Lichtenberger v. Long Island Machinery Sales Corp.
Opinion of the Court
—In an action (1) to declare null and void specified actions of the defendant corporation and (2) for a declaration of certain alleged rights of preferred shareholders of said corporation, defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from all portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, entered June 6, 1978 except so much thereof as declared that "at the time of the shareholders’ meeting of February 24, 1975 the voting power of the shareholders had not shifted to the preferred stockholders, and that the Fifth cause of action alleged by the plaintiffs must therefore fail.” Judgment affirmed, insofar as appealed from, with costs. We find no basis for disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court and further hold that defendants failed to meet the burden of establishing a lack of alternative means to accomplish the purported purposes for which stock options were granted (see Schwartz v Marien, 37 NY2d 487; see, also, Dunlay v Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 NY 274). Defendant Long Island Machinery Sales Corp. (Long Island), has been in continuous operation since the filing of its certificate of incorporation on June 21, 1954. The Island Cutter Corporation (Island Cutter), which employs plaintiffs Lichtenberger and Bryant, is 45% owned by Long Island and 55% owned by the November Corporation. The latter corporation, however, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Long Island. At the commencement of the trial the parties dictated various stipulations into the record. Among them were the following: "Item Number Two, that there is presently authorized two classes of stock, namely voting common stock and convertible non-voting preferred stock, the latter being convertible to common without time limitation on a share for share basis is also stipulated. Item Number Three, the plaintiff’s statement is to the effect that as of January 18, 1975, the plaintiffs controlled 119,750 shares of the common stock and 76,121 shares of the convertible preferred stock of a total of 195,871. The defendants dispute that to the extent of approximately 27,500 shares which are ascribed to Roy Bryant, one of the plaintiffs, Charles R. Bryant, and it is the defendants’ contention that the shares were not controlled by the plaintiffs since they were not fully paid for as of that date. As to Item Number Four, it is the plaintiffs’ contention that as of January 18, 1975, the defendants controlled 150,179 shares of the common stock and 23,292 shares of the convertible preferred stock or a total of 173,471 shares. The defendants stipulate that they did control as to the common shares 150,179. However, the defendants do not join in the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants controlled as to the preferred shares 23,292 to the extent that the defendants make no claim as to 8,697 shares of that preferred stock, the court: These are the items, some of which are going to be an issue in the hearing. mr. behringer [attorney for plaintiffs]: Yes, your Honor, the court: All
Defendants: 150,179 common shares
Plaintiffs: 119,750 common shares (if,
arguendo, plaintiff Bryant’s 27,500 shares are included in plaintiffs’ shares).
Defendants claimed at the February 24, 1975 shareholders’ meeting that Bryant’s shares were never fully paid for. If, arguendo, we eliminate Bryant’s shares, the respective common share interests would be:
Defendants: 150,179 common shares
Plaintiffs: ■ 92,250 common shares.
At first blush, it would appear that the inclusion of Bryant’s shares in plaintiffs’ shares would not affect defendants’ common stock majority. However, since the preferred shareholders had the right to convert their shares into common shares, on a share for share basis, Bryant’s shares do become crucial. Thus, if Bryant’s 27,500 shares are excluded from plaintiffs’ claim of 119,750 common shares, leaving a balance of 92,250 shares, plaintiffs, nevertheless, could convert the 76,121 shares of preferred stock controlled by them (see above stipulation) into common shares. This would give plaintiffs:
Common shares prior to conversion 92,500 shares
Preferred shares converted into
common shares 76,121 shares
Total common shares after
conversion: 168,621 shares.
If defendants were to convert all 23,292 preferred shares which plaintiffs attribute to them, defendants would have:
*943 Common shares prior to conversion 150,179 shares
Preferred shares converted into
common shares 23,292 shares
Total common shares after
conversion: 173,471 shares.
If Bryant’s shares were included in plaintiffs’ shares, plaintiffs, by utilizing the conversion route, could change themselves from minority common share stockholders into majority common share stockholders.
Plaintiffs:
Common 119,750
Preferred 76,121
Total....................................195,871
Defendants:
Common 150,179
preferred (inclusive of the 8,697 shares as to which defendants
"make no claim”) 23,292
Total....................................173,471.
As set forth in the stipulation, defendants "make no claim as to 8,697 shares of that preferred stock” which plaintiffs attribute to defendants. Thus, if we accept defendants’ disclaimer, defendants, after conversion, would have only:
Common shares prior to conversion: 150,179
Add preferred shares converted into common shares (23,292 less 8,697) 14,595
Total common shares after conversion: 164,774.
Whereas, even without plaintiff Bryant’s shares, plaintiffs’ postconversion totals would be, as noted, supra:
Common shares prior to conversion 92,500
Preferred shares converted into
common shares 76,121
Total common shares after conversion: 168,621.
