Caras v. Thalmann
Opinion of the Court
The question presented on this áppeal arises upon a demurrer to the complaint which was sustained by the courts below. The complaint alleges that, at the city of New York, on or about March 28, 1905, the defendants, for value received, drew a bill of exchange in .at least two equal parts of even date and tenor upon the Société G-énérale of Paris, France, requiring it to pay in Paris, France, at sight, to the order of J. Palau & Co., a firm of Barcelona, Spain, the sum "of 2,500 francs, French currency ; that the defendants mailed both pails of said bill of exchange inclosed in post-paid wrappers on the 28th day of March, 1905, addressed to J. Palau & Co. at Barcelona, Spain, one part going by a steamer sailing on Wednesday and the other part by a steamer sailing the following day ; that the said J. Palau & Co. never received the first part of the said bill of exchange or the proceeds thereof; that the second part of the said bill of exchange was received by the. payees, by them duly indorsed and negotiated and .was in.the course of business on the 12th day of April, 1905, presented to the drawee for payment and payment thereof refused upon the ground that the first part of the
There can be no question but that the law of the place of performanCe, namely, Paris, in the Eepublic of France, governed as to the payment of the bill. By the.bill in question the'drawee of the bill xvas required to pay to the payees at Paris in the Eepublic of
Section 315 of the act provides: “Except as herein otherwise provided, where any one part of a bill drawn in a set is' discharged by payment or otherwise the whole bill is discharged.” Therefore,a valid payment by the drawee of one part of this bill discharged the whole bill.
- Tlie complaint alleges that this bill was drawn in two parts, one of which .parts was actually paid by the drawee to the person presenting It although the payee’s, name thereon had been forged. If this payment was valid by the law' of the Republic of France it necessarily follows that the bill itself was discharged and no liability could be predicated on the refusal to pay the second part as payment of the first part had discharged the obligation to pay the same to the payees. The defendants were liable if at all under section- 111 of the Negotiable Instruments'Law which.provides that the drawer by drawing the instrument engages that, on due presentation the instrument will be accepted and paid, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. If the drawee pays one part of a. bill drawn in a set the bill itself is discharged) and, therefore, the bill was not dishonored. The complaint also alleges that the payment of the first part was a valid payment under the French law in virtue of the provisions of articles 144 and 145 of section 9 of title 8 of the French Code of Commerce
The plaintiff contends that as the second part of this bill which is now. sued on was the only one delivered to tlie payees, therefore, as between the drawers and the payees it constituted the only valid existing instrument and that the payees could not be affected by the fate of the undelivered duplicate of the.bill. But the bill itself was drawn- in a- set, and, therefore, all of the parts constituted one' bill. The defendants were under no obligation to the payees to transmit a sum of money. The validity of the bill did not depend upon its being received by the payees, but was an existing obligation 'of the defendants when issued by them and delivered to the post office authorities for transmission; the right of the payees to recover depended not upon their receipt of the bill, but upon a failure of the drawee to pay the bill when presented at maturity and without opposition. If the drawee duly paid the bill when presented according to the law of the place-of payment the bill was discharged and no further liability existed upon it, and as the complaint alleges that the drawee did pay one part of the bill when presented to it according to the law of the Republic of France where it was payable, the bill itself having been discharged it would seem to follow that no action could be maintained by the payees against the drawers for a failure to pay the bill. There is no allegation that the drawee was negligent in paying the first part of the set when presented. The complaint alleges that the bill-was paid by the drawee over its counter in good faith to the person presenting the same in the belief that it was making payment of the bill to the lawful holder thereof, although before making such payment it did not take any steps to ascertain the identity of tlie person presenting the same or the genuineness of the indorsements thereon. It is not alleged that an obligation to ascertain the identity of the person presenting the bill or the genuineness of the indorsements was imposed upon the drawee by the law of France and the allegation that the bill was paid in good faith and without opposition under the law of the Republic of
It follows that the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants and the judgment should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
McLaughlin and Miller, JJ., concurred; Laughlin and Dowling, JJ., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
The defendants herein for value received at the city of New York drew a bill of exchange in duplicate parts of even tenor and date upon the Société Générale of Paris, France, requiring it to pay in Paris, at sight, to the order of J. Palau & Co., a .firm of Barcelona, Spain, the sum of 2,500 francs in French currency. Such parts were both mailed on March 28, 1905,.to said J. Palau & Co.'; one part being sent per “ S. S. Baltic,” and the other per “ S. S. La Bretagne.” Ho instructions had been given by the payees as to the method of delivery of the bill and they were unaware of its existence until the second part thereof was delivered to them through the mail at Barcelona, the said bill having been remitted by the defendants to J. Palau & Co. in payment of a debt due the latter by a third party, who had placed the defendants in possession of funds for the purpose, and had instructed them to make the said remittance, which defendants undertook to do and for which they charged and received from said third party the usual rate of exchange.
