Hynds v. Fourteenth Street Store
Opinion of the Court
This action was brought for libel. The complaint avers that the defendant is a domestic corporation engaged in general retail business in the city of Hew York; that for twenty years last past plaintiff has been engaged in the business of manufacturing ladies’ corsets and has, in that business, obtained’ a very high reputation and has invested in said business large sums of money and has obtained throughout the world a name for herself at the head of such business; that on November 19, 1909, the defendant maliciously and recklessly composed and caused to be published in the Evening World an advertisement as follows: “ Therese Hynds Corsets Bought At Auction. On Sale Tomorrow Half Her Former Prices. Bankruptcy Proceedings necessitated the Sale. Corsets Formerly $5.00 to $20.00 at Less Than Half Those Prices. To the women who are in the custom of paying liberally for their corsets there is no more familiar name than Therese Hynds, She established a reputation that extends from Hew York to San Francisco. In her booklet entitled c My Honest Opinion' Corsets,’ she says in part: £ My story is plain and sincere, made possible by years of earnest effort and experience gained in personally fitting, designing and manufacturing corsets for thousands of the best dressed and most discriminating women in the world, who are to-day and have been for years my exclusive customers, well able to purchase the best garment money can buy.’ We bought too many corsets and too varied an assortment to be able to give the actual details of all the
The answer, for a separate defense to the first cause of action, both whole and partial, alleged that prior to the alleged publication, and for some time previous thereto, plaintiff had been engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling ladies’ corsets and lingerie; that all of the goods and merchandise so manufactured by the plaintiff were marked, known as and sold under the trade name “ Therese Hynds; ” that in order to facilitate her method of doing business, plaintiff, on or about the 10th of September, 1908, caused two corporations to be organized, one the “ Therese Hynds Lingerie Co.” and the other the “Therese Hynds Cometiere Co.,” and certificates of incorporation were filed in the county clerk’s office. Both of the above-named corporations occupied an office in common, which said office was maintained at the residence of the plaintiff. Shortly subsequent to the organization of said two corporations, the “ThereseHynds Mfg. Co.” was organized, and on the 19th of October, 1908, a certificate of incorporation was filed. The “ Therese Hynds Mfg. Co.” was organized as a selling agent of the plaintiff’s business, and in order to exploit and use the name “ Therese Hynds ” in connection with all the goods manufactured or sold by it; the said “Therese Hynds Mfg." Co.” exchanged merchandise with the plaintiff and with the other corporations referred to, which were operated in connection with the business of the plaintiff, for the purpose of advertising, exploiting and using the trade name “Therese Hynds.” All of the comets and other merchandise sold by the “ Therese Hynds Mfg. Co.” were marked and designated with the name or labelc ‘ Therese Hynds. ” The said ‘ ‘ Therese Hynds Mfg. Co.” borrowed money on notes indorsed by the plaintiff or one or the other of the two corporations above referred to. The “Therese Hynds Mfg. Co.” possessed the right to and did use in its business the name “ Therese Hynds ” asa trade mark on all merchandise manufactured or sold by it and on all
For a partial defense and by way of mitigation and also reduction of damages the answer repeated the allegations just set forth and alleged that relying upon the genuineness and authenticity of said name or label on said corsets this defendant caused a notice or advertisement, a partial copy of which
The defendant gave evidence tending to prove the allegations of the answer. Mrs. Hynds testified in her own behalf that she had been in business for herself twenty years or over; that she was first in business with her mother under the name of Therese White, but for the last eleven years since her marriage under the name Therese Hynds. “ I have used no other name during that time in my business. * * * During my business career I was never a bankrupt.” That she had never repudiated a debt; had paid one hundred cents on the dollar for the merchandise she had bought. That she had a five-story house at the time of this publication at 11 East Forty-seventh street. It was a large house, twenty-five by ninety. “I lived in the house and I manufactured corsets in the house. * * * I took up two of the lofts for the manufacturing of corsets, one other loft for the reception rooms and sitting rooms and offices. -» -x- * i had, I should say, altogether about thirty, forty or forty-five girls on an average the year round. * * * They manufactured these corsets. * * * I did the fitting myself, with four assistants.” She testified under cross-examination that in September, 1908, she was one of the incorporators of the Therese Hynds Corsetiere Company. This corporation was organized for the purpose of buying, manufacturing and selling corsets and corset goods of every description. “ I was president. It is a fact that I held all of the capital stock * * * except two shares.” On the same date a corporation known as the Therese Hynds Lingerie Company was organized. “I was an officer and stockholder of that company. It conducted an underwear business. * * * Besides myself, the other officers of these two companies were my husband, John G-. Hynds, and my brother, Francis White. They were directors and officers in both companies.” At the time of
She said she knew nothing about that company except that there was a company. “ I knew my husband was using my name in the corporate title of this company, without my permission; * * * and I knew that * * * the Therese Hynds Manufacturing Company had a factory over on Seventh Avenue” and that it “was maintaining or did maintain retail stores at different places in the City of New York and elsewhere.” It was proved by her husband’s testimony taken in the bankruptcy proceedings, and by a proof of debt bearing her signature, which recites that she is the treasurer of the Therese Hynds Oorsetiere Company, which she had filed in these proceedings, that the Therese Hynds Manufacturing Company was indebted to the oorsetiere company to the extent of $12,422.14.
