Spriggs v. State
Cases that cite this one
5 later published cases cite this decision.
- Matter of County of Orange v. Monroe Bakertown Rd. Realty, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- J.W. Mays, Inc. v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- J.W. Mays, Inc. v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Ingber v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1992)
- Swiderski v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1984)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
— Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: In 1969 the State appropriated claimant’s rectangularly shaped, unimproved parcel of land in the Town of Camillus, consisting of 5.467 acres. To the north, claimant’s land borders a "paper street”, for a distance of 1,818.04 feet; its depth is 132 feet and its southern boundary is contiguous to a railroad track which is elevated nearly six feet on an embankment. Immediately south of the embankment lies Milton Avenue, a major east-west thoroughfare. At the time of the appropriation, the subject property was zoned for single-family homes. The Court of Claims awarded claimant $60,000 after concluding that the highest and best use of the property was for multiple-apartment development. This determination rests upon a finding that there was a reasonable probability that an application for rezoning, to accommodate the projected use, would have been granted at the time of the appropriation. The primary issue presented by the State in this appeal is whether that finding is supported by the preponderance of the credible evidence (see Mochen v State of New York, 43 AD2d 484, 489, citing McCauley v State of New York, 8 NY2d 938). Initially, however, the State suggests that in order to show a reasonable probability of rezoning, the zoning change must have been imminent or inevitable. We have not required such evidence (see Norris v State of New York, 42 AD2d 839; Knight v State of New York, 36 AD2d 574). Nor do we view Masten v State of New York (11 AD2d 370, affd 9 NY2d 796) as intending to declare such a standard. In determining whether a reasonable probability of rezoning exists, the various factors present in each case should be weighed (Norris v State of New York, supra) in order to ascertain whether "a request for a change in zoning * * * would have been favorably received” (Babcock v State of New York, 41 AD2d 860) or whether there were "good prospects” of rezoning (Knight v State of New York, supra). Here, claimant’s land, contrary to its zoning classification, does not
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.