Cannavale v. County of Westchester
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Rodriguez v. Savoy Boro Park Associates Ltd. Partnership (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- Brasch v. Yonkers Construction Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- Dibuono v. Abbey, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- DiBuono v. Abbey, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Bryde v. CVS Pharmacy (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Steuhl v. Home Therapy Equipment, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- McCleary v. City of Glens Falls (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Vyadro v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- Lerer v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- Zdrojeski v. Gramercy Court Associates (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1993)
- Bermudez v. New York City Housing Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1993)
- Kosan v. County of Westchester (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
- Connolly v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This action was commenced, inter alia, to recover damages for injuries allegedly incurred by the plaintiff Vincent B. Cannavale, Jr. in 1983, when an elevator on premises owned by the defendant County of Westchester stalled between two floors, necessitating the removal of the plaintiff from the elevator by firefighters. In its answer, the county, by its third
The Supreme Court denied the county’s motion for summary judgment on its third and fourth cross claims on the grounds that (1) it could not be determined whether the allegations of negligence in the complaint were within the terms of the indemnification clause of the contract between the county and Central, and (2) with respect to the request relating to Central’s duty to defend, Central’s insurance company had not been made a party to this action. The county appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the order as, in effect, denied its requests for relief relating to Central’s duty to defend. We affirm but for reasons different than that stated by the Supreme Court.
Pursuant to Central’s 1982 contract with the county, Central agreed to upgrade the elevators on the county’s premises, including the elevator in question, and to service the elevators. The contract’s defense and indemnification clause provided that Central would "indemnify and save harmless” the county for all liability and expenses directly or indirectly arising out of the contract. Further, Central agreed "to provide defense for and defend any claims or causes of action of any kind or character directly or indirectly arising out of [the contract] at its sole expense and agree[d] to bear all other costs and expenses relating thereto”, but Central was not required to indemnify the county "from its * * * sole negligence”.
Since this action arose from the execution of the 1982 elevator upgrading contract, the county argues that Central is obligated to provide its defense. Central maintains that its duty to defend cannot be determined separately from its duty to indemnify, which cannot be ascertained at this juncture since, as found by the Supreme Court, a question of fact exists as to whether Cannavale’s alleged injuries were caused solely by the negligence of Central or by the negligence, in whole or in part, of the county.
We agree with Central, which is not an insurer, that its duty to defend is no broader than its duty to indemnify the county. General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 (1), as amended in 1981, which relates, in pertinent part, to agreements for the
We note that the county did not seek specific relief against CNA Insurance Companies, which purportedly issued a policy to Central in accordance with Central’s obligations under its contract with the county. We therefore do not address the county’s rights, if any, against CNA Insurance Companies, which are separate and apart from its rights against Central (see, General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 [1]; Patenaude v General Elec. Co., 147 AD2d 335, 338). Mollen, P.J., Lawrence, Eiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.