Emmet v. City of New York
Opinion of the Court
The Title" and Guarantee Company was a domestic corporation organized under chapter 538 of the Laws of 1885 for the purpose of examining titles to real estate and guaranteeing such titles and issuing and guaranteeing bonds and mortgages on real estate. It was, prior to the 1st day of April, 1910, the owner of certain corporate stock of the city of New York for $47,000 and this action was brought by the plaintiff, as Superintendent of Insurance, against the city of New York and the defendant Prendergast, as the comptroller of the said city, to recover for the conversion of such stock. The complaint alleges that plaintiff as such Superintendent was duly authorized and directed to liquidate the business of the said Title and Guarantee Company in pursuance of section 63 of the Insurance Law
The court found that on and prior to the 1st day of April, 1910, the Title and Guarantee Company was the owner and entitled to the possession of the corporate stock of the city of New York for the sum of $47,000, registered in the name of the company, transferable by the holder in person or by attorney upon the
I think upon those facts that there was a sale of this stock by the Title and Guarantee Company to the South Shore Traction Company. The directors of the title company had, by a formal vote, authorized its vice-president or one of its directors to sell, assign and transfer the stock; the directors by an instrument in writing had, “for Value Received, * * * bargained, sold, assigned and transferred ” the stock, and that assignment was presented to the finance department with a request to cancel the certificate and issue a new certificate for the benefit of the South Shore Traction Company. That request was complied with, and the city then paid to the traction company $50,000, which had been deposited with it, and received this stock in lieu of the deposit, and the South Shore Traction Company then paid to the title company the value of the stock. The transaction was then complete. The stock had been transferred by an officer of the title company who had authority to sell and transfer it; the value of the stock had been paid by the traction company and received by the title company. It may be that the title company could have rescinded the transfer as made in bad faith, but as to third parties dealing with the stock based upon the legal title to the certificate, I cannot see why this transaction did not pass the title. If on these papers presented to the finance department it had issued a new certificate to the South Shore Traction Company, and it had sold the certificate to a third party in good faith without notice, certainly such purchaser would not be guilty of a conversion, and I do not see that the defendants were guilty of a conversion for accepting the trans
Nor do I see how under the circumstances the city could be liable for a conversion of the stock. It has done nothing with the stock. The city has neither disposed of the stock nor has it received any benefit from it. The comptroller claims to hold the stock as security for the performance by the traction company of the obligation which it assumed when it received its franchise. If the comptroller is not entitled to hold the stock for that purpose, the title company or the plaintiff as its liquidator will be entitled to recover the stock which it deposited with the comptroller; but on the facts as developed on the trial, the plaintiff failed to prove a conversion. I can find no evidence that the title company or the plaintiff ever elected to rescind the sale, ever offered to return the money that it received as the value of the stock, or sought to recover back from the traction company the stock that it delivered, and the traction company is not a party to this action. The fact that the officers of the title company misappropriated the amount that it received for the stock cannot make the defendants liable. Whether this results from a valid transfer of the certificate of stock by the title company to the traction company or by way of estoppel is not material. Certainly both the title company and the plaintiff, seeking to enforce its rights, are estopped from holding the city of New York liable for the default of its officers duly authorized to act for it.
McLaughlin and Hotchkiss, JJ., concurred; Scott and Dowling, JJ., dissented.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
See Consol. Laws, chap. 28 (Laws of 1909, chap. 33), § 63, added by Laws of 1909, chap. 300, as amd. by Laws of 1910, chap. 634; Laws of 1911, chap. 366, and Laws of 1912, chap. 217. Since amd. by Laws of 1913, chap. 29.— [Rep.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.