Elgart v. Raleigh Hotel Corp.
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Ellis v. Jackson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
- Cooper v. Badruddin (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1993)
- Ganvey Merchandising Corp. v. Knudsen Elevator Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1991)
- Jones v. Marley (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
- ByComp, Inc. v. New York Racing Ass'n (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1989)
- Memorial Hospital v. Wilkins (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1988)
- Mathiesen v. Desadora (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
- Jones v. R. S. R. Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
- Hoosac Valley Farmers' Exchange v. Lewis (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1986)
- Levy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1986)
- Matzen Construction, Inc. v. Hale (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1985)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cholakis, J.), entered March 8, 1985 in Sullivan County, which denied plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment.
Plaintiff Joseph Elgart was injured when he fell in January 1984 at a hotel owned by defendant. Plaintiffs commenced this action by service of a summons and complaint, pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306 (b), upon the Secretary of State on August 17, 1984. When defendant did not thereafter timely answer, plaintiffs moved for a default judgment (CPLR 3215), whereupon defendant served a verified answer, which plaintiffs rejected as untimely. Accordingly, defendant’s counsel then submitted his own affirmation in opposition to the motion for default judgment. Special Term denied plaintiffs’ motion and this appeal ensued.
Plaintiffs argue that Special Term abused its discretion in excusing defendant’s default. We disagree. The default in this case was allegedly occasioned by law office failure. As a result, excusing the default was a matter left to Special Term’s discretion (CPLR 2005). As the defaulting party, defendant was, however, required to supply both a reasonable excuse for the default and an affidavit of merits from a person competent to attest to the meritorious nature of the claim (see, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Andersen & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695; MacFarland
Order affirmed, with costs. Mahoney, P. J., Main, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.