Rycroft v. Pierce
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent and vote for an affirmance of the order.
The undisputed facts compel the conclusion, to my mind, that the defendant’s default was intentional and premeditated. I cannot doubt that he left the city of New York without the slightest intention of returning until it suited his convenience to do so. He simply relied upon the facility with which defaults have commonly been opened in this city with no greater penalty than the imposition of a bill of costs. In my opinion the defendant’s deliberate default exhibited a clear contempt of the power or willingness of the court to assert its authority. The former order of this court authorized the defendant to renew his application at Special Term to open the default “upon satisfactory proof that the defendant was unable to come to New York to be present at the trial of the case and that he has a defense on the merits.” He certainly has not established by satisfactory proof that he was unable to come to New York, and the prevailing opinion does not refer to any such proof. On the contrary, the proof is all to the effect that he could have returned if he had chosen, although perhaps at some personal inconvenience. • As to the merits, the defendant now offers a radically different defense from that pleaded in his answer, and one which, upon the present state of the pleadings,, he could not prove. His answer denies liability because plaintiff’s stocks were sold by Post & Flagg, his brokers, without his knowledge or authority. He now says that the stocks were sold by his orders and authority, upon the faith of a letter written to him by plaintiff which he treats as a direction to
Order reversed, motion granted, default opened and new trial granted upon terms stated in opinion. Order to be settled on notice.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff obtained a judgment upon an inquest for $171,149.66 on March 6, 1912. On April 22, 1912, an order of the Special Term was entered vacating said judgment upon terms. Upon appeal to this court said order was reversed, the opinion thereon being reported" in 150 Appellate Division, 521. The order of this court provided, however, as follows: 1 ‘Without prejudice to an application at Special Term for leave to renew the motion to open the default upon satisfactory proof that the defendant was unable to come to New York to be present at the trial of the case and that he has a defense on the merits. ” Thereafter the motion was renewed at the Special Term upon additional papers and, having there been denied, this appeal is taken.
The former record on appeal contained no affidavit of the defendant. That deficiency is supplied in the present record, and the facts now shown present a materially different case upon the merits.
The complaint alleges that on the 26th of May, 1903, plaintiff had a stock account with the firm of Arthur S. Leland & Co., bankers and brokers, composed of 100 shares of the common stock' of the Hocking Valley Railroad .Company, 500 shares of' the common stock of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, 400 shares of the common stock of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and 200 shares of the preferred stock of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company, of the reasonable value on that day of $92,700; that on or about the 25th day of May, 1903, defendant promised and agreed with this plaintiff that if she would transfer her account as it then existed with Arthur S. Leland & Co. to the firm of Post & Flagg, with whom defendant then had an
Upon the inquest she testified as follows: “Q. What did he say about this account with Leland & Co. ? * * * A. He said if I would have the account transferred to his brokers in my name it would put him in a better position. * * * He said he would also guarantee the account. "x" * * His brokers were Post & Flagg. "x" * * As a result of that conversation * * * I authorized their transfer. * * * Q. * * * When was the first time that you learned that your account had not appeared upon Post & Flagg’s books, if ever? A. That was in June, 1909. Q: In June, 1909, you learned about the account from whom ? A. From Hr. Pierce. "x" * * Q. From the time in May, 1903, when you had authorized and directed the transfer of your account in the name of A. G-. Bycroft from Leland & Co. to Post & Flagg until these communications which are in evidence' here of July 30, 1909, and October 26, 1909, had you ever heard from Post & Flagg in regard to that account so transferred ? A. Ho. Q. Had you at any time from the 26th day of May, 1903, down to the time when you learned of these' facts in regard to this account, ever authorized or directed any person to transfer those securities from that account in any other name or to any other account than your own ? A. Why, no. * "x" * Q. * * * Had you had any knowledge or intimation that the account for these securities had ever been transferred to any other account than your own ? A. Ho. * * * Q. During [this] interval * * * had you at any time made any inquiries from Mr. Pierce in regard to the account which you had transferred at his request to Post & Flagg ? A. Oh, yes. Q. What assurances, if any, had you received from him in answer to those inquiries regarding that account? A. That everything was all right, I had nothing to worry about.”
Mr. Post testified: “ Q. Will you kindly state to the jury what was done with those securities and that account when they were taken over by yoúr firm? A. They were placed in the account standing on our books of H. Clay Pierce,
In the affidavit filed by Pierce, as required by the order of this court, showing that he had a defense, he says: “ I did not, nor did the said firm of Post & Flagg, place the securities mentioned in the complaint to my credit and account, but on the contrary, the said securities were placed in an account entirely separate and, distinct from my own personal account, * * * the said separate and distinct account being designated by my directions on the books of Messrs. Post & Flagg as 1H. Olay Pierce, Esq., Special.’ No securities belonging to me or to any one else except the plaintiff were ever carried in this account, nor were her securities ever mingled with my own; as a matter of accommodation to the plaintiff * * * I guaranteed the said Post & Flagg against any loss on this special account, and I actually sustained a personal loss in connection with the account amounting to $22,984.15. * * * In the year 1902, and prior thereto, * * * plaintiff was engaged in a series of stock speculations on margin with various brokerage firms, * * * among whom were the firms
“.‘Statement'of Mr. H. 0.'Pierce’s Special Account with Post & Flagg, for account of Mrs. Alice Gr. Bycroft. (?)
“ ‘ June 30, 1903 (the debit balance this account was as per statement rendered. $107,591.54
“ ‘ The securities mentioned in said statement were as follows:
As per P. & F’s As per market at Stock. statement of close of business July 27th, ’03. July 30th, 1903. •¡■Southern Pacific, o o at $41.. $28,700.00 $44 $30,800.00 •¡■Hocking Valley, 100, 75.. 7,500.00 80 8,000.00# ? Atchison, 500, 62.. 31,000.00 62% 31,250.00 Union Pacific 400, 73.. 29,200.00 75 30,000.00 fM. K. & T. Pfd. 200, 38.. 7,600.00 40% 8,025.00#
Totals.......... $104,000.00 $108,075.00
1.300 shares Va. Ohem, at 32... 41,600.00 }
1.300 shares Va. Ohem, at 34 (?) 44,200.00 f
Total.........15,100.00 and $16,025.00
Satdy. 8/1
*800 f New York 1 " ■\ Jul 31 1903 ¡-Instructed P. & F. to sell at today’s market. 1C. B. O. j
700 Southern Pacific 100 Hocking Valley 500 Atchison Com 200 M. K. & T.
& take up at Sharp & Bryan 800. Vir. Chem. Co. at $26,750.’
* * * Upon receipt of said statement of account I examined it, and marked in lead pencil with cross marks the names of the stocks directed to he sold by the plaintiff in her said letter. Upon consideration of the figures I came to the conclusion that I would he unwilling to make the additional commitment involved in taking up the stock of the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company mentioned in the plaintiff’s said letter, unless she also gave me authority to sell her Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe stock in addition to the stocks mentioned in her said letter. I therefore placed opposite the word ‘ Atchison ’ in lead pencil a ‘ V, and thereafter conferred with the plaintiff as requested by her in her said letter. At such conference I undertook to take over the stock of the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company ■ on condition that the plaintiff would give me authority to sell her said Atchison stock in addition to the other stocks mentioned in her said letter, and directions to do so were given me by plaintiff. Thereupon on August 1, 1903, I directed the said Post & Flagg to sell at the ruling market prices for that day the 700 shares of stock of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the 100 shares of stock of the Hocking Valley Railroad Company, the 500 shares of stock of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company and the 200 shares of the preferred stock of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company and * * * to take up at the brokerage firm of Sharp & Bryan 800 shares of stock of the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company and to pay to the said Sharp & Bryan the plaintiff’s debit balance against said stock amounting to $26,750. The statement in the plaintiff’s said letter, that there- were 1,300 shares of stock of the . Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company turned out to be incor
Mrs. Bycroft and her two counsel admit in their affidavits that before the taking of the inquest they knew of the letter from her of July 30, 1903, quoted supra, and had a copy of it. ' It is true she denies that she ever had any conference with defendant or gave him any directions after the writing of such letter. In this she is flatly contradicted by the defendant and he is corroborated to a considerable extent by documentary evidence.
She is proceeding as upon a conversion' on May 26,1903, and she denies that she requested the defendant to. take up and carry for her in the said special account the securities mentioned in the complaint, and reiterates the testimony which she gave upon the inquest, where she said that the first time that she learned that her account had not appeared in her name upon Post & Flagg’s books was in June, 1909, and that she had never authorized or directed any person to transfer those securities in any other name or to any other account than hei own.
In view of the fact that this lady was an experienced operator, who knew that brokers were in the habit of sending regular statements in regard to all open accounts in their offices, and the fact that She never received any from Post & Flagg; the fact that the Southern Pacific stock which opened the H. Olay Pierce special account in 1902 was ordered to be sold by her in her letter of July thirtieth and is not included in her cause of action; the fact that the 800 shares of Virginia Chemical held in her name in the office of Sharp & Bryan were, as matter of fact, transferred from said office to Post & Flagg in
It is not necessary for us at this time to hold that the defendant has made out a complete defense to the whole cause of action; enough has been established to raise a strong presumption against the validity of the plaintiff’s claim, at least in its entirety. Under such circumstances, in the interests of justice, we are imwilling to permit this judgment to stand. We think that a real trial should be had in open court, where the conflicting stories may be tested according to the course of the common law. The plaintiff does not meet the attack upon the integrity of her testimony and of the judgment obtained thereon, made by the production of this letter, while she and her counsel admit that they were aware of it and had a copy of it at the time of the inquest.
The averment is made by one of the counsel in his affidavit that there is evidence which deponent, in justice to his client, cannot at this time, without prejudice to her other case now pending, disclose here, which, in deponent’s judgment, answers in an entirely satisfactory manner the claims of the defendant based upon this alleged letter as made by him. If plaintiff is not willing to disclose such alleged evidence in order to maintain her judgment a trial ought, to be had upon which both parties will have the opportunity to disclose all the facts and the whole truth touching their mutual relations.
The order appealed from should, therefore, be reversed, the motion granted, the default opened and a néw trial ordered, upon the following terms: That the judgment is to stand as security; that the defendant stipulate that in the event of his
Ingraham, McLaughlin and Laughlin, JJ., concurred; Scott, J., dissented.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.