Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Myerson & Kuhn
Opinion of the Court
—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Beverly Cohen, J.), entered on August 14, 1992, which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint (CPLR 3213), is unanimously reversed, on the law, and the motion is granted, with costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $488,541.65 plus interest, and for costs and disbursements of this action including attorneys’ fees.
Plaintiff-appellant Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. seeks a judgment in lieu of complaint (CPLR 3213) on a note guaranteed by defendant-respondent Harvey Myerson.
The motion court denied plaintiff’s summary judgment motion holding that the note and guarantee are not "instruments for the payment of money only” because the note and guarantee refer to the settlement agreement for the definition of "default.”
The default here is entirely monetary. To the extent that the promissory note refers to the settlement agreement for definition of "default,” the definition for which referral is necessitated is that Myerson & Kuhn "fails to pay any amount when due as provided in paragraph 1.”
While we have on occasion denied a plaintiff the benefit of the expedited procedure set forth in CPLR 3213 on the ground that reference beyond the four corners of the instrument was necessary in order to comprehend fully the nature of the obligation to be enforced and thus raised a question as to whether the instrument was in fact one "for the payment of money only”, where, as here, the referenced matter is merely repetitive of terms already contained within the instrument and does not alter the purely monetary nature of the obliga
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.