Cosco Industries, Inc. v. Johnson & Higgins
Opinion of the Court
Order and judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Fingerhood, J.), entered on September 15, 1989 and September 27, 1989, respectively, both of which granted a motion by third-party defendants Kemper Corporation et al. pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint of Johnson & Higgins, and order of said court entered on November 29, 1989, which granted the third-party plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 2221 for reargument of the previous motion and, upon reargument, adhered to the previous decision, are unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Summary judgment was correctly granted as to indemnity. There is no triable issue of fact as to whether or not all of the third-party plaintiff’s liability to the primary plaintiff is attributable to wrongdoing on the part of the third-party defendants.
Summary judgment was also properly granted as to the cause of action for contribution. The broker cannot seek contribution on a contract theory (see generally, Board of Educ. v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 NY2d 21). It can seek contribution on a negligence theory that the plaintiff did not assert, but the broker cannot assert a claim unless the plaintiff could have asserted that claim (Doyle v Happy Tumbler Wash-O-Mat, 90 AD2d 366, 367-368). Even assuming that the record indicates that there is such a cause of action here, APIC is entitled to rely on the plaintiff’s release, and there is no showing that the remaining third-party defendants exercised actual control of the type that would allow this court to disregard the corporate distinctions among them (cf., Fiur Co. v Ataka & Co., 71 AD2d 370, 373). Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Carro, Milonas and Smith, JJ.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.