Middle Village Associates v. Vertical Industrial Park Associates
Opinion of the Court
—In an action for a judgment declaring the respective rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the heating, ventilating and air conditioning of a certain retail mall, and for related damages and injunctive relief, the plaintiff appeals (1) as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Smith, J.), dated March 22, 1991, as conditioned the granting of its motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from discontinuing
Ordered that the appeal and cross appeal from the order dated March 22, 1991, are dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the amended order dated April 3, 1991, and it is further,
Ordered that the amended order dated April 3, 1991 is modified, as a matter of discretion, by (1) deleting the provision thereof requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant arrears in the sum of $218,291.62, and substituting a provision requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of $159,250 representing alleged arrears, (2) deleting the provision thereof requiring the plaintiff to continue to pay the defendant $39,395.83 per month for heating, ventilating, and air conditioning services and substituting therefor a provision requiring the plaintiff to continue making such payments at the rate of $31,000, per month, and (3) deleting the provision thereof requiring the plaintiff to post an undertaking in the amount of $200,000 and substituting therefor a provision requiring the plaintiff to post an undertaking in the amount of $500,000; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated April 15, 1991, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument.
The imposition of reasonable conditions on the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a necessary and incidental power of the courts (see, Town of E. Hampton v Buffa, 157 AD2d 714, 716; Paddock Const. v Automated Swimpools, 130 AD2d 894; see also, 12 Carmody-Wait 2d, Injunctions, § 78:76). A review of the record reveals that continued payments by the plaintiff
We find that the trial court correctly denied the defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint based upon the Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-701) and General Obligations Law § 15-301 (1), with leave to the defendant to reassert that claim as an affirmative defense. Lawrence, J. P., Miller, Ritter and Copertino, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.