It is thus clear that although defendants controlled the majority of the issued common stock (voting stock) as of January 18, 1975, it was an extremely fragile majority. At any time plaintiffs could have utilized the preferred stock conversion route to transform themselves into the majority and defendants into the minority. For defendants to have maintained control they would have had to increase considerably the number of shares controlled by them in contrast to those controlled by plaintiffs. This is precisely what defendants did, commencing with a directors meeting on January 18, 1975, notice of which was simply as follows: "Notice is hereby given that a Board of Directors meeting will be held January 18, 1975 (Saturday) at 4:00 PM at Long Island Machinery Sales Corp. offices at 568 West Hoffman Ave., Lindenhurst, New York.” At that meeting, the five defendant directors out voted plaintiff directors Lichtenberger and Bryant to enact the following resolution: "The Chairman then said that for a great number of years Mr. W. F. Ebner had been serving the company faithfully and well and, because of the company’s long standing poor cash position it was not possible to compensate him adequately nor was it possible to pay
For
Robert W. Donohoe John J. Donohoe Albert J. Delurey James E. Donohoe Wallace F. Ebner
Against
Charles R. Bryant Robert Lichtenberger”.
After the defendant directors voted at the January 18, 1975 directors’ meeting to grant the 70,000 share option to defendant Ebner, the following motion was made at a January 24, 1975 directors’ meeting (minutes filed by defendants): "Robert Lichtenberger made a motion, seconded by Charles R. Bryant, that, in view of past activities and devotion to duty shown by Messrs. Lichtenberger, Bryant and Burkard, they be allowed to purchase 70,000 shares each of common stock of Long Island Machinery Sales Corp. The motion was put to a vote and defeated, the directors having voted as follows:
For
Robert Lichtenberger John J. Burkard Charles R. Bryant
Against
James E. Donohoe Wallace F. Ebner Robert W. Donohoe Albert J. Delurey John J. Donohoe”.
At the trial herein it was elicited that plaintiff Lichtenberger became a shareholder in Long Island in 1961; he was an employee of Long Island from approximately 1961 until 1963, at which time he began working for Island Cutter. He is a vice-president of Long Island. Defendant John J. Donohoe testified that while he and defendants Ebner and James E. Donohoe had loaned moneys to Long Island, other stockholders, including plaintiff Lichtenberger, had also done so; and Lichtenberger (as well as defendant "Mr. Donohoe”) had guaranteed bank loans made to Long Island. (It was also elicited, however, that Lichtenberger was landlord of the building which housed both long Island and Island Cutter until Long Island moved out prior to the institution of this suit.) Further, it would appear from the testimony of plaintiff Bryant (now employed by Island Cutter) that Bryant had been working for Long Island or Island Cutter for nearly 20 years and that he agreed in 1956 to purchase $15,000 in Long Island stock, for which he paid $5,000 cash and gave a note for the balance. Bryant testified that the balance was to be reduced by credits for commissions: "Q Did you have any understanding with the corporation at the time that you signed the note as to whether or not there would be any credits to you? A At the time there was supposed to be a commission paid on sales and the balance was supposed to come out of commission because of the low draw that we were taking from the business.” The crucial board of directors meeting was convened by the following simple notice: "February 10, 1975 Notice is
"FULLY PAID
COMMON STOCK ENTITLED TO VOTE
J.J. DONOHOE 51,127
J.E. DONOHOE 51,127
W.F. EBNER 97,925
J. BURKHARD 28,000
P.J. ROTCHFORD 54,000
E.J. ROTCHFORD, JR. 10,250
R.W. DONOHOE 10,000
DONOHOE CO. 10,000
220,179 92,250
STOCK NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE
TREASURY 4,000
CHARLES WOODAM 20,000 Not fully paid
C.R. BRYANT 27,500 Not fully paid”.
It is conceded in the brief submitted by the defendants on this appeal that Ebner’s above-listed 97,925 common shares included the subject 70,000 shares resulting from the stock option previously granted to him by the board of directors. Thus, defendants had augmented their common stock voting shares by Ebner’s 70,000 "option” shares and deleted from the voting shares claimed by plaintiffs, the 27,500 "Bryant shares”. As already noted, by closing the stock transfer book on February 13, 1975, for the first time in the corporation’s history, defendants had precluded plaintiffs from effectively converting their preferred shares in time to augment their vote at the February 24, 1975 shareholders’ meeting. The remaining business at the February 24, 1975 meeting was conducted with dispatch. By a vote of defendants’ 220,179 common shares to plaintiffs’ 92,250 common shares, defendants (1) reduced the board from eight to five members, eliminating plaintiffs Lichtenberger, Burkhard and Bryant as directors and electing themselves as the new board; (2) approved the sale of Island Cutter, subject to the discretion of the board; and (3) voted to grant to defendants John J. Donohoe and James E. Donohoe options to purchase (at 10 cents par value) 70,000 common shares each, by virtue of long services to and financial sacrifices for the corporation. The minutes include the following bitter protestations from plaintiff Rotchford on behalf of the plaintiffs: "He [Rotchford] felt his position was as peacemaker between the two groups and to make his position clear on the illegality of the stock purchase option offered to Ebner. Chair asked if there was any other comments to be made. When none were made he asked for motion to approve actions of Board of Directors meeting of Jan. 18, 1975. Rotchford asked for motion to be reread as he was unsure of what he was voting on. Chair reread entire motion. * * * rotchford stated that this was a power play to change control of company and effects [sic] his family interests. Have no doubt that there will be court action to defeat this illegal action. * * * Rotchford: I have same objections as before. Other people in this Corporation have worked as hard as you, myself included until I left Corporation and I am prepared to fight in any way possible to stop this illegal power play. Chair: Please don’t threaten this Corporation. Rotchford: I am not Threatening but I want to be sure I’m heard. Chair: You have been given every opportunity to be heard not only at this meeting but by direct contact over the past 5 years to
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