“Although I was managing this oorsetiere business, knew all about corsets and was a business woman myself, I never discussed the kind of corsets they were making in the Seventh Avenue business, how they were advertising or anything about the business at all, because I was always too busy. Q. How did you know the money was advanced, the moneys you advanced was for rent and pay rolls % A. You forget that fact, that he was my husband. Q. And he told you they were pay rolls ? A. He was my husband, that is all I can say. He had the right. * * * He might have stated the purpose for which the moneys were loaned, but I really don’t remember. * * * I don’t remember giving them permission to use the name £ Therese Hynds ’ in connection with the Seventh Avenue business. I didn’t refuse him the use of the name £ Therese Hynds,’ when he filed an incorporation certificate in the name of the company, and used it in his place, and business. Could
There is thus the evidence of the relations of these three companies all making use of the name ££ Therese Hynds.” There was a mass of evidence as to the written script name ££ Therese Hynds ” which was on all the corsets and other things, order blanks and advertisements of the manufacturing company. One of these corporations, the Therese Hynds Manufacturing Company, did go into bankruptcy and the corsets advertised in the article complained of were bought by the defendant at the bankrupt sale under the direction of the receiver of said company. There is no question of that. But the plaintiff was not a stockholder or officer in that company. She is still in business for herself and has never been in bankruptcy. The difficulty with the case is that the court dismissed the complaint.
The article uses the personal pronoun: “ThereseHynds Corsets, * * * Half Her Former Prices; ” “There is no more familiar name than Therese Hynds;” “She established a reputation; ” “In her booklet * * * she says * * *: £My story;”’ “ She had a factory at 727 Seventh Avenue, a shop on fashionable Fifth Avenue; ” “at the auction of the Therese Hynds Bankrupt stock * * * we bought every style that Therese Hynds made; ” “ She was her own manufacturer; ” “ she made only the finest, high class corsets, priced at from $5 to $25.”
While all the matters proved in evidence tend to the reduction and mitigation of damages and to partial justification, the defense has not justified or attempted to justify the particular charge made in the complaint, which is, that the article complained of charged her with being a bankrupt. A course of business and proceedings has been shown proper to submit to a jury in determining how much, if any, damages it would give if
It is settled that in a libel suit if the defendant does not justify or prove privilege and the article is libelous per se damages are presumed, and the case must be submitted to the jury solely to determine the amount of damages. Speaking of words which tend to injure one in his trade or occupation, Andrews, J., said in Moore v. Francis (121 N. Y. 199): “ The case of words affecting the credit of a trader, such as imputing bankruptcy or insolvency, is an illustration. The action is maintainable in such a case although no fraud or dishonesty is charged, and although the words were spoken without actual malice.”
In Morrison v. Smith (177 N. Y. 366) Gray, J., said: “ The language used is to be understood by judge and jury in the same manner as others understand it, and words are to be taken in that sense, which would be naturally conveyed to persons of ordinary understanding. * * * If the language is unambiguous, whether it is actionable becomes a question of law; but if ambiguous and capable of an innocent, as well as of a disgraceful meaning, the question becomes one for the jury to settle. When the defamatory meaning is not apparent, innuendo is necessary. If the words are incapable of the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo and are prima facie not actionable, the complaint should be dismissed. If they are capable of such a meaning, however improbable it may appear, the jury should say whether they may be so understood.”
In Klaw v. New York Press Co., Limited (137 App. Div. 686) Mr. Justice Laughlin said: “If the article be susceptible of only one meaning, then the question whether or not it is libelous per se is to be decided as matter of law by the court. * * * If it be susceptible of more than one meaning, one of which would make it libelous, then it is the office of an innuendo to charge the libelous meaning, and it would be for the jury to determine whether or not the libelous meaning would be ascribed to it by readers of ordinary and average intelligence. * * * If it be equivocal or ambiguous and not necessarily libelous per se, and a libelous meaning of which it be susceptible in one view that may reasonably be taken of it be charged by innuendo, then it will withstand a demurrer, for the plaintiff would in
Falsely to charge a person engaged in business, to whom commercial credit is of the utmost importance, with bankruptcy, is libelousy>er se. The innuendo charges that the article complained of was intended to and did charge the plaintiff with being a bankrupt. If, upon the whole case, there was doubt whether the article was susceptible of that interpretation, then the case should have been submitted to the jury for their determination. The justification was not as broad as the charge. It was error to dismiss the complaint.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Ingraham, P. J., Dowling and Hotchkiss, JJ., concurred; Scott, J., dissented.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. Order to be settled on notice.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.