Hall-Mark Realty Corp. v. McGunnigle
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff and Stephen A. McGunnigle and Mary T. McGunnigle, his wife, entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to purchase from them certain premises situate in the town of Oyster Bay, Nassau county, N. Y. Upon the execution of the contract, plaintiff made a down payment of $17,000, to recover which this action is brought.
The premises agreed to be conveyed, while described by metes and bounds in the contract, are said to contain 84.449 acres of land, and the courses and distances contained in the description were taken from a survey of the premises made by a Mr. Hawxhurst November 13, 1925. Plaintiff rejected the title upon the ground that the defendant and her husband (now deceased) did not have title to the entire parcel of land. It is claimed that the defendant
The defense, in substance, is a general denial and a separate defense by way of counterclaim for specific performance of the contract, and the question presented for our consideration is whether the defendant and her husband, at the time stated in the contract for closing, had a good and marketable title to the land they proposed to convey.
The premises in question originally comprised two contiguous farms, the easterly one of which was known as the Van Veghten farm, while the westerly one was known as the Sevin farm. The chain of title to the Van Veghten farm commences with a deed, dated December 3, 1852, from Richard Van Veghten and wife to David King. In this deed Van Veghten described the westerly boundary of his land as the Sevin farm. David King conveyed the premises by deed dated September 23, 1854, to Maria Van Nest. He described the westerly boundary of his land as the “ middle of Division Avenue and fine of Sevens land.” The subsequent conveyances of the Van Veghten farm all fix its westerly boundary as the center line of Division avenue, although some of them identify the westerly boundary thereof (as King did) as the fine of Sevin’s land. The grantor, King, conceded and fixed by his deed his westerly boundary as the center line of this street.
All of the conveyances affecting the Sevin farm fix its easterly boundary as the land of Richard Van Veghten. This chain of title commences with a deed from Johann A. Sevin and wife to Richard B. Kimball, dated November 4, 1854. Its description contains no reference to Division avenue, but the easterly boundary thereof is fixed as the westerly boundary of the Van Veghten farm. All of the other conveyances also fix this easterly boundary as the line of the land of Richard Van Veghten. Three of the more recent deeds (1913) affecting the Sevin farm describe it as commencing at a point on the westerly side of Division avenue, which is stated there to be the westerly fine of the Van Veghten farm. These deeds, however, contain recitals that they are the same premises theretofore conveyed by Armstead to Beach and by Beach’s executor to J. Newton Beach. These prior conveyances to which reference is made do not mention Division avenue, but describe the easterly
Sevin’s grantees had title to the westerly half of Division avenue, because King had definitely disclaimed any title to it by fixing his boundary (the Van Veghten farm) as the center of Division avenue. Sevin’s grantees passed title to the westerly half of Division avenue when they described their easterly boundary as the westerly boundary of the Van Veghten farm. The learned trial court, therefore, erred in finding that the whole of Division avenue was within the boundaries of the Van Veghten farm, and that title thereto remained in King’s heirs. Even if we assume, as the learned trial court has found, that King by his map fixed the westerly boundary of his land as the westerly side of Division avenue, by his deed he fixed it as the center of Division avenue. If, as appellant suggests, he did include some of the Sevin land (the westerly half of Division avenue) in his map, he could not by this method acquire title to any of Sevin’s land. But the question as to whether there is an alleged gap will have to be determined in a subsequent proceeding when all parties interested are before the court.
Respondent is entitled to a title free from reasonable doubt. The element of doubt arises out of the three recent deeds to which I have referred. The question that will have to be determined is as to whether this doubt is dispelled by the recitals therein contained, referring to prior conveyances, and explaining what is intended to be conveyed. This raises such a question as to the validity of the defendant’s title to the fifty-foot strip of land as to make it questionable. Even if it were decided- in this action that the title is good, such a decision would not bind Sevin’s or King’s heirs, because they are not parties to the action, and the
For the reasons stated, the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Lazansky, P. J., Young and Scudder, JJ., concur; Hagarty, J., dissents.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.