In re Charlotte II
Opinion of the Court
— Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Clinton County (Feinberg, J.), entered July 22,1981, which adjudicated Charlotte II. to be a permanently neglected child and terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent mother contends that the evidence in the record does not support the trial court’s finding of permanent neglect. We note initially that although this matter was tried and decided before the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Santosky v Kramer (455 US 745), the trial court found the evidence sufficient not only under the fair preponderance standard prescribed by statute (Family Ct Act, § 622), but also under the more rigorous clear and convincing evidence standard mandated by Santosky v Kramer (supra). We agree. There is overwhelming proof that respondent failed to plan for the future of her child, although physically and financially able to do so (Social Services Law, § 384-b, subd 7, pars [a], [e]). Respondent was required to formulate and to act to accomplish a feasible and realistic plan (Matter of Orlando F., 40 NY2d 103, 110-111). While the adequacy of a parent’s plan should not be determined by reference to unrealistically high standards (Matter of Leon RR, 48 NY2d 117, 125), there must be some attempt to formulate and act upon a practical plan for the child’s future, including a method for coping with the problems created by the child’s prolonged separation from respondent and the strong psychological ties that the child has formed with her foster parents (Matter of John AA, 89 AD2d 738, 740, mot for lv to app den 58 NY2d 605). Respondent made no such plan. For example, after a prolonged period of separation during which respondent’s contacts with her child were limited to occasional cards, letters, telephone calls and infrequent visits, respondent was unable, despite advice and encouragement from petitioner, to cope with, or even to recognize, the problems created by the absence of a true parent-child relationship between respondent and her child. Accordingly, the visits were often stressful for the child and petitioner was required to place certain restrictions on the visits to protect the child. In addition, during the period of time covered by the trial testimony, respondent made numerous and frequent changes of residence, evidencing her inability to establish a stable home (see Matter of Candle Lee W., 91 AD2d 1106,1108). It is clear from the record that respondent was unable to project a future course of action for herself and made no viable effort to plan for her child’s future. Turning next to the question of petitioner’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship (Social Services Law, § 384-b, subd 7, par [a]), we find
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.