Young & Rubicam L.P. v. Gramercy Court Associates
Opinion of the Court
— Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Myriam J. Altman, J.), entered June 12, 1992, granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and awarding them damages of $823,780.99, inclusive of interest and costs and disbursements, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the motion denied, without costs or disbursements.
The landlord (defendants) rebuilt and renovated an office building, which was to be entirely occupied by the tenant (plaintiffs). In accordance with the lease, the tenant was to be responsible for construction costs over $8,450,000 in the work required for its space (tenant work) while the landlord would be responsible for the costs of the work on the structural parts of the building unrelated to tenant space requirements (core
During the pendency of the lien foreclosure proceeding, the landlord and tenant agreed to a close-out agreement, dated November 12, 1987, which provided, inter alia, that the tenant had paid $530,596.82
The landlord contends that after execution of the close-out agreement it repeatedly sought the tenant’s approval to negotiate a settlement with East End. Insisting that East End’s claim was inflated and that in no event was its claim for tenant work worth more than $72,000, the tenant refused to authorize any settlement, even a settlement for core work, unless it were first determined that the tenant’s share for tenant work would not exceed $72,000. After the lien foreclo
The tenant thereafter commenced this action, alleging breach of contract and seeking refund of the $520,990. After joinder of issue, the tenant was awarded summary judgment, the IAS Court finding that the landlord had breached the close-out agreement by failing to obtain the tenant’s consent before settling the East End claim and ordering the landlord to return the entire $520,990. The court also found, as a matter of law, that it was sheer speculation to argue, as the landlord does, that the tenant would not have given its consent to the settlement, had it been sought. We reverse.
The close-out agreement clearly provided that any determination as to each party’s allocable share of the amount due East End was to be postponed until after such amount was judicially determined or fixed by settlement. The tenant did not have the right, as allegedly it asserted it had, to withhold approval of any settlement that would obligate it to pay more than $72,000; the close-out agreement implicitly imposed upon the parties the obligation to negotiate in good faith. (See, Smith v United Traction & Elec. Co., 49 App Div 641, affd 168 NY 597; A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium v I.M.C. Chem. Group, 873 F2d 155, 158.) Notably, the tenant has not responded to the landlord’s factual assertions in this regard. Inasmuch as the landlord was faced with exposure to East End’s entire claim of $1,314,492.43 plus interest, the tenant’s approval to any settlement could not unreasonably be withheld. Since the tenant had allegedly asserted a veto power over any settlement negotiations except on its terms, namely, a $72,000 cap on its allocable share of any settlement, a question of fact is presented as to whether the tenant acted in bad faith, thereby breaching the contract and waiving its right to require the landlord to seek the tenant’s consent. (See, Marquette Co. v Norcem, Inc., 114 AD2d 738, 739.)
Since there are unresolved issues of fact, the motion for
Although the amount specified in agreement is $530,596.82, the actual amount was apparently $520,990.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.