Iannarone v. Faucetta
Opinion of the Court
—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCaffrey, J.), dated June 30, 1992, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and granted the plaintiffs cross motion for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint naming an additional defendant.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted, and the plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint naming an additional defendant to the action is denied.
On March 14, 1988, the plaintiff was injured when she walked into a glass door which had recently been installed in an office building in Oceanside. Approximately two and one-half years later, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant Peter Faucetta, alleging that he was the owner of the premises, and that he had been negligent, inter alia, in failing to place warning markings on the glass door. However, after Faucetta’s deposition was taken in December 1991 it became apparent that the premises was actually owned by the F & F Realty Co., a partnership in which Faucetta was a member. Thereafter, in February 1992 the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that Workers’ Compensation was the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy because he was president of the company which employed her at the time of her accident. The plaintiff responded by cross-moving, nearly one year after expiration of the Statute of Limitations, for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint naming F & F Realty as an additional defendant. The Supreme Court granted the cross motion, reasoning that jurisdiction was timely acquired over the partnership F & F Realty pursuant to CPLR 203 (b) because it was united in interest with the individual defendant Faucetta. The court further denied Faucetta’s motion for summary judgment. We now reverse.
In Brock v Bua (83 AD2d 61), this Court set forth a three prong test for determining whether the statutory relation-back remedy is operative as an exception to the Statute of Limitations. The three prong test "examines whether: (1) both
We further find that the Supreme Court erred in denying the defendant Faucetta’s motion for summary judgment, since, as president of the corporation which employed the plaintiff at the time of her accident, he was the plaintiffs coemployee. The plaintiff’s exclusive remedy against Faucetta is therefore limited to the Workers’ Compensation benefits she received following the accident (see, Heritage v Van Patten, 59 NY2d 1017; Amelco v Berk, 199 AD2d 448; Druiett v Brenner, 193 AD2d 644). Balletta, J. P., Copertino, Hart and Krausman, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.