Bienstock v. Zoning Board of Appeals
Opinion of the Court
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of East Hampton, dated April 10, 1990, which, inter alia, denied the petitioners’ application for an area variance and a Natural Resources Special Permit to build a swimming pool, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Leis, J.), dated October 3, 1990, which dismissed the proceeding.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The petitioners own a parcel of waterfront property in the Town of East Hampton which is presently improved by a one-family residence. They filed an application with the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of East Hampton (hereinafter the Zoning Board) for an area variance and a Natural Resources Special Permit to build a swimming pool on their property. The Zoning Board denied the application after finding that the petitioners had not established practical difficulties or special and unique circumstances warranting the granting of a variance, and that they had not met the standards necessary for the issuance of a Natural Resources Special Permit. Contrary to the petitioners’ assertions, the Zoning Board’s determination was not arbitrary and capricious and was supported by the record.
It is well settled that local zoning boards have discretion in considering applications for variances and that judicial review is limited to determining whether the action taken by the board is illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion (see, Matter of Malhotra v Town of Brookhaven, 185 AD2d 817; Matter of Fuhst v Foley, 45 NY2d 441, 444). The Zoning Board’s determination will ordinarily be sustained if the determination has a rational basis. It is incumbent upon an applicant for an area variance to demonstrate that " 'strict compliance with the zoning ordinance will result in practical difficulties’ ” (Matter of Fuhst v Foley, supra, at 445, citing Conley v Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 40 NY2d 309). While there is no precise definition of the term "practical difficulties”, in general, the "petitioner must show that as a practical matter he cannot utilize his property or a structure located thereon 'without coming into conflict with certain of the restrictions of the zoning ordinance’ ” (Matter of Fuhst v Foley, supra, at 445, quoting from 3 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, ch 45, § 1 [4th ed]; Matter of Grace v Palermo, 182 AD2d 820).
The petitioners may continue to use the dwelling on their
In light of our determination, the petitioners’ assertion concerning the adequacy of the reasons for the denial of the Natural Resources Special Permit is academic. We note, in any event, that the applicants failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the relevant standards enunciated in the Town of East Hampton Code § 153-5-40 could be complied with (see, Matter of Dausey v Kelley, 137 AD2d 686). Therefore, the record supports the denial of that permit. Thompson, J. P., Eiber, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.