Fay v. Witte
Opinion of the Court
On the 14th day of February, 1931, before maturity, the appellant, the payee of a note, indorsed the same on the back thereof as follows: “ I hereby assign all my right and interest in this note to Richard Fay in full.” (Signed) “ Harry C. Witte.” Section 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Law expressly provides that a qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser an “ assignor of the title to the instrument.” The indorsement in question is in the language of a mere assignment of the title to the instrument, which satisfies in full the definition of what a qualified indorsement constitutes. If the words “ without recourse ” constitute the symbol of an assignment of title and if “ words of similar
The order should be reversed upon the law, with costs, and the complaint dismissed, with costs.
Hinman, Rhodes and Crapsek, JJ., concur; Hill, J., dissents, with an opinion, in which Van Kirk, P. J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
The defendant is the payee named in a promissory note. He transferred it to the plaintiff by an indorsement which stated, “ I hereby assign all my right and interest in this note to Richard Fay in full.” He contends that the indorsement is qualified and that he is not hable as an indorser. He appeals from an order denying his motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.
Uniform treatment of negotiable instruments is desirable among the States, and courts have suggested that if authority as to any question does not exist at home, especial regard should be given the decisions of other jurisdictions. The reported decisions in New York do not furnish a precedent as to the issue here presented. In the States where the question has been passed upon, the decisions are in conflict. Those which have determined that similar indorsements are qualified have stated the reason that as the transferor, by writing his name only upon the instrument, became the transferor and assignor of title to the instrument and also became obligated as an indorser to pay the note, an indorsement which in terms only transferred the instrument, by implication excluded the obligation to pay. Support for this reasoning was found in the maxim that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). The plain language of the statute leaves no room for this reasoning. The enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law was designed to simplify,
The order should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Kirk, P. J., concurs.
Order reversed on the law, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and complaint dismissed, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.