Agristor Leasing-II v. Pangburn
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- TBG, INC. v. Bendis (District Court, D. Kansas 1994)
- Sugar Creek Stores, Inc. v. Pitts (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1993)
- Continental Casualty Company v. Boughton (2d Cir. 2017)
- Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. Motient Corp. (Tex. App. 2009)
- Petrello v. White (District Court, E.D. New York 2006)
- National Union Fire Insurance v. Arioli (District Court, E.D. Michigan 1996)
- THE PIKE COMPANY, INC. v. JERSEN CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Pike Co. v. Jersen Construction Group, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Pike Co. v. Jersen Construction Group, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Braddock v. Braddock (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Barrier Systems, Inc. v. A.F.C. Enterprises, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
- Zagrobelny v. Kadah (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1994)
- People v. Stanin (New York Supreme Court 1991)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Judgment unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: Defendant lessee appeals from an order granting plaintiff lessor’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendant breached an agreement for the lease of certain farming equipment. In granting summary judgment to plaintiff, the court dismissed defendant’s affirmative defense and counterclaim alleging fraud in the inducement and seeking rescission of the agreement and damages. That was proper.
Plaintiff established that it is entitled to summary judgment
Similarly, the lease agreement contains disclaimers which preclude any claim of reliance upon alleged misrepresentations of Wood. While a general merger clause does not preclude parol evidence to show that fraudulent misrepresentations induced the contract, a fraud claim is precluded by a clause that specifically disclaims representations concerning the very matter to which the fraud claim relates (see, Citibank v Plapinger, 66 NY2d 90, 94-95, rearg denied 67 NY2d 647; Wittenberg v Robinov, 9 NY2d 261; Danann Realty Corp. v Harris, 5 NY2d 317; Bonda v LNR Props., 155 AD2d 922).
Additionally, the fact that defendant signed a payment deferral agreement bars him from challenging the original agreement on the ground of fraud. Whether under a waiver or ratification analysis, a party may not avoid an agreement on grounds of fraud if, after acquiring knowledge of the fraud, he affirms the contract by accepting a benefit under it (Brennan v National Equitable Inv. Co., 247 NY 486; Gravenhorst v Zimmerman, 236 NY 22, 38; see generally, 22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts, § 491, at 437-438). By signing the payment deferral agreement, defendant was allowed to continue using the equipment and his default in payments was excused. Since the basis for defendant’s fraud claim is that the equipment did not live up to Wood’s representations, there is no doubt that defendant accepted those benefits after acquiring knowledge of the alleged fraud.
We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Lowery, J.—partial summary judgment.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Denman, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.