The first part of said bill of exchange was never received by J. Palau & Co., and when the second part received by them, had been duly indorsed and negotiated in the course of business, it was, on April 12, 1905, duly presented by a subsequent indorsee to the drawee for payment, and payment thereof was réfused upon the ground that the first part of said bill had, in the course of business, been presented for payment to said drawee on April 11, 1905, and on that date paid to the holder thereof, whereupon the second part was duly protested and notice of dishonor duly-given.
It is further alleged that when the first part of said bill was pre: sented to the drawee for payment and paid it bore several indorsements, each following the other, and all apparently correct on their face; and the drawee paid said bill over its counter in good faith to
“ Section 144.'-The party who pays a bill of exchange before its maturity is responsible for the validity of the payment.
“Section 145.- The party who pays a bill of exchange at its maturity and without opposition is presumed validly discharged.”
The plaintiff is the assignee and indorsee of the setiond part of the bill, and of the cause of- action thereupon, and his complaint sets forth substantially the foregoing facts-.
To this complaint the defendants demur .and the question presented is whether such facts set forth a good cause of action. Under section 111 of the Negotiable Instruments Law of this State the defendants would be liable as drawers of the bill in suit, unless they have been discharged by a valid payment made by the drawee. It cannot be doubted that, so far as the payment of this bill, is concerned, its validity is to be determined by the law of France, being the place whereat payment was to be, made. Under the French Code of Commerce it seems clear that a rule of evidence has been laid down whereby the burden of proof is upon the drawee to establish the validity of the payment made by him if he pays the bill before maturity. If, on the other hand, the bill is paid at maturity and without opposition, then a different rule applies and
It is difficult to see upon what theory the presumption created under section 145-of the Code of Commerce can be held to be a conclusive one. It would seem that such presumption is like any other which can be met and overcome by proof. In this case the plaintiff sets forth acts of negligence upon the part of the drawee, which, if proven, would be sufficient to make the payment of the first part of the bill, unavailable as' a defense to payment of the second part. This would seem to be clear on reason and is supported by the French commentators. G-oirand in his commentary on “French Commercial Law” (2d ed. p. 210), treating of article 145, says: “ When the payment has been made at the date of maturity, it cannot be disputed, nor can the drawee be compelled to pay over again. It is otherwise, however, when the drawee has been served with an opposition to the payment of the bill. It must be remarked that this presumption of payment having been validly made, ceases if grave negligence can be imputed to the drawee; consequently, the drawee, in order to pay with full security, must take certain precautions. Thus, he. must on presentation of the bill, examine it, in order to convince himself that the holder is the rightful owner. He must verify the chain of .endorsers, and, if it be broken, refuse payment. In other words, he must examine if all the signatures of the endorsers follow each other regularly and correspond, and whether each endorsement is followed by the signature of the endorser whose name is mentioned in the preceding endorsement, as it is this latter only who is the proprietor of the bill, and who has the right to transfer it.”
For these reasons it appears that the complaint sets forth a good cause of action, and that the determination of the Appellate Term and the judgment of the Municipal Court should be reversed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Term, and the demurrer overruled, with costs, with leave to the defendants to withdraw the demurrer and to answer upon payment of said costs.
Laughlist, J., concurred.
Determination affirmed, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.