Ireland v. Hall
Opinion of the Court
This is- an action by the owner of premises known as 93 Beade street, borough of Manhattan, New York, to recover rent of the premises from the 1st day of March, 1908, to the 1st day of February, 1909, upon the theory that defendant was an assignee of a lease thereof in possession. The premises were leased by the plaintiff to the Edgar A. Wilhelmi Company on the 17th day of January,, 1905, for three years from February first of that year, at a rental of $5,000 for the first year and $5,500 per annum for the balance of the term, payable in equal monthly installments on the first of each month in advance, with a privilege of renewal for two years at a rental of $5,500 per annum, which was duly exercised on November 19, 1906, by Wilhelmi, Hall & Co., the successor to the original lessee. The defendant was vice-president of Wilhelmi, Hall & Co. Wilhelmi, Hall & Co., on the day it exercised the renewal privilege, executed a sub-lease of the premises for the balance of the term to, the New York House Furnishing Goods' Company, to commence January 1, 1907, at a rental, however, of $300 per annum more than that reserved by the plaintiff in the- original lease. The sub-lessee went into possession on the 1st day of January, 1907. At the time'of negotiating this sub-léase, Wilhelmi, Hall & Co. requested the plaintiff to accept the New York House Furnishing Goods Company as the tenant arid tó release it from liability under the lease, which he declined, but he consented to the sub-lease of the premises. By the sub-lease the sub-lessee was obligated to pay the rent to Wilhelmi, Hall & Co., and did pay the first month’s rent to that company, which delivered it all: to the defendant, who sent his personal check to William G..
: Walker’s Sons, the agents of the owner,, and inclosed it with' a-letter in which he informed them, that he was sending it “ asassignee and owner of the léase,,” and requested a receipt in. the name of the owner by them, as agents. This course with, respect to the payment of the rent was continued by the sub- • lessee and by the defendant for thirteen months more, excepting that during this time the sub-lessee paid the rent directly to-the defendant. The receipts given, by the plaintiff’s agents for the rent for January and February, 1907,. recited that it was
The learned trial justice submitted to the juay .as a question of fact whether or not the -defendant was in possession .of the premises for the period for which the plaintiff seeks to recover rent after the trustee in bankruptcy vacated them; and in that connection instructed the jury as matter ¡of lawihatThe defendant was not in possession of the premises while the sub-lessee or -the trustee in bankruptcy occupied them, and that .'actual possession by the defendant was essential to the plaintiff’s Tight to recover, hut that this might he shown by ¡assuming control .and retaining the keys without actually entering .upon-or occupying the premises. Counsel for the plaintiff duly excepted to these parts of the charge. In answer to an inquiry by the jury, The court instructed Them that -the defendant could only he held liable on the ground that he was The assignee ¡of the lease or was estopped from denying that he was such -assignee, .and on the ground that he was in possession, ¡and that plaintiff only seeks to hold him liable as assignee in possession “ and not because of any contractual assumption of the payment of the rent.” Counsel for the plaintiff, in view of this .and -other requests made by the jury, sent to the court from the jury room, requested the court to further instruct them that if plaintiff was justified by defendant’s letter in believing that he was assignee of the lease and acted thereon to his prejudice by refraining from instituting dispossess proceedings, or otherwise taking possession, they might find that -defendant was - estopped from denying that he was assignee, which was declined -on the ground that the jury had not asked for further instructions -on that point. The plaintiff testified that he refrained from taking any steps to regain possession of the premises, relying upon defendant’s letter stating that he was assignee of the lease, which afforded a basis for this request. The court gave the
Counsel for the respondent contends, in effect, that the sublease was an assignment of the original lease, and that, therefore, nothing remained which could be assigned to respondent, and that appellant could not have been misled by his letter, as he should have known the legal effect of the sub-lease. The sub-lease, having been for the balance of the term, although at a higher rental, could have been regarded by the appellant as an assignment of the lease. (Stewart v. Long Island R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 601, 607; Herzig v. Blumenkrohn, 122 App. Div. 756.) The appellant, however, never accepted the sub-lessee as assignee of- the lease, or did anything to release Wilhelmi, Hall ■& Co. Wilhelmi, Hall & Co. manifestly retained an interest in the lease which was capable of assignment. It remained liable to the lessor, and the sub-lessee was obligated to pay the rent to it and on default could have been dispossessed, and it would then have had the right to occupy the premises, or again sub-let them with the consent of the lessor. This interest and right it could assign to the respondent and there is evidence. tending to show that 'it did so, although it is not uncontroverted; but the respondent represented to the, appellant that he was the assignee of the lease, and it is, therefore, not material whether or not such was the fact, provided, as the appellant testified, he relied upon that representation to his prejudice. The learned court erred in holding that the respondent could not be an assignee in possession of the premises during the period the sub-lessee and its trustee in bankruptcy occupied them. If the respondent was the assignee of the lease, the possession of the sub-lessee was his possession.' (Carter v. Hammett, 18 Barb. 608; Landon v. Townshend, 129 N. Y. 166, 178.) The ruling was most prejudicial' to the rights of the appellant, for it left his claim that the respondent was in pos- • session to rest solely on the, evidence with respect to the custody of the keys and efforts to rent the premises after the trustee in bankruptcy vacated them. We are also of opinion that the court should have granted plaintiff’s request to further, instruct the jury with respect to the important question of estoppel.
Ingraham, P. J., McLaughlin, Miller and Dowling, JJ., concurred.
Judgment and order reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.