Brush v. Olivo
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Martin Katz and Louana Katz v. The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (2d Cir. 1984)
- ORIX Real Estate Capital Markets, LLC v. Superior Bank, FSB (District Court, N.D. Illinois 2000)
- Maslan v. American Airlines, Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 1995)
- Walsh v. Maryland Bank, N.A. (District Court, S.D. New York 1992)
- Martirano Construction Corp. v. Briar Contracting Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1984)
- Fordham-Coleman v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Danzy v. Community Health Plan (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Rowe v. City of New York (New York Supreme Court 1994)
- Community Planning Board. No. 4 (Manhattan) v. Homes for the Homeless (New York Supreme Court 1993)
- Park Associates v. Crescent Park Associates, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
- Grellet v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1986)
- Halpern v. Halpern (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1985)
- Curcio v. Ippolito (N.Y. 1984)
- State v. Monarch Chemicals, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1982)
- Rice v. Temple (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1981)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
— Appeal by defendant, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County, entered January 20, 1981, as denied the branch of his motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action asserted in plaintiff’s complaint. Order reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with $50 costs and disbursements, and motion granted to the extent of dismissing plaintiff’s first and second causes of action. Defendant is a physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology. Plaintiff was his patient. Defendant agreed to perform a surgical procedure upon plaintiff known as a bilateral vaginal tubal ligation for the purpose of rendering her permanently sterile. Plaintiff entered the hospital on January 13, 1974, the surgery was performed the following day and on January 20, 1974 she was discharged from the hospital. On or about December 30, 1977 plaintiff consulted defendant and he diagnosed that she was pregnant. She commenced this action by the service of a summons on or about November 21, 1978. The first cause of action asserted in plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendant committed medical malpractice in the performance of the operation and in caring for plaintiff thereafter. The second cause of action alleges that defendant committed malpractice in failing to obtain plaintiff’s informed consent to the operation. The third and fourth causes of action are premised upon acts of the defendant in connection with plaintiff’s subsequently diagnosed pregnancy. Defendant’s answer asserted the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations and thereafter he moved for summary judgment upon that ground. Special Term denied the motion because plaintiff had failed “to particularize those causes of action for which dismissal is sought.” This was error for two reasons. First, although it is the rule that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action will be denied in its entirety where the plaintiff’s complaint asserts several causes, one of which is legally sufficient, and the defendant does not particularize the causes he wishes dismissed (see 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3211.38;
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.