New York Public Interest Group, Inc. v. New York State Department of Insurance
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Connor, J.), entered August 3, 1983 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners’ application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and an action for declaratory judgment, to declare unlawful a regulation of the Department of Insurance.
As part of the no-fault auto insurance system, the Legislature directed the Superintendent of Insurance to promulgate regulations to ensure that any of an insurer’s “excess profits” were returned to consumers (Insurance Law, § 677, subd 5 [all statutory references are to the Insurance Law]).
Initially, we note that a CPLR article 78 proceeding is not the proper method by which to challenge an agency’s quasi-legislative acts (see Matter of Lakeland Water Dist. v Onondaga County Water Auth., 24 NY2d 400, 407). We will, however, address the merits of the declaratory judgment portion of the lawsuit (see Matter of Sherman v Frazier, 84 AD2d 401, 405). In this regard, Special Term’s determination that the regulations challenged were not arbitrary and capricious appears well founded. The record reveals that public hearings, though not required, were held and that various viewpoints were aired. The Department of Insurance spent years developing a method to implement the Legislature’s intent and the regulation seems well formulated to return excess profits as the Legislature desired. Nonetheless, these facts and conclusions are not particularly relevant to resolving the issue posed under the declaratory judgment portion of the cases: whether 11 NYCRR part 166 is unlawful because it is at variance with 11 NYCRR part 165, promulgated pursuant to subdivision 3 of section 178, despite the requirement for uniformity imposed by subdivision 5 of section 677.
It is evident from our review of the regulations at issue that profit is defined in terms of net worth in 11 NYCRR part 165 and in 11 NYCRR part 166 (compare 11 NYCRR Appendix 15, pp A-3, A-5, with 11 NYCRR 166-1.4) and, thus, the regulations are consistent in this regard. It is further evident, however, that profit is computed on a per company basis under 11 NYCRR part 165 (see 11 NYCRR 165.3 [b]), whereas profit is computed using aggregate industry data under 11 NYCRR part 166 (see 11 NYCRR 166-1.2, 166-1.6). Such computations may be well advised and thoughtfully conceived (see 11 NYCRR 166-2.2, Appendix 15), but they are contrary to the dictate of subdivision 5 of section 677, which requires that profit for purposes of excess profit be computed in accordance with 11 NYCRR part 165. The fact that the formula under 11 NYCRR part 165 includes industry data (see 11 NYCRR 165.2 [e], [f], [g]; Appendix 15, p A-6)
We find no merit to respondent’s contention that the discretion vested in the superintendent by 11 NYCRR 165.3 (c) to utilize an alternative method for calculating profit permits the differences found in 11 NYCRR parts 165 and 166. Pursuant to 11 NYCRR 165.3 (c), the superintendent can authorize the use of an alternative method for calculating profit when a more reliable result will thereby be produced. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the superintendent has in fact exercised his discretion and allowed the calculation of profit in any manner but that designated in 11 NYCRR part 165. Moreover, the superintendent’s discretion can be exercised only in those situations where it is necessary to reach a more reliable result than that reached by using the prescribed calculation. We simply cannot permit respondent to justify the differences in the calculations of profit found in 11 NYCRR parts 165 and 166 by relying on an unexercised authorization of discretion, which is designed to accomplish a goal unrelated to the case now before us. Accordingly, we are of the view that 11 NYCRR part 166 is contrary to the statutory directive of subdivision 5 of section 677 and must be declared unlawful. It remains for respondent to either promulgate new regulations in accordance with subdivision 5 of section 677 or convince the Legislature to amend subdivision 5 of section 677 so as to permit the regulations as promulgated.
Judgment modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as dismissed the complaint; 11 NYCRR part 166 is declared to be unlawful and invalid; and, as so modified, affirmed. Main, J. P., Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Pursuant to a complete recodification of the Insurance Law effective September 1,1984, section numbers have been changed (L 1984, ch 367). Thus, subdivision 5 of section 677 has been recodified as section 2329 and subdivision 3 of section 178 has been recodified as subdivision (a) of section 2323. We refer to the sections as they were numbered and worded prior to the recodification and as they were referred to by the parties. No substantive changes which would affect the outcome of this case resulted from the recodification.
Dissenting Opinion
dissent and vote to modify in the following memorandum by Casey, J. Casey, J. (dissenting). Although the method for computing profit provided for in 11 NYCRR part 166 is not identical to that provided for in 11 NYCRR part 165, the Superintendent of Insurance could rationally construe the uniformity requirement of subdivision 5 of section 677 of the Insurance Law as prohibiting inconsistent results, rather than mandating identical formulas. Accordingly, we would modify the judgment to declare valid 11 NYCRR part 166.
First, it must be noted that while both parts 165 and 166 establish methods for computing profits, the purpose and scope
Subdivision 5 of section 677 of the Insurance Law provides that “[a]n excess profit shall be a profit beyond such percentage rate of return on net worth attributable to such policies, as computed in accordance with [part 165]”. Part 165 establishes a method for measuring profitability on a per company basis, using a complex system which includes certain industry-wide averages (11 NYCRR 165.3 [b]). The regulation further provides, however, that: “Whenever in the judgment of the superintendent, the calculation of profit for any company in accordance with the foregoing provisions does not produce reliable results * * * or whenever it can be shown that another method of calculation for such company will produce more reliable results, the superintendent may, in his discretion, permit or require the use of such other method of calculation or prescribe any other method of calculation which will produce more reliable results” (11 NYCRR 165.3 [c]). The majority discounts the importance of this authorization of an alternate method on the basis of a purported lack of evidence in the record to indicate that the superintendent exercised his discretionary authority under 11 NYCRR 165.3 (c), but in our view the promulgation of part 166 containing a different method for calculating profit constitutes the best evidence of the superintendent’s election to exercise his discretion.
Nor can it be said that a rational basis is lacking for the superintendent’s exercise of discretion. As noted above, the purposes and scopes of the legislation authorizing the promulgation of parts 165 and 166 differ significantly, thereby establishing the need for further inquiry into whether the use of identical
Thus, inasmuch as the statute requires only that profit in part 166 be determined “in accordance with” part 165 (Insurance Law, § 677, subd 5), and since part 165 gives the superintendent the discretionary authority to prescribe an alternate method (11 NYCRR 165.3 [c]), and there being a rational basis in the record and the regulations for the superintendent’s exercise of this authority with respect to determining excess profits under the no-fault insurance law, it cannot be said that part 166 violates the uniformity requirement of subdivision 5 of section 677 of the Insurance Law. Accordingly, the judgment should be modified to declare valid part 166.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.