Traynor v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
Opinion of the Court
This is a statutory action to recover for the death of Philip Traynor which occurred on the 12th day of June, 1911, and is alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in whose employ he was as a “ third rail man’s helper,” and assigned to duty by the defendant’s electrical foreman as a helper to one Quinn, whose title and désignation was “ third rail man.”
The action is brought - both under the Employers’ Liability Act, so called (Labor Law [Consol. Laws, chap. 31; Laws of 1909, chap. 36], §§ 200-204, as amd. by Laws of 1910, chap. 352), and the Eailroad Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 49 [Laws of 1910, chap.- 481], § 64). Due notice was served upon the defendant as required by statute to authorize the maintenance of the action. The negligence charged, so far as material to the appeal, was in not furnishing a watchman for the decedent and in operating trams where decedent was working without keeping a proper lookout or giving any signal or warning.
At the time of the accident which resulted in the death of Traynor the defendant was engaged in constructing its terminal in the borough of Manhattan, New York, known as the Grand
Quinn, the only witness for the plaintiff, was interested, for he had an action pending against defendant for the injuries which he sustained. He testified in substance that he and the decedent first went to track 9 or 10 and did repair work, and
The cars which remained standing on track 13 after a train came in and went out each contained an electric motor and were called multiple unit cars and apparently all looked alike from the front at least.
On behalf of the defendant it was shown by the testimony of witnesses who operated the trains and whose duty it was to direct the operation thereof that from eight-fifty-six A. M. that day three cars had been left standing at the southerly end of track 13, and that they were to form part of a train to leave at six-twenty-five p. m. that day; that a train consisting of six cars came in on that track at four-fifty-five P. M. from White Plains and stopped with a space between it and the three cars standing to the south and remained there until five-thirty-six p. M., when it started to leave again for White Plains and when the accident which was caused either by that train or the train backing in on track 12 occurred. That evidence not only tends to show that no train came in and went out on track 13 as testified tq by Quinn, but that with the nine cars standing on track 13, as stated, Quinn and the decedent could not have been working opposite the middle of the platform, for the evidence shows that the platform is only about the length of thirteen cars .which are sixty feet in length and if, as Quinn says, he and the decedent were working about one hundred and seventy-five feet to the north of the north car and there were nine cars thus standing on this track, he and the decedent must have been working within about sixty-five feet of the north end of the platform.
If, as Quinn testified, he and the decedent were working on the third rail of track 13 and were put in jeopardy by the train on that track moving out without signal or warning and that its movement was not discovered by them until it was nearly upon them although they had made such observations as the nature of their work permitted, then, doubtless, the defendant would be liable, either upon the theory that the foreman was negligent in requiring them to perform work in such a dangerous place without furnishing a watchman to warn them or to signal trains, or under section 64 of the Bail-road Law for the negligence of the engineman of the train which moved out on track 13 or the employee of the defendant in charge of the movement of the train on track 12; but we are of opinion that a finding that the accident occurred as Quinn testified would he clearly against the weight of the evidence presented by this record.
But it is not entirely clear that the verdict was based upon the testimony of Quinn, for the learned trial court in submitting the case to the jury permitted them to find, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff if the decedent was on or about any of the tracks in the yard engaged in the performance of any duty which he was directed to perform by defendant’s foreman.
Before the court instructed the jury, or during the giving of such instructions, counsel for the defendant handed up certain requests in writing. One of these was as follows: “ That if
At the close of the charge the court in passing upon these requests modified this request and charged it as follows: “ That if the jury find that Traynor, the deceased, was not engaged in making repairs, or in the performance of some duty he was directed by defendant’s foreman to perform, immediately before he was injured, it was not the duty of defendant to furnish a watchman to keep a lookout for the movement of trains and to inform Traynor of such movement,” and thereupon further instructed the jury as follows: “In regard to this modification and the several modifications of other requests, I state that I have modified the requests in the form in which they have been modified by reason of the testimony which appears in the case given by defendant’s foreman, that he not only directed the decedent and Quinn to perform work on the particular tracks mentioned, but directed them to make repairs where they found them to be needed, and this might necessarily involve the duty of looking to see where repairs were needed.”
The court was requested to further instruct the jury that “ under the evidence the jury may not find that plaintiff’s intestate was engaged in making repairs on tracks 12 and 11 immediately prior to the accident,” to which the court replied: “ I so charge, but I charge you in that connection that if the decedent was on or about any of the tracks in that yard engaged in the performance of any duty which he was directed by defendant’s foreman to perform, that it was the duty of the defendant to use reasonable care and precaution in safeguarding him in the performance of that duty.” Counsel for defendant duly excepted to the refusals of the court to charge as requested in each instance and to the charge as modified.
The jury may well have understood that the court in declining these requests intended to permit them to find a verdict for the plaintiff even though they disbelieved the testimony of Quinn in toto. This we think was error. If the accident had
It follows, therefore, that judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Ingraham, P. J., McLaughlin, Clarke and Scott, JJ., concurred.
Judgment and order reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event. Order to he settled on notice.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.