Cornell v. Poliakoff
Opinion of the Court
This action was brought by the plaintiff, as executor of one T. G. Cornell, to recover one-half of the amount of two promissory notes which were executed jointly and severally by T. G. Cornell and the defendant' as comakers. Both of these notes were paid in full at maturity by decedent. The question in the case was whether the defendant signed the notes for the accommodation of his comaker.
It is the claim of the defendant that his signature was put upon these latter two notes, renewals of which are the notes in suit, as an accommodation for Cornell who represented to him that he could not procure loans from the Freeport banks except on “ two-name ” paper. Poliakoff was incompetent to testify in his own behalf because of the death of Cornell. To prove the fact that there was no consideration, Kleber testified that in a conversation between himself and Cornell concerning these transactions, the following occurred: “ So I [Kleber] said to him, ‘ Why did you have Mr. Poliakoff endorse these notes if you are going to pay the notes, if it is your obligation? ’ ‘ Well/ he [Cornell] said, ‘ I have to do that as a matter of banking, there have to be two signatures on this note/ He said further, ' So far as Mr. Poliakoff and I know, everything is squared off/ ” If this were all there were in the record, it might be taken as sufficient to substantiate defendant’s
It is conceded that Kleber and Forrest were unable to meet their obligations under the original guaranty to pay each twenty-five per cent of the original $15,000 note. Pofiakoff was himself liable to the holder for the full amount, if sued. At the time the Freeport notes were made, the Telegraph Typewriter Company, Inc., issued a note to Pofiakoff and Cornell as consideration for their executing the Freeport notes. Later, on the bankruptcy of the Telegraph Typewriter Company, Inc., when Kleber and Forrest were both officers of that corporation, Poliakoff put in a claim for half of the note for $16,232.82 which had been given, and the bankrupt fisted the liability on that note as divisible between the two payees. Since Forrest and Kleber must have known all about the circumstances of the making of the notes in suit and the giving of the corporate note, the claim in bankruptcy is cogent evidence that Pofiakoff and the others knew he was not an accommodation maker.
There were various renewals of the two Freeport notes and when the last one was renewed, Cornell wrote Pofiakoff, in a letter offered by the defendant, as follows:
“ I hand you herewith two four months notes covering our accommodations at the Freeport Bank and Trust Company for $7,800.00 and the Farmers National Bank of Freeport for $7,500.00 due and payable April 19th, 1926.
“ I have arranged to have both these notes put on the calendar months basis so that they both will mature on the same dates.
“ Please sign on the fines indicated and return, with your check for $155.50, one-half of the discount and remit to me so that they reach me not later than April 16th, 1926.”
There is no satisfactory explanation of how Pofiakoff could have given his name to accommodate Cornell if Cornell could demand that Pofiakoff should pay one-half of the discount on the notes.
Since the verbal testimony cannot be reconciled with the documentary evidence in the case, the greater weight must be given to defendant's implied admission of liability by his claim in the bankruptcy and to the demand made by Cornell on Pofiakoff in Cornell's lifetime, which does not seem to have been rejected by Pofiakoff so far as any evidence in the case shows.
The case was decided on the basis of the guaranty made in 1921. The action, however, was not brought on the guaranty. If it had been, the claim would have been outlawed by the Statute of Limita
The judgment should be modified by directing that the plaintiff recover from defendant the amounts demanded in the complaint, with interest and costs, and as so modified affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.
Martin, P. J., Merrell, Glennon and Untermyer, JJ., concur.
Judgment modified by directing that the plaintiff recover from defendant the amounts demanded in the complaint, with interest and costs, and as so modified affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff. Settle order on notice.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.