C. F. Harms Co. v. Leonhard Michel Brewing Co.
Opinion of the Court
Both of the parties to this action are corporations. The plaintiff owns and operates dumping scows and tugs; the defendant is a brewing corporation. The action is upon a written guarantee in the following form: “We, the Leonhard Michel Brewing Company, guarantee the payment of bills for charter, towing, wharfage and labor for loading and unloading of all scows or dumpers chartered from C. F. Harms Company for our account to be used in connection with the Bond ¡Development Company, or its successors, at Bond and Third St. Board Bklyn., N. Y., at $18 per day for dumpers.
“ We furthermore guarantee the payment of all bills rendered by C. F. Harms Company within thirty (30) days after bill is rendered.
“In case of cancellation of this guarantee,"all scows to be unloaded and returned to us free and clear of all material and all debts, liens and demands for towages, wharfage, labor for loading and unloading, etc. ”
It appeared in evidence that there was erected upon defend
Treating defendant, as the complaint treats it, as a guarantor of the Bond Development Company for the payment of bills incurred for removing excavated material from the dumping ground, it is clear that no recovery could be sustained. There is no evidence that the guaranty was ever authorized by the directors of the corporation, and if it had been it was clearly ultra vires of the purpose for which defendant was incorporated. It is settled law that a corporation has no power, by contract or indorsement, to become a surety or guarantor for any other person except in the course of the authorized business of the guarantor or indorser. (National Park Bank v. German-American Mutual Warehousing & Security Co., 116 N. Y. 281.) The numerous cases cited by plaintiff wherein guaranties by brewing corporations of rents and furniture bills have been enforced are not really exceptions to the rule. They proceed upon the theory that such guaranties are in furtherance of the guarantor’s authorized business by inducing custom. No such ground for exception appears in the present case.
For these reasons the judgment and order appealed from must be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Clarke, P. J., McLaughlin, Page and Davis, JJ., concurred.
Judgment and order reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event. Order to be settled on notice.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.