In re the Estate of McCann
Cases that cite this one
16 later published cases cite this decision.
- In re Morris (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- In re the Estate of Middagh (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
- Matter of Hart (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2025)
- Pekofsky v. Estate of Cohen (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
- Matter of Cincotta (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Lancer Indemnity Co. v. JKH Realty Group, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- MatterofBenware (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- In re the Estate of Benware (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- In re the Estate of Benware (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- In re the Estate of McNeil (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- In re Thompson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- In re the Estate of Jakobson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- In re the Estate of Kouri (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
- In re the Estate of Labua (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
- In re the Estate of Murphy (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
- In re the Estate of Gottschen (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
—In a proceeding to fix attorneys fees pursuant to SCPA 2110, the appeal is from an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County (Prudenti, S.), dated September 27, 1995, which fixed the legal fees of the attorneys for the estate in an amount less than requested.
It is well settled that the Surrogate "bears the ultimate responsibility to decide what constitutes reasonable legal compensation” in estate matters (Matter of Verplanck, 151 AD2d 767). This is so regardless of whether there was an agreement by the parties concerning legal fees (see, Matter of Verplanck, supra; Matter of Phelan, 173 AD2d 621).
In determining what constitutes reasonable compensation for an attorney’s services, the court should consider the time spent, the difficulties involved in the matter, the nature of the services, the amount involved, the professional standing of counsel, and the results obtained (see, Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1, 9; Matter of Bobeck, 196 AD2d 496; Matter of Potts, 213 App Div 59, affd 241 NY 593). The court is not "obliged to accept at face value an attorney’s summary of the hours expended” (Matter of Bobeck, supra, at 497), and the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rests on the attorney (see, Matter of Potts, supra). The determination of what constitutes reasonable fees is a matter "within the sound discretion of the Surrogate, who is in a superior position to judge factors such as the time, eifort and skills required” (Matter of Papadogiannis, 196 AD2d 871, 872; see, Matter of Jones, 168 AD2d 448, 449).
Contrary to the appellants’ claims, the record establishes that the court examined the relevant factors in reaching its determination of what constituted reasonable fees, and there is no basis for this Court to disturb that determination.
We have reviewed the appellants’ remaining contentions and find that they are without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Joy, Florio, and McGinity, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.