Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1996

Sloan v. Village of Hempstead

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York · Decided January 22, 1996

223 A.D.2d 632; 636 N.Y.S.2d 852; 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 443

Cases that cite this one

9 later published cases cite this decision.

Ovisinak v. Town of Southold (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
Brooks v. Village of Babylon (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
Ravina v. Incorporated Town of Greenburgh (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
Monopoli v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
Frullo v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
Cattani v. Inc. Village of Ocean Beach (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
Hirsch v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1997)
Godesky v. First Unum Life Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1997)
Fiedler v. Incorporated Village of Massapequa Park (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1997)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Village of Hempstead appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.), dated December 21, 1994, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as it is asserted against the appellant, and the cross claims asserted against the appellant are dismissed.

On October 28, 1991, the plaintiff tripped and fell on an allegedly dangerous public sidewalk in the Village of Hemp-stead. The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the Village and the abutting landowner. The Village *633thereafter moved for summary judgment, contending that it had not received prior written notice of the allegedly defective condition as required by Village Law § 6-628. The plaintiff did not dispute that the Village had received no written notice of the alleged defect, but instead contended, in an affirmation by her attorney, that written notice was not required because the Village had created the defective condition by removing a nearby tree.

.Summary judgment should have been awarded to the Village. Pursuant to Village Law § 6-628, prior written notice is a condition precedent to maintaining an action against the Village arising from a sidewalk defect (see, Tyschak v Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, 193 AD2d 670; Mollahan v Village of Port Washington, N., 153 AD2d 881). While no prior written notice of defect is necessary where there is an affirmative act of negligence (see, Marona v Incorporated Vil. of Mamaroneck, 203 AD2d 337; Tyschak v Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, supra), the plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegation that the Village created the defective condition, made in the affirmation of her attorney, who had no personal knowledge of the facts, was insufficient to defeat the Village’s motion (see, Tyschak v Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, supra; Dabbs v City of Peekskill, 178 AD2d 577; West v Village of Mamaroneck, 172 AD2d 827). Thompson, J. P., Sullivan, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.