Hudson City Savings Institution v. Burton
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- SEFCU v. Allegra Holdings, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- SEFCU v. Allegra Holdings, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Credit-Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, L. L. C. v. Castelli (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
- Stanton v. RICH BAKER BERMAN & CO., PA (District Court, D. New Jersey 1995)
- Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Hunte (2d Cir. 2024)
- 650 Brooklyn LLC v. Hunte (New York Supreme Court 2015)
- JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. Ilardo (New York Supreme Court 2012)
- Charter One Bank, FSB v. Leone (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- United Companies Lending Corp. v. Hingos (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Dallas v. Dallas (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1992)
- Megaris Furs, Inc. v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1991)
- Dime Savings Bank v. Johneas (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1991)
- ew York Guardian Mortgagee Corp. v. Olexa (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1991)
- Barclay's Bank v. Smitty's Ranch, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1986)
- New York State Urban Development Corp. v. Marcus Garvey Brownstone Houses, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1983)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
— Appeal from an order "of the County Court of Columbia County (Zittell, J.), entered December 2, 1980, which, inter alia, granted plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment for foreclosure of a mortgage. Since relief in the form of restitution would be available if defendant Anne E. Burton (defendant) were to succeed on this appeal, neither the failure to post an undertaking to obtain an automatic stay (CPLR 5519, subd [a], par 6) nor the sale of the foreclosed premises renders the appeal moot. Turning to the merits, we find that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment and, therefore, the order must be affirmed. Defendant contends that her allegations concerning her six affirmative defenses created questions of fact precluding summary judgment. There is no merit to this contention. With respect to the defense of tender, it is the general rule that a mortgagor’s tender of the entire amount necessary to expunge all default prior to the mortgagee’s exercise of the acceleration option is a complete defense (see Sherwood v Greene, 41 AD2d 881). Defendant’s only tender occurred on or about July 25,1980 and since it did not include the July, 1980 payment, which was then in default, it was not a tender of the entire amount then due. The acceleration clause here is in statutory form (Real Property Law, § 258,
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.