Omni Partners, L.P. v. County of Nassau
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Silvercup Studios, Inc. v. Power Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- UPROSE v. Power Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Riverhead Business Improvement District Management Ass'n v. Stark (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
- S.P.A.C.E. v. Hurley (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Village of Tarrytown v. Planning Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Miranda Holdings, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Town of Orchard Park (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Prand Corp. v. Town Board of Town of East Hampton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
- Barrett v. Dutchess County Legislature (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Matter of Stop Polluting Orleans County v. Crotty (New York Supreme Court, Albany County 2004)
- Spitzer v. Farrell (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Munash v. Town Board of the Town of East Hampton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Coalition for Future of Stony Brook Village v. Reilly (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- Fisher v. Giuliani (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2001)
- Citizens Concerned for the Harlem Valley Environment v. Town Board of Amenia (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In a hybrid action for a judgment declaring Nassau County Ordinance Nos. 76-1996 and 77-1996 null and void, and a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Nassau County Planning Commission, dated April 18, 1996, issuing a negative declaration pursuant
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by adding thereto a provision directing the Nassau County Planning Commission to issue a positive declaration and remitting the matter to the Nassau County Planning Commission for the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs to the petitioner.
The subject of this action/proceeding is a 67-acre parcel of property located in Nassau County (hereinafter the County), known as the Mitchel Park Athletic Complex (hereinafter Mitchel Park). In November 1994, the County proposed a project to replace, redesign, and reconstruct the athletic facilities at Mitchel Park. Although the project was initially designated as an "unlisted action” for which a full environmental assessment form (hereinafter EAF) was not required, (see, 6 NYCRR 617.2 [ak]; 617.6 [a] [3]), the County nevertheless prepared a full EAF. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the project is a "Type I” action, a finding which is not challenged on appeal since the County had already prepared the full EAF required for a "Type I” action (see, 6 NYCRR 617.4, 617.6 [a] [2]).
In performing its review of the project pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA), the Nassau County Planning Commission (hereinafter the Planning Commission) reviewed the EAF and issued a "negative declaration”, finding that the project would have no significant environmental impact, and recommended that no further environmental review or action be required (see, 6 NYCRR
The primary purpose of SEQRA is " 'to inject environmental considerations directly into governmental decision making’ ” (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 569, quoting Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d 674, 679). To this end, SEQRA mandates the preparation of an EIS when a proposed project "may have a significant effect on the environment” (ECL 8-0109 [2]). Because the operative word triggering the requirement of an EIS is "may”, there is a relatively low threshold for the preparation of an EIS (see, Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382, 397; Matter of West Branch Conservation Assn. v Planning Bd., 207 AD2d 837, 838-839; Matter of Merson v McNally, 227 AD2d 487). Further, SEQRA regulations provide that a Type I action, such as the one proposed herein, "carries with it the presumption that it is likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and may require an EIS” (6 NYCRR 617.4 [a] [1]; see, Matter of Merson v McNally, supra). An EIS is required if the action may include the potential for even one significant adverse environmental impact (see, 6 NYCRR 617.7 [a] [1]).
In this case, a review of the EAF reveals several areas of possible significant environmental impact in connection with the proposed project. These include a potential effect on air quality, traffic conditions, water use, sewage, and drainage. Thus, the Planning Commission should have issued a positive declaration and required the preparation of an EIS (see, Matter of West Branch Conservation Assn. v Planning Bd., supra, at 841). To confirm the negative declaration in this case would permit the circumvention of SEQRA’s comprehensive review process (see, Matter of Merson v McNally, supra). Consequently, we conclude that the Planning Commission’s determination was not made in accordance with lawful procedure and was arbitrary, capricious, and irrational (see, Akpan v Koch, supra, at 570; Matter of Merson v McNally, supra). The Supreme Court properly annulled the determination and declared Nassau
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.