we are persuaded that they were a part of the res gestee / that they were matters which it was proper to bring out as showing the situation of the parties — the standpoint from which they acted — and there is no reason to suppose that the evidence was understood in any other relation. The objections were very general, and when the case is read we are of the opinion that the evidence was competent for the purpose for which it was introduced, and that there is not reversible error presented by the exceptions.
The suggestion that this verdict of $7,500 is grossly excessive does not appeal to us. This young woman has been wronged; all of the rights and privileges which belong to the marriage relation have been denied to her under circumstances which are not calculated to arouse great sympathy for the defendants, and we are of opinion the judgment should stand.
G-atnor and Miller, JJ., concurred; Jenks, J., "concurred in result; Rich, J., read for reversal.
See Dom. Rel. Law (Laws of 1896, clap. 272), § 4, subcL.1.— [Rep.
Dissenting Opinion
I find myself unable to concur in this case. Defendants tried in various ways'to induce their son to spend more of his evenings at home. There is no claim that they had any objection to plain tiff; what they objected to was that he spent so-much of his time in the society of females. It, was neither strange nor unusual that affectionate parents should be solicitous regarding the welfare of their eighteen-year-old boy. The plaintiff understood their feelings but did not respect them, and agreed with defendants’ son. that a clandestine marriage ceremony should be performed and kept a secret until they were of the age of twenty-one years; that she would not take her husband’s name; that they should continue tó live apart, and that the marriage should not be consummated until they were twenty-one years old. Defendants learned of the marriage within a few days after the ceremony was performed, and I am .not surprised that they were grieved and disappointed at the conduct of their son. There is no claim .of any impropriety on the part, of defendants up to this time. The agreement to live, separate from her husband was terminablé at the pleasure of plaintiff, and she ■ availed herself of the privilege of terminating it at the very first opportunity. They were married on Sunday, and on the following Saturday evening plaintiff’s husband told her that his father wished him to stick by him through the trouble with his mother, who had just lost her sister; the father said that if he would give half of his time to his mother and half to the plaintiff everything would be all right. Plaintiff testified: “ I told him that if they had not known it it would have been different, but their knowing it I wanted him to acknowledge me before' everybody. I wasn’t going to be half way with him, I had had half of his time and I wasn’t going to take it now, and we felt very badly about it.” He remained. at plaintiff’s home that night occupying a room alone. ' About midnight and while he was there, defendants called to inquire for their son and were told by plaintiff’s mother that their son had left for home. Next morning, plaintiff went with her husband to' Fort Green. Speaking of the conversation had while there she testified: “We sat down ón a bench in the park and I told him that I was afraid in my heart about it, and I asked him if he was not sorry. I said, we have been foolish, Ernest, and he said, No, not if I had to go all
I vote for a reversal. :
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.