Katz v. State
Opinion of the Court
This was a complete taking in fee for arterial high-
way purposes. (Highway Law, art. XII-B.) The Court of Claims awarded claimants the sum of $232,500 as the fair market value of the lands, buildings and improvements, plus the sum of $888.33 as the cost of moving and reinstalling at another location, a car lift, air lines and neon signs. The State originally cross-appealed from the entire judgment on the ground of excessiveness, but has now withdrawn its appeal except for the allowance of the sum of $888.33 above mentioned.
Claimants conducted a business on the premises known as “ Public Service Garage ” which included the sale of new trucks, buses, cars and trailers; purchase and sale of used cars and trucks; rental of cars and trucks; storage and parking of cars and trucks; operation of a complete garage, including complete parts department, paint shop and body shop, and a gasoline service station. Claimants’ gross business at the premises in 1954, the year preceding the appropriation, amounted to $861,880.44. It is undisputed that the best use of the premises was the use to which it was being put by claimants. The record contains a detailed description of the property and improvements. The above brief and general description is merely to indicate that this was unusual property.
A construction engineer with excellent qualifications testified for claimants that the reconstruction cost of the buildings and improvements was $245,047.60, and deducting physical depreciation of $65,313.20, found a net value of $179,934.40. This witness and his staff made a detailed and thorough examination of all improvements, and the record contains sketches, dimensions, materials and breakdowns which tend to substantiate his estimates.
Claimants’ two real estate experts valued the land over which the State had no easement (85,220 square feet) at $2.50 per square foot, and the land over which the State already had
The experts for the State arrived at a total valuation of $181,100. The record indicates that they made a comparatively cursory inspection and examination of the premises and improvements. Their testimony was considerably weakened by admissions made on cross-examination. No clear foundation or factual support for the opinion valuation appears. A mere opinion without factual support is not entitled to great probative force. (Matter of Reihl v. Town of Amherst, 308 N. Y. 212; McQuade v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 84 App. Div. 637.)
We recognize the general rule that on a question of quantum appellate courts are reluctant to disturb the evaluation of the trial court. However, that rule is not without exceptions, and if the evaluation is clearly inadequate it is erroneous. Here the buildings and improvements were gone when the trial court viewed the premises, having been demolished immediately after the taking. Upon all the evidence we find that the award is inadequate, and conclude that the fair market value of the property appropriated was $300,000 on the date of the appropriation.
We find no sound legal basis for the allowance by the Court of Claims of the sum of $888.33 for the installation of equipment removed to other premises. It seems implicit from the fact that the equipment was not included in the valuation of the real estate and was removed, that it was personal property for which compensation may not be had. Claimants concede they are not entitled to compensation for personal property, but insist that is not what they are claiming. However, under the circumstances of this case, where there was a complete and permanent taking, claimants are entitled to the fair market value of the property taken, and nothing more.
Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ., concur.
Judgment modified, on the law and facts, by increasing the amount thereof to the sum of $300,000, with interest, and as so modified, affirmed, with costs to claimants.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.