BBIG Realty Corp. v. Ginsberg
Cases that cite this one
17 later published cases cite this decision.
- Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Tempest Windows, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Nofar Tribeca LLC v. Shably Holdings, LLC (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2025)
- Aaronson v. SN Funding, LLC (New York Supreme Court, Nassau County 2024)
- Green Castle A. Mgmt Corp. v. B&V Dev., LLC (New York Supreme Court 2023)
- GFE Jerome Ave. LLC v. Steph-Leigh Assoc., LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- Board of Managers of the 125 North 10th Condominium v. 125North10, LLC (New York Supreme Court 2016)
- Qosina Corp. v. C & N Packaging, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Qosina Corp. v. C & N Packaging, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Warner v. Levinson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1992)
- DeLuca v. Lett (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1991)
- Westminster Construction Co. v. Sherman (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
- Raglan Realty Corp. v. Tudor Hotel Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1989)
- Lucci v. Lucci (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1989)
- Gross v. DeMeglio (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1988)
- Zurich Insurance v. White (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
- Ainspan v. City of Albany (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
- Costanza Construction Corp. v. City of Rochester (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shorter, J.), entered April 12, 1984, which denied third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss the third-party
This appeal arises out of negotiations concerning the proposed sale of third-party defendant Pontikes’ cooperative apartment located at 425 East 85th Street in Manhattan. Pontikes retained the services of Byron Greenfield of the plaintiff BBIG Realty Corp. to sell the apartment at a price of $500,000, including commissions. Greenfield contacted a potential purchaser, the defendant and third-party plaintiff Ginsberg, who orally offered $470,000. The possibility of Ginsberg assuming the payment of the commission rather than the seller Pontikes was discussed. Subsequently, a contract of sale was drawn by the broker Greenfield which provided for a net price to the seller of $470,000 with the purchaser paying any commission due. This contract was executed by Pontikes but not by the proposed purchaser Ginsberg, who sought time in which to review the cooperative corporation’s financial statements as well as other aspects of the sale. Pontikes, while Ginsberg still had matters under consideration, withdrew his offer to sell. The broker thereupon sued the proposed purchaser Ginsberg for $28,200, representing the customary commission of 6% on a net selling price of $470,000. Ginsberg in turn commenced a third-party action against the proposed seller Pontikes, asserting that in the event that he, Ginsberg, were held liable for the broker’s commission, such liability was caused by Pontikes’ withdrawal of his offer to sell the apartment and that Pontikes should be held accountable as the broker’s principal. Among the affirmative defenses to the third-party complaint asserted by Pontikes were failure to state a cause of action and the lack of any agreement between him and either BBIG Realty or Ginsberg.
Special Term denied Pontikes’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, finding issues of fact as to whether the broker was acting as Pontikes’ agent and whether Ginsberg had been given an adequate opportunity to reject the offer. These issues are collateral at best to the primary issue of whether the third-party complaint alleges any facts upon which Pontikes could be held liable for the broker’s commission claim against Ginsberg.
CPLR 1007 permits a defendant to implead “a person not a party who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him” into the primary action by instituting a third-party action. Consistent with CPLR 3014, the third-party complaint may contain alternative, hypothetical or inconsistent causes of action and such a pleading will be sustained as long as the facts alleged do not necessarily preclude
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.