Forest View Nursing Home v. Perales
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Bradley, J.), entered July 8, 1992 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent that petitioner is collaterally estopped from relitigating issues relating to its Medicaid reimbursement rate.
Petitioner, the operator of a residential health care facility located in Queens County, filed administrative appeals (hereinafter the current rate appeal) following the issuance of two final audit reports concerning petitioner’s Medicaid reimbursement rate, the first audit covering the 1975 through 1979 rate years and the second audit covering the 1981 rate year. Petitioner contended, inter alia, that the real property historical costs used in the audits were inaccurate. Respondent’s designee determined that petitioner’s real property historical costs had been finally determined during a prior audit conducted by the Department of Health (hereinafter DOH) and, therefore, petitioner was barred from relitigating the issue by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner contends that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was wrongly invoked because two key elements of the doctrine, identicality of issues and full and fair opportunity to litigate (see, Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500-501), are absent. Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument and dismissed the petition, resulting in this appeal by petitioner.
When the reports of the audit were subsequently issued, petitioner initiated an administrative appeal and argued, inter alia, that the land cost found by the auditor was insufficient to reflect the fair market value of the land at the time of the creation of the facility. Petitioner’s argument was rejected on the ground that no documentation had been submitted to support its position. Petitioner elected not to proceed any further with the administrative review process.
In the current rate appeal, petitioner submitted evidence relevant to the fair market value of the land at the time the facility was constructed and argued that it was not being allowed the fair market value of the land as a component of its Medicaid reimbursement rates. According to petitioner, its entitlement to use the fair market value of the land was established by DOH in the prior rate appeal, but the prior audit did not use fair market value because no documentation was then available and no appraisal was performed. Petitioner concludes, therefore, that the issue of fair market value was never decided and that, in any event, it never had the opportunity to litigate the issue. We disagree.
To establish the requisite identity of issue, there must be an identity between the particular matter in the second proceeding and that presented in the first proceeding, and it must be shown that this identical issue was necessarily decided in the first proceeding and is conclusive in the subsequent proceeding (D’Arata v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 NY2d 659, 666). For a question to have been actually litigated, so as to satisfy the required identity of issues, it must have been properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise placed in issue and actually determined in the prior proceeding (Halyalkar v Board of Regents, 72 NY2d 261, 268).
As to the full and fair opportunity to litigate, petitioner raised the fair market value of issue on its appeal of the prior audit to the Bureau, and it is undisputed that further administrative review of Bureau’s decision was available. Petitioner asserts a number of vague claims concerning its incentive to appeal, the interrelationship of the prior audit and the prior rate appeal, and new evidence, but we find these claims insufficient to meet petitioner’s burden to establish the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding (see, Ryan v New York Tel. Co., supra). Supreme Court correctly dismissed the petition and its judgment should therefore be affirmed.
Weiss, P. J., Levine, Mercure and Mahoney, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.