Claim of Rodriguez v. Continental Steel Corp.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed February 1, 1983, which ruled that claimant’s respiratory disease was precipitated by his employment and awarded benefits.
During 20 years of employment as a laborer at Penn-Dixie Industries, Inc., claimant was exposed to stone and iron ore dust in the cement manufacturing process. After the plant was closed in 1975, he worked for other employers until he was hospitalized for coronary bypass surgery and chest abnormalities in October, 1978. Based on examinations and a lung biopsy taken during cardiac surgery on October 19, 1978, Dr. Frank Maxon, Jr., a pulmonary disease specialist, diagnosed silicosis which rendered claimant permanently and totally disabled. Dr. James Blake, who examined claimant for the self-insured employer, found no
Continental Steel initially contends as a threshold issue that by reason of reorganization proceedings pursuant to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, specifically subdivision (a) of section 362 of the code (US Code, tit 11, § 362, subd [a]), the automatic stay provision bars any action or proceeding against the petitioning debtor. The issue is whether the specific exception to the automatic stay (US Code, tit 11, § 362, subd [b], par [4]) is applicable to workers’ compensation cases.
Continental Steel next contends prejudice in the designation of Dr. Poggi as an impartial specialist because he was associated
Finally, the decision, being supported by substantial evidence, must be affirmed (Matter of Morgante v Southeastern Public Serv. Co., 98 AD2d 892). The determination of which conflicting or opposing medical evidence should be accepted is within the province of the board (Matter of Fallon v Johns-Mancille Sales Corp., 103 AD2d 955).
Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workers’ Compensation Board. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.
Pertinent parts of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code provide: “(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition * * * operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of— (1) the commencement or continuation * * * of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was *** commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; * * * (b) The filing of a petition * * * does not operate as a stay * * * (4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power”.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.