People v. Evans
Opinion of the Court
— Appeal by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rienzi, J.), rendered October 22, 1990, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, under Indictment No. 16015/89, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2) an amended judgment of the same court also rendered October 22, 1990, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court (Maraño, J.), upon a finding that he had violated a condition thereof, under Indictment No. 519/89, upon his admission, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon his prior conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
Ordered that the judgment and amended judgment are affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance since he was found in close proximity to a large quantity of narcotics under circumstances evincing an intent to unlawfully mix, compound, package, or otherwise prepare them for sale (Penal Law § 220.25 [2]).
The testimony adduced at trial established that the defen
The element of "close proximity” under Penal Law § 220.25 (2) does not require that the defendant be found in the same room as the narcotics (see, People v Garcia, 156 AD2d 710). Rather, the jury is permitted to employ the statutory presumption where, as here, the defendant is present at the place of discovery of the narcotics (see, People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624). The defendant failed to properly preserve his contention that the police testimony offered in support of the statutory presumption was incredible as a matter of law (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858; People v Valerio, 167 AD2d 439). In any event, we find that upon review of the record, there is no basis to reject the police testimony as being incredible as a matter of law. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]).
We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Eiber, J. P., Ritter, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.