Wilson Omnibus Corp. v. Fallsburg Central School District
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- The Matter of ACME Bus Corp. v. Orange County (N.Y. 2016)
- Sodexho Management, Inc. v. Nassau Health Care Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Hamlin Construction Co. v. County of Ulster (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- N.E.P. Glass Co. v. Board of Education (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1996)
- Suit-Kote Corp. v. City of Binghamton Board of Contract & Supply (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1995)
- Vancom-New York, Inc. v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1994)
- Jerkens Truck & Equipment, Inc. v. City Yonkers (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1992)
- Kernan Library Office Group, Inc. v. Board of Education of City School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1992)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Williams, J.), entered May 24, 1990 in Sullivan County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review two determinations of respondent Board of Education of Fallsburg Central School District awarding two bus transportation contracts to intervenor.
Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul two decisions by respondent Board of Education of Fallsburg Central School District (hereinafter respondent) which awarded transportation contracts to intervenor, the lowest bidder. Supreme Court found a rational basis for respondent’s determinations and dismissed the petition. Petitioner has appealed.
We affirm. There is no merit to the arguments forwarded on appeal by petitioner, a competing bus company which submitted the only other bid for the contracts. We reject petitioner’s argument that respondent was required to adopt a specific resolution authorizing bid advertisements for the transportation contracts. We can find nothing in the General Municipal Law that requires such detailed authorization and find that respondent’s vote authorizing the district clerk "to advertise, open and record bids” was legally sufficient (see, General Municipal Law § 103 [2]). Nor can we agree with petitioner that the specific "vehicle information” required by the bid specifications impermissibly restricted competitive bidding. In this instance, petitioner provided the information in the complained of specifications and intervenor provided evidence that it would have the requirements therein "in time to perform its contractual obligations” (Matter of Coram Bus Serv., 9 Ed Dept Rep 199, 200). Accordingly, it cannot be said that the specifications tended to " 'shut out competitive bidding or permit unfair advantage’ ” (Gerzof v Sweeney, 16 NY2d 206, 209, quoting Matter of McNutt Co. v Eckert, 257 NY 100, 104; see, 8 NYCRR 156.1 [d]).
We likewise reject petitioner’s contention that material variations existed between the specifications and intervenor’s bid such that respondent’s acceptance of the latter disadvantaged petitioner. Whether differences between the bid specifications and the bid itself were "material” or "substantial” was for respondent to decide (see, Matter of A&S Transp. Co. v County of Nassau, 154 AD2d 456, 459), and the record reveals a rational basis for concluding that the discrepancies peti
Finally, we note that petitioner erroneously asserts that respondent’s decision not to ask for security with each bid required the adoption of yet another resolution. Respondent’s waiver was effectuated by awarding the contract to intervenor without requiring security as is within its discretion (see, L. J. Coppola, Inc. v Park Mechanical Corp., 131 AD2d 641, 641-642; Matter of Superior Hydraulic v Town Bd., 88 AD2d 404, 408-409, appeal dismissed 58 NY2d 824). In our view, this was purposefully done with waiver in mind and was all that was required (see, L. J. Coppola, Inc. v Park Mechanical Corp., supra, at 642). In light of the foregoing, Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition as meritless.
Judgment affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.