Rodee v. City of Ogdensburg
Opinion of the Court
This is an appeal from an order denying the motion of the city of Ogdensburg for an order compelling the referees appointed in this action to repair or rebuild, and to keep in repair, the bridges over the canals, conduits and raceways on
In the year 1828 one Nathan Ford was the owner of a tract of land of upwards of 1,400 acres, situated mainly in the then town of Oswegatchie on the westerly side of the Oswegatchie river, but with upwards of 250 acres thereof lying in the then village of Ogdensburg on the easterly side .of the river. Prior to that year a dam, connecting those two parcels of property, and hence being wholly upon the land of Ford, had been built across the river on or near the site of the present dam, by which the water of the river was impounded, and has been conveyed by means of canals, raceways, sluices and other conduits, to mill sites upon the westerly side of the river, and also by a conduit to the portion of said land situated on the easterly side of the river, embraced in which is the Water Power Company lot, owned and occupied by the village and the city of Ogdensburg as its water power plant. In the year 1828, and in fche years immediately following, active development of the water power was had, and conveyances containing mutual covenants were made by Nathan Ford, his representatives and grantees, of mill sites in said tract, including the right to use certain quantities of water in the operation of the power plants erected upon said lots and subject to certain restrictions and liabilities relative thereto specified in the conveyances thereof, and from time to time additional conduits were required and were constructed to serve additional power plants.
The two roadways frequently mentioned in said conveyances and known in earlier times as the Morristown road and the Black Lake road, running down the St. Lawrence river and up the Oswegatchie riv.er, and now known as Main street and Lake street respectively, are ancient highways, dating doubtless from the settlement of that part of the country, and were in existence long before the construction of the canal and other intersecting conduits. While there is nothing in the record indicating by what permission and under what agreement, if
In 1863, upon petitions requesting that River street be opened, the trustees of the village resolved that “whenever River street westerly of Lake street shall have such part of the aqueduct removed as to make an easy grade, and the right of way surrendered so that no expense is incurred by the village therefor, the board of trustees will establish the same as a public highway.” In that year River street west of Lake street was surveyed by the village and declared to be a public highway; and in 1865 the village graded River street, built a bridge over the raceway and required the property owners to build sidewalks along the street. By such action the power lot owners were relieved of the maintenance of River street, including the bridge over the raceway west of Lake street, and those obligations were assumed by the village.
It thus appears that at this time the obligation to maintain the bridges over the canal on Lake and Main streets rested upon
Prior to 1870 differences had arisen among the lot owners as to the nature and extent of their respective rights and interests in the water power and undivided property, and as to the nature and extent of their several obligations in respect of maintaining the dam, conduits, gates and bridges, and other parts of the water power property, and it being charged that some of the lot owners were using more water than they were entitled to take, and that other lot owners had neglected or refused to maintain conduits, or to contribute to the expense of making necessary repairs, or to otherwise observe the covenants in the conveyances under which they held title and pos-, session, it was considered advisable that such rights, duties and obligations of each property owner, as towards the others, should be judicially settled and defined, and a decree obtained under which each owner might be compelled to observe the covenants of his conveyance.
To this end the plaintiffs Henry Bodee and others, in 1870, instituted an action in the Supreme Court, making the city of Ogdensburg and all persons and other corporations having water privileges parties defendant, setting forth in the complaint the facts as to the conveyances of water privileges, and as to the duties and obligations attendant thereon, and asking, among other things, a judicial construction of the several conveyances as to the rights of the several parties in the water power property, and asking the court “ to define and determine the nature and extent of the obligations of the several parties to this action with respect to building, maintaining and keeping in 'repair, and clear and unobstructed, the dams * * * aqueducts, gates, bridges and other parts of said water power property, and to provide for the strict enforcement of such obligations in said decree.”
In 1872 said action was tried and a judgment entered therein which, among other things, provided that the owners and occupants of water privileges upon said water power property were equally entitled to certain rights in common, among which was the right to use as a common way the streets and ways designated on the map of said property, among which
It is upon this judgment that the city of Ogdensburg bases its sole claim of right to an order requiring the power property owners to repair and rebuild the bridges in question; and in its brief before us it says it does not seek to compel the erection by the property owners of bridges other than such as are required by the provisions of the judgment. The city
Mention was made of streets and bridges in several of the conveyances of water power property including and following the conveyance by Ford in 1828, and the trial judge in his elaborate opinion has collected the various references thereto as contained in the judgment roll, of which the conveyances form a part, and from them he concludes that, although there are references in the judgment roll which undoubtedly require the property owners to build certain bridges on streets crossing the property for the common benefit of the property owners, search must be made in vain for any provisions which even suggest that the property owners are to build bridges for the public; and that it was not the intention of the property owners to obligate themselves for the construction of the bridges beyond what might be necessary for utilizing the water power property, and that the property owners had no intention of taking upon themselves the burden of maintaining the bridges which it was the duty of the public authorities to maintain for the public use.'
It is contended by the respondents that there was no intention upon the part of the court in granting the judgment of 1872 to impose upon the property owners any obligations other than those which existed under these conveyences, and that the court intended by the judgment merely to definitely define the rights and obligations of the parties and provide for their enforcement.
The respondents suggest that the village and city having built and maintained the bridges over the canal on Lake and Main streets, and over the raceway on River street, for upwards of sixty years, more than forty of which have elapsed since the entry of the decree, the city is estopped and cannot at this late day question its liability to continue to maintain these bridges. It appears from the evidence that from the time the limits of the village of Ogdensburg were extended in 1851 to include the portion of the water power property situated on the westerly side of the river known as Fordsville down to the time of the incorporation of the city of Ogdensburg in 1868, and from that time to the present these bridges have been' built and maintained by the municipality. This the counsel for the city attributes to the fact that many of the officials of the village and city were the owners of water power property and lax in the enforcement of the obligations of such owners. Even if such were the fact, the prior voluntary maintenance of the bridges could impose no obligation whatever upon the city to continue the favor or furnish a basis for estoppel. It is a well-settled principle that rights cannot be acquired by prescription as to a public highway against the public. (Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Shultz, 116 id. 382; Fulton L., H. & P. Co. v. State of N. Y., 200 id. 400.)
There is a further aspect in which the question as to the liability of the power owners to maintain a bridge over the raceway on River street should be considered even if it be held that the power owners were vested with the obligation to maintain that bridge under the provision of the decree requiring them to maintain bridges “over other waste races, if any,” crossing streets. As before stated, River street was opened by the power owners as a private street through their own property in the development of their power system. Its principal use was apparently by the power owners in connection with their business and as furnishing convenient access to the railroad station. The travel on the street was not great and required a not
It is elementary that covenants are to be so construed as to carry into effect the intention of the parties, and it is well settled that equity will enforce specific performance only in accordance with the intent of the parties at the time the covenant was made. (People ex rel. Frost v. N. Y. C. R. R., 168 N. Y. 194; Conger v. N. Y., W. S. & B. R. R. Co., 120 id. 29.)
The question as to the liability of the power lot owners tó maintain bridges over conduits at other places has not been considered because of apparent immateriality and the meagreness of the record with reference to them. We conclude, however, that the power lot owners are obligated to maintain the bridges over the canal on Lake and Main streets, and the city to build and maintain the bridge over the raceway on River street. The order of the Special Term should be modified accordingly, but without costs to either party in this or the lower court.
All concurred, except Howard, J., dissenting; Kellogg, J., not sitting.
Order modified as per opinion, and as modified affirmed, without costs to either party in either court.
See 86 Misc. Rep. 229.—[Rep.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.