Whitman Heffernan Rhein & Co. v. Griffin Co.
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Foros Advisors LLC v. Digital Globe, Inc. (District Court, S.D. Illinois 2018)
- JF Capital Advisors, LLC v. Lightstone Group, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- JF Capital Advisors, LLC v. Lightstone Group, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- dMY Sponsor, LLC v. Glatt (New York Supreme Court 2023)
- Castellotti v. Free (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Ostrove v. Michaels (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Lazard Freres & Co. v. First National Bank (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1997)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Beatrice Shainswit, J.), entered December 20, 1989, granting defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint as barred by the Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [10]), is unanimously affirmed, without costs.
General Obligations Law § 5-701 (a) (10) provides that an agreement is void, unless evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged, if the agreement is a contract to pay compensation for services rendered in negotiating the purchase of a business. The term "negotiating” includes assisting in the "consummation of the transaction” (§ 5-701 [a] [10]).
We agree with the IAS court that the services to be rendered by plaintiff, in assisting it in evaluating and analyzing the proposed acquisition and providing consultant services, fall within the ambit of the Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [10]; see, Enfeld v Hemmerdinger Estate Corp., 34 AD2d 980, 981, affd 28 NY2d 606), and plaintiff’s claims are, therefore, barred.
While plaintiff concedes the obligation to pay a fee in connection with the acquisition is barred by the Statute of Frauds, it contends this obligation was severable from the obligation to pay a fee in connection with assisting defendant in obtaining financing. However, the general rule is that if part of an entire contract is void under the Statute of Frauds, the whole of such contract is void (see, Dickenson v Dickenson Agency, 127 AD2d 983, 984). In addition, the instant contract is not susceptible of division and apportionment because the distinct calculation of payments for plaintiff’s services cannot stand alone. Each, read together, constitutes payment for plaintiff’s promise to assist defendant in acquiring Resorts, including both consulting and obtaining financing, a single consideration. The extent to which these provisions are intertwined renders them inappropriate for division without doing violence to the terms of the contract (cf., Dickenson v Dickenson Agency, supra, at 984).